FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS ***do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries*** FOREIGN AFFAIRS ***can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*** The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

By Nikita S. Khrushchev

I have been told that the question of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is uppermost today in the minds of many Americans—and not only Americans. The question of coexistence, particularly in our day, interests literally every man and woman on the globe.

We all of us well know that tremendous changes have taken place in the world. Gone, indeed, are the days when it took weeks to cross the ocean from one continent to the other or when a trip from Europe to America, or from Asia to Africa, seemed a very complicated undertaking. The progress of modern technology has reduced our planet to a rather small place; it has even become, in this sense, quite congested. And if in our daily life it is a matter of considerable importance to establish normal relations with our neighbors in a densely inhabited settlement, this is so much the more necessary in the relations between states, in particular states belonging to different social systems.

You may like your neighbor or dislike him. You are not obliged to be friends with him or visit him. But you live side by side, and what can you do if neither you nor he has any desire to quit the old home and move to another town? All the more so in relations between states. It would be unreasonable to assume that you can make it so hot for your undesirable neighbor that he will decide to move to Mars or Venus. And vice versa, of course.

What, then, remains to be done? There may be two ways out: either war—and war in the rocket and H-bomb age is fraught with the most dire consequences for all nations—or peaceful coexistence. Whether you like your neighbor or not, nothing can be done about it, you have to find some way of getting on with him, for you both live on one and the same planet.

But the very concept of peaceful coexistence, it is said, by its alleged complexity frightens certain people who have become

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unaccustomed to trusting their neighbors and who see a double bottom in each suitcase. People of this kind, on hearing the word "coexistence," begin to play around with it in one way and another, sizing it up and applying various yardsticks to it. Isn't it a fraud? Isn't it a trap? Does not coexistence signify the division of the world into areas separated by high fences, which do not communicate with each other? And what is going to happen behind those fences?

The more such questions are piled up artificially by the cold-war mongers, the more difficult it is for the ordinary man to make head or tail of them. It would therefore be timely to rid the essence of this question of all superfluous elements and to attempt to look soberly at the most pressing problem of our day—the problem of peaceful competition.

II

One does not need to delve deeply into history to appreciate how important it is for mankind to ensure peaceful coexistence. And here it may be said parenthetically that the Europeans might have benefited a great deal in their day if, instead of organizing senseless crusades which invariably ended in failure, they had established peaceful relations with the differently-minded peoples of the Moslem East.

But let us turn to facts concerning the relatively recent past when the watershed between states no longer consisted of different religious creeds and customs, but of much deeper differences of principle relating to the choice of social systems. This new situation arose on the threshold of the 1920s when, to the booming of the guns of the Russian cruiser *Aurora* which had joined the rebellious workers and peasants, a new and unprecedented social system, a state of workers and peasants, came into the world.

Its appearance was met with the disgruntled outcries of those who naïvely believed the capitalist system to be eternal and immutable. Some people even made an attempt to strangle the unwanted infant in the cradle. Everybody knows how this ended: our people voted with their arms for Soviet power, and it came to stay. And even then, in 1920, V. I. Lenin, replying to the question of an American correspondent as to what basis there could be for peace between Soviet Russia and America, said: "Let the American imperialists not touch us. We won't touch them."

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From its very inception the Soviet state proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its foreign policy. It was no accident that the very first state act of the Soviet power was the decree on peace, the decree on the cessation of the bloody war.

What, then, is the policy of peaceful coexistence?

In its simplest expression it signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues. However, this does not cover the entire concept of peaceful coexistence. Apart from the commitment to non-aggression, it also presupposes an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretext whatsoever. The principle of peaceful coexistence signifies a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of government or mode of life or for any other motives. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence also presupposes that political and economic relations between countries are to be based upon complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit.

It is often said in the West that peaceful coexistence is nothing else than a tactical method of the socialist states. There is not a grain of truth in such allegations. Our desire for peace and peaceful coexistence is not conditioned by any time-serving or tactical considerations. It springs from the very nature of socialist society in which there are no classes or social groups interested in profiting by war or seizing and enslaving other people's territories. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, thanks to their socialist system, have an unlimited home market and for this reason they have no need to pursue an expansionist policy of conquest and an effort to subordinate other countries to their influence.

It is the people who determine the destinies of the socialist states. The socialist states are ruled by the working people themselves, the workers and peasants, the people who themselves create all the material and spiritual values of society. And people of labor cannot want war. For to them war spells grief and tears, death, devastation and misery. Ordinary people have no need for war.

Contrary to what certain propagandists hostile to us say, the coexistence of states with different social systems does not mean that they will only fence themselves off from one another by a high wall and undertake the mutual obligation not to throw

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stones over the wall or pour dirt upon each other. No! Peaceful coexistence does not mean merely living side by side in the absence of war but with the constantly remaining threat of its breaking out in the future. *Peaceful coexistence can and should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying man's needs in the best possible way.*

We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us try out in practice whose system is better, let us compete without war. This is much better than competing in who will produce more arms and who will smash whom. We stand and always will stand for such competition as will help to raise the well-being of the people to a higher level.

The principle of peaceful competition does not at all demand that one or another state abandon the system and ideology adopted by it. It goes without saying that the acceptance of this principle cannot lead to the immediate end of disputes and contradictions which are inevitable between countries adhering to different social systems. But the main thing is ensured: the states which decided to adopt the path of peaceful coexistence repudiate the use of force in any form and agree on a peaceful settlement of possible disputes and conflicts, bearing in mind the mutual interests of the parties concerned. In our age of the H-bomb and atomic techniques this is the main thing of interest to every man.

Displaying skepticism about the idea of peaceful competition, Vice President Nixon, in his speech over the Soviet radio and television in August 1959, attempted to find a contradiction between the Soviet people's professions of their readiness to coexist peacefully with the capitalist states and the slogans posted in the shops of our factories calling for higher labor productivity in order to ensure the speediest victory of Communism.

This was not the first time we heard representatives of the bourgeois countries reason in this manner. They say: The Soviet leaders argue that they are for peaceful coexistence. At the same time they declare that they are fighting for Communism and they even say that Communism will be victorious in all countries. How can there be peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union if it fights for Communism?

People who treat the question in this way confuse matters, wilfully or not, by confusing the problems of ideological struggle with the question of relations between states. Those indulging in this sort of confusion are most probably guided by a desire to cast

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aspersions upon the Communists of the Soviet Union and to represent them as the advocates of aggressive actions. This, however, is very unwise.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its Twentieth Congress made it perfectly clear and obvious that the allegations that the Soviet Union intends to overthrow capitalism in other countries by means of "exporting" revolution are absolutely unfounded. I cannot refrain from reminding you of my words at the Twentieth Congress: "It goes without saying that among us Communists there are no adherents of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists. Romain Rolland was right when he said that 'freedom is not brought in from abroad in baggage trains like Bourbons.' It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order."

We Communists believe that the idea of Communism will ultimately be victorious throughout the world, just as it has been victorious in our country, in China and in many other states. Many readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS will probably disagree with us. Perhaps they think that the idea of capitalism will ultimately triumph. It is their right to think so. We may argue, we may disagree with one another. *The main thing is to keep to the positions of ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is right.* The point is that with military techniques what they are today, there are no inaccessible places in the world. Should a world war break out, no country will be able to shut itself off from a crushing blow.

We believe that ultimately that system will be victorious on the globe which will offer the nations greater opportunities for improving their material and spiritual life. It is precisely socialism that creates unprecedentedly great prospects for the inexhaustible creative enthusiasm of the masses, for a genuine flourishing of science and culture, for the realization of man's dream of a happy life, a life without destitute and unemployed people, of a happy childhood and tranquil old age, of the realization of the most audacious and ambitious human projects, of man's right to create in a truly free manner in the interests of the people.

But when we say that in the competition between the two systems, the capitalist and the socialist, our system will win, this does not mean, of course, that we shall achieve victory by interfering in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. Our confi-

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dence in the victory of Communism is of a different kind. It is based on a knowledge of the laws governing the development of society. Just as in its time capitalism, as the more progressive system, took the place of feudalism, so will capitalism be inevitably superseded by Communism—the more progressive and more equitable social system. We are confident of the victory of the socialist system because it is a more progressive system than the capitalist system. Soviet power has been in existence for only a little more than 40 years, and during these years we have gone through two of the worst wars, repulsing the attacks of enemies who attempted to strangle us. Capitalism in the United States has been in existence for more than a century and a half, and the history of the United States has developed in such a way that never once have enemies landed on American territory.

Yet the dynamics of the development of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are such that the 42-year-old land of the Soviets is already able to challenge the 150-year-old capitalist state to economic competition; and the most farsighted American leaders are admitting that the Soviet Union is fast catching up with the United States and will ultimately outstrip it. Watching the progress of this competition, anyone can judge which is the better system, and we believe that in the long run all the peoples will embark on the path of struggle for the building of socialist societies.

You disagree with us? Prove by facts that your system is superior and more efficacious, that it is capable of ensuring a higher degree of prosperity for the people than the socialist system, that under capitalism man can be happier than under socialism. It is impossible to prove this. I have no other explanation for the fact that talk of violently "rolling back" Communism never ceases in the West. Not long ago the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives deemed it proper to pass a resolution calling for the "liberation" of the socialist countries allegedly enslaved by Communism and, moreover, of a number of union republics constituting part of the Soviet Union. The authors of the resolution call for the "liberation" of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even a certain "Ural Area."

I would not be telling the full truth if I did not say that the adoption of this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation. Personally I agree with this appraisal.

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It would be interesting to see, incidentally, how the authors of this resolution would have reacted if the parliament of Mexico, for instance, had passed a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona and California be "liberated from American slavery." Apparently they have never pondered such a question, which is very regrettable. Sometimes comparisons help to understand the essence of a matter.

Travelling through the Soviet Union, leading American statesmen and public figures have had full opportunity to convince themselves that there is no hope of sowing strife between the Soviet people and the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and of influencing them to rebel against Communism. How, then, are we to explain the unceasing attempts to revive the policy of "rolling back" Communism? What do they have in mind? Armed intervention in the internal affairs of the socialist countries? But in the West as well as in the East people are fully aware that under the conditions of modern military technique such actions are fraught with immediate and relentless retaliation.

So we come back to what we started with. In our day there are only two ways: peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third choice.

III

The problem of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems has become particularly pressing in view of the fact that since the Second World War the development of relations between states has entered a new stage, that now we have approached a period in the life of mankind when there is a real chance of excluding war once and for all from the life of society. The new alignment of international forces which has developed since the Second World War offers ground for the assertion that a new world war is no longer a fatal inevitability, that it can be averted.

First, today not only all the socialist states, but many countries in Asia and Africa which have embarked upon the road of independent national statehood, and many other states outside the aggressive military groupings, are actively fighting for peace.

Secondly, the peace policy enjoys the powerful support of the broad masses of the people all over the world.

Thirdly, the peaceful socialist states are in possession of very

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potent material means, which cannot but have a deterring effect upon the aggressors.

Prior to the Second World War the U.S.S.R. was the only socialist country, with not more than 17 percent of the territory, 3 percent of the population, and about 10 percent of the output of the world. At present, the socialist countries cover about one-fourth of the territory of the globe, have one-third of its population, and their industrial output accounts for about one-third of the total world output.

This is precisely the explanation of the indisputable fact that throughout the past years, hotbeds of war breaking out now in one and now in another part of the globe—in the Near East and in Europe, in the Far East and in Southeast Asia—have been extinguished at the very outset.

What does the future hold in store for us?

As a result of the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the present Seven Year Plan of economic development of the U.S.S.R., as well as of the plans of the other socialist countries of Europe and Asia, the countries of the socialist system will then account for a little more than half of the world output. Their economic power will grow immeasurably, and this will help to an even greater extent to consolidate world peace: the material might and moral influence of the peace-loving states will be so great that any bellicose militarist will have to think ten times before risking going to war. It is the good fortune of mankind that a community of socialist states which are not interested in new war has been set up, because to build socialism and Communism the socialist countries need peace. Today the community of socialist countries which has sprung up on the basis of complete equality holds such a position in the development of all branches of economy, science and culture as to be able to exert an influence towards preventing the outbreak of new world wars.

Hence we are already in a practical sense near to that stage in the life of humanity when nothing will prevent people from devoting themselves wholly to peaceful labor, when war will be wholly excluded from the life of society.

But if we say that there is no fatal inevitability of war at present, this by no means signifies that we can rest on our laurels, fold our arms and bask in the sun in the hope that an end has been put to wars once and for all. Those in the West who believe that war is to their benefit have not yet abandoned their schemes.

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They control considerable material forces, as well as military and political levers, and there is no guarantee that some tragic day they will not attempt to set them in motion. That is why it is so much the more necessary to continue an active struggle in order that the policy of peaceful coexistence may triumph throughout the world not in words but in deeds.

Of much importance, of course, is the fact that this policy has in our day merited not only the widest moral approval but also international legal recognition. The countries of the socialist camp in their relations with the capitalist states are guided precisely by this policy. The principles of peaceful coexistence are reflected in the decisions of the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries. Furthermore, many countries of Europe, Asia and Africa have solemnly proclaimed this principle as the basis of their foreign policy. Finally, the idea of peaceful coexistence has found unanimous support in the decisions of the twelfth and thirteenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

In our view, peaceful coexistence can become lasting only if the good declarations in favor of peace are supported by active measures on the part of the governments and peoples of all countries. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has already done a good deal in this respect, and I am able to share some experiences with you.

As far back as March 12, 1951, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a "Law on the Defense of Peace," stating:

(1) Propaganda for war, in whatever form it may be conducted, undermines the cause of peace, creates the menace of a new war and therefore constitutes the gravest crime against humanity.

(2) Persons guilty of war propaganda should be brought to court and tried as heinous criminals.

Further, the Soviet Union has in recent years unilaterally reduced its armed forces by more than 2,000,000 men. The funds released as a result have been used to develop the economy and further raise the material and cultural living standards of the Soviet people.

The Soviet Union has liquidated its bases on the territories of other states.

The Soviet Union unilaterally discontinued the tests of atomic weapons and refrained from conducting them further until it became finally clear that the Western powers refused to follow our example and were continuing the explosions.

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The Soviet Union has repeatedly submitted detailed and perfectly realistic proposals for disarmament, meeting the positions of the Western powers halfway. But to solve the disarmament problem it is necessary for our Western partners to agree and desire to meet us halfway too. This is just what is lacking.

When it became clear that it was very difficult under these conditions to solve the complex disarmament problem immediately, we proposed another concrete idea to our partners: Let us concentrate our attention on those problems which lend themselves most easily to a solution. Let us undertake initial partial steps on matters concerning which the views of the different parties have been brought closer together.

It is perfectly clear that one of these questions today is the question of discontinuing atomic and hydrogen weapon tests. The progress achieved in this matter justifies the hope that an agreement on the discontinuation of nuclear weapon tests will shortly be reached. Implementation of this measure will, of course, be an important step on the way to the solution of the disarmament problem and the banning of nuclear weapons in general.

Attributing much importance to contacts and intercourse between statesmen of all countries, the Soviet Government a few years ago proposed that an East-West heads of government conference be convened in order to come to terms—taking into account present-day realities and guided by the spirit of mutual understanding—on concrete measures, the realization of which would help to relax international tension.

We also proposed that this conference consider those international questions for the settlement of which realistic prerequisites already existed. As a first step toward such a settlement, we proposed to the powers concerned that a peace treaty be concluded with Germany and that West Berlin be granted the status of a demilitarized free city. I want to emphasize particularly that we were guided primarily by the desire to put a final end to the aftermath of the Second World War. We regard the liquidation of the consequences of the Second World War and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states—the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic—as the question of questions.

Indeed, 14 years have already passed since the war ended, but the German people are still without a peace treaty. The delay has

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afforded wide scope for renewed activities of the West German militarists and revanchists. They have already proclaimed their aggressive plans, laying claim, for instance, to lands in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Of course, the German revanchists are thinking not only of a march to the East; they also know the way to the West. In the Second World War the Hitlerites occupied Western Europe before advancing against the Soviet Union.

Will the direction chosen by the modern German revanchists for their aggression be any consolation to the peoples of Europe if a global war breaks out on that continent? The lessons of history should not be ignored. To do so often ends in tragedy.

Some say: The Soviet people are unduly sensitive. Can one assume that Western Germany is now in a position to precipitate another world war? Those who put the question thus forget that Western Germany is at present acting in the world arena not alone but within the military North Atlantic bloc. She plays a paramount role in this bloc. And more than that, life has shown that the North Atlantic Alliance is being gradually converted into an instrument of the German militarists, which makes it easier for them to carry out aggressive plans. It is not at all impossible, therefore, that Western Germany, taking advantage of her position in the North Atlantic Alliance, might provoke hostilities in order to draw her allies into it and plunge the whole world into the chasm of a devastating war.

All this indicates how timely and realistic are the proposals of the Soviet Government for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and for bringing the situation in West Berlin back to normal.

And yet, some of the Western opponents of the Soviet proposals say that if the Soviet Union really stands for peaceful coexistence it should even be asked to commit itself to the preservation of the existing status quo. Others argue that if the Western powers agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states that would amount to a retreat on their part, and the Soviet Union should make some compensation for this "retreat."

There are no grounds whatever for these assertions, in our opinion. The task before us is to do away with the aftermath of the Second World War and to conclude a peace treaty. And any possibility of someone gaining and others losing, of someone acquiring and others making concessions, is out of the question

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here. All the parties concerned acquire a stronger foundation for the maintenance of peace in Europe and throughout the world in the shape of a peace treaty. Does this not accord with the interests of all the peoples?

At times, and of late especially, some spokesmen in the West have gone so far as to say that the abolition of the aftermath of the Second World War is a step which would allegedly intensify rather than ease international tension. It is hard to believe that there are no secret designs behind allegations of this kind, especially when attempts are made to present in a distorted light the policy of the U.S.S.R., which is intended to secure a lasting and stable peace, by alleging that it all but leads to war. It seems to us, on the contrary, that the Soviet position on the German question corresponds most of all to the present-day reality.

It now seems that no sober-minded leader in the West is inclined any longer to advance the unrealistic demand for the so-called reunion of Germany before the conclusion of a peace treaty, in as much as more and more political leaders are becoming aware of the fact that reunion in the conditions now obtaining is a process which depends upon the Germans themselves and not upon any outside interference. We should start from the obvious fact that two German states exist, and that the Germans themselves must decide how they want to live. In as much as these two states, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, do exist, the peace treaty should be concluded with them, because any further delay and postponement of this exceptionally important act tends not only to sustain the abnormal situation in Europe but also to aggravate it still further.

As for Germany's unity, I am convinced that Germany will be united sooner or later. However, before this moment comes—and no one can foretell when it will come—no attempts should be made to interfere from outside in this internal process, to sustain the state of war which is fraught with many grave dangers and surprises for peace in Europe and throughout the world. The desire to preserve the peace and to prevent another war should outweigh all other considerations of statesmen, irrespective of their mode of thinking. The Gordian knot must be cut: the peace treaty must be achieved if we do not want to play with fire—with the destinies of millions upon millions of people.

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IV

In this connection it is impossible to ignore also the question of West Berlin. It is commonly known that the German revanchists have made West Berlin the base for their constant undermining and subversive activity directed towards the provoking of war. We resolutely reject any attempts to ascribe to the Soviet Union the intention of seizing West Berlin and infringing upon the right of the population in this part of the city to preserve its present way of life. On the contrary, in demanding the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, we have proposed to convert it into a free city and to guarantee, jointly with the Western states, the preservation there of the way of life and of the social order which suits the West Berlin inhabitants best of all. This shows that the positions of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Governments of the Western states, judging by their statements, coincide on this question. We, and so do they, stand for the independence of West Berlin and for the preservation of the existing way of life there.

It is, therefore, only necessary to overcome the difficulties born of the cold war in order to find the way to an agreement on West Berlin and on the wider question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states. This is the way to ease international tensions and to promote peaceful coexistence. It would strengthen confidence between states and assist in the gradual abolition of unfriendliness and suspicion in international relations.

Implementation of the Soviet proposals would not injure the interests of the Western powers and would not give any one-sided advantages to anybody. At the same time, the settlement of the German question would prevent a dangerous development of events in Europe, remove one of the main causes of international tension and create favorable prospects for a settlement of other international issues.

The proposals of the Soviet Union were discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva. The Ministers did not succeed in reaching an agreement, but the Geneva conference did accomplish a great deal of useful work. The positions of the two sides were positively brought closer together and the possibility of an agreement on some questions has become apparent.

At the same time, we still have substantial differences on a

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number of questions. I am deeply convinced that they are not fundamental differences on which agreement is impossible. And if we still have differences and have not reached agreement on certain important questions, it is, as we believe, with adequate grounds—a result of the concessions made by the Western powers to Chancellor Adenauer, who is pursuing a military policy, the policy of the German revanchists. This is a case of the United States, Britain and France dangerously abetting Chancellor Adenauer. It would have been far better if the NATO allies of Western Germany would persuade Chancellor Adenauer, in the interest of the maintenance of peace, that his policy imperils the cause of peace and that it may ultimately end in irreparable disaster for Western Germany. All this emphasizes again that the representatives of the states concerned must do some more work in order to find mutually acceptable decisions.

I believe that my trip to the United States and the subsequent visit of President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union will afford the possibility for a useful exchange of opinions, for finding a common tongue and a common understanding of the questions that should be settled.

V

We are prepared now as before to do everything we possibly can in order that the relations between the Soviet Union and other countries, and, in particular, the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., should be built upon the foundation of friendship and that they should fully correspond to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

I should like to repeat what I said at my recent press conference in Moscow: "Should Soviet-American relations become brighter, that will not fail to bring about an improvement in the relations with other states and will help to scatter the gloomy clouds in other parts of the globe also. Naturally, we want friendship not only with the U.S.A., but also with the friends of the U.S.A. At the same time we want to see the U.S.A. maintain good relations not only with us, but with our friends as well."

What, then, is preventing us from making the principles of peaceful coexistence an unshakable international standard and daily practice in the relations between the West and East?

Of course, different answers may be given to this question. But in order to be frank to the end, we should also say the following:

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It is necessary that everybody should understand the irrevocable fact that the historic process is irreversible. It is impossible to bring back yesterday. It is high time to understand that the world of the twentieth century is not the world of the nineteenth century, that two diametrically opposed social and economic systems exist in the world today side by side, and that the socialist system, in spite of all the attacks upon it, has grown so strong, has developed into such a force, as to make any return to the past impossible.

Real facts of life in the last ten years have shown convincingly that the policy of "rolling back" Communism can only poison the international atmosphere, heighten the tension between states and work in favor of the cold war. Neither its inspirers nor those who conduct it can turn back the course of history and restore capitalism in the socialist countries.

We have always considered the Americans realistic people. All the more are we astonished to find that leading representatives of the United States still number in their midst individuals who insist on their own way in the face of the obvious failure of the policy of "rolling back" Communism. But is it not high time to take a sober view of things and to draw conclusions from the lessons of the last 15 years? Is it not yet clear to everybody that consistent adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence would make it possible to improve the international situation, to bring about a drastic cut in military expenditures and to release vast material resources for wiser purposes?

The well known British scientist, J. Bernal, recently cited figures to show that average annual expenditures for military purposes throughout the world between 1950 and the end of 1957 were expressed in the huge sum of about 90 billion dollars. How many factories, apartment houses, schools, hospitals and libraries could have been built everywhere with the funds now spent on the preparation of another war! And how fast could economic progress have been advanced in the underdeveloped countries if we had converted to these purposes at least some of the means which are now being spent on war purposes!

VI

It is readily seen that the policy of peaceful coexistence receives a firm foundation only with increase in extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade. It can be said without

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fear of exaggeration that there is no good basis for improvement of relations between our countries other than development of international trade.

If the principle of peaceful coexistence of states is to be adhered to, not in words, but in deeds, it is perfectly obvious that no ideological differences should be an obstacle to the development and extension of mutually advantageous economic contacts, to the exchange of everything produced by human genius in the sphere of peaceful branches of material production.

In this connection it may be recalled that soon after the birth of the Soviet state, back in the early 1920s, the Western countries, proceeding from considerations of economic interest, agreed to establish trade relations with our country despite the acutest ideological differences. Since then, discounting comparatively short periods, trade between the Soviet Union and capitalist states has been developing steadily. No ideological differences prevented, for instance, a considerable extension of trade relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and other Western states in recent years. We make no secret of our desire to establish normal commercial and business contacts with the United States as well, without any restrictions, without any discriminations.

In June of last year the Soviet Government addressed itself to the Government of the United States with the proposal to develop economic and trade contacts between our two countries. We proposed an extensive and concrete program of developing Soviet-American trade on a mutually advantageous basis. The adoption of our proposals would undoubtedly accord with the interests of both states and peoples. However, these proposals have not been developed so far.

Striving for the restoration of normal trade relations with the United States, the Soviet Union does not pursue any special interests. In our economic development we rely wholly on the internal forces of our country, on our own resources and possibilities. All our plans for further economic development are drawn up taking into consideration the possibilities available here. As in the past, when we outline these plans we proceed only from the basis of our own possibilities and forces. Irrespective of whether or not we shall trade with Western countries, the United States included, the implementation of our economic plans of peaceful construction will not in the least be impeded.

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However, if both sides want to improve relations, all barriers in international trade must be removed. Those who want peaceful coexistence cannot but favor the development of trade, economic and business contacts. Only on this basis can international life develop normally.

VII

Peaceful coexistence is the only way which is in keeping with the interests of all nations. To reject it would mean under existing conditions to doom the whole world to a terrible and destructive war at a time when it is fully possible to avoid it.

Is it possible that when mankind has advanced to a plane where it has proved capable of the greatest discoveries and of making its first steps into outer space, it should not be able to use the colossal achievements of its genius for the establishment of a stable peace, for the good of man, rather than for the preparation of another war and for the destruction of all that has been created by its labor over many millenniums? Reason refuses to believe this. It protests.

The Soviet people have stated and declare again that they do not want war. If the Soviet Union and the countries friendly to it are not attacked, we shall never use any weapons either against the United States or against any other countries. We do not want any horrors of war, destruction, suffering and death for ourselves or for any other peoples. We say this not because we fear anyone. Together with our friends, we are united and stronger than ever. But precisely because of that do we say that war can and should be prevented. Precisely because we want to rid mankind of war, we urge the Western powers to peaceful and lofty competition. We say to all: Let us prove to each other the advantages of one's own system not with fists, not by war, but by peaceful economic competition in conditions of peaceful coexistence.

As for the social system in some state or other, that is the domestic affair of the people of each country. We always have stood and we stand today for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. We have always abided, and we shall abide, by these positions. The question, for example, what system will exist in the United States or in other capitalist countries cannot be decided by other peoples or states. This question can and will be decided only by the American people themselves, only by the people of each country.

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The existence of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries is a real fact. It is also a real fact that the United States of America and the other capitalist countries live in different social conditions, in the conditions of capitalism. Then let us recognize this real situation and proceed from it in order not to go against reality, against life itself. Let us not try to change this situation by interferences from without, by means of war on the part of some states against other states.

I repeat, there is only one way to peace, one way out of the existing tension: peaceful coexistence.

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FRANCE IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

By René Pleven

FOR 16 months, now, France has had a new régime, swept into office by a broad popular movement and dominated by the personality of General de Gaulle. In the same period several decisions have affected the military relations of France and the United States within the Atlantic framework. They indicate that all is not as it should be in the alliance of the two countries, even though both believe in it as wholeheartedly as they did on the day it was founded.

Public opinion in France and the United States is alarmed, and with good reason, at the prolongation of the malaise. The first indication of it was the French Government's refusal to integrate French fighter planes into NATO's aerial defense system. Then came the withdrawal of a number of French units from the Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean. There was also the failure to reach agreement with the French Government on terms governing the establishment and use of launching sites for medium-range ballistic missiles and stockpiles of atomic warheads on French soil. This obliged the NATO Commander-in-Chief to transfer more than 200 American fighter-bombers formerly based at French airfields.

Must it be concluded that the new French régime is inclined to withdraw from NATO? Or do these events mean something entirely different, namely, that certain aspects of the Atlantic Alliance need to be reconsidered? As one who is no less firmly convinced today than when the Atlantic Pact was signed that it is essential to Western security and world peace, and writing with absolute independence, since I do not belong to any of the parties which support the present French Government, I should like to try to give an objective answer to that question.

II

First let us consider the personal factors which have had a part in creating the present difficulties within the Atlantic Community.

When General de Gaulle again assumed the leadership of France, he had been out of power for 12 years, from February 1946 to May 1958. It was during this period that the Atlantic Alliance was conceived, its organization completed and its gov-

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erning regulations and principles enunciated. This Atlantic organization and policy, elaborated without his coöperation, formed part of de Gaulle's inheritance from the Fourth Republic. Nevertheless I do not think that either the need for the Pact nor its goal is at issue. This has been demonstrated by the attitude of the French representatives at Geneva. At no time did they lend themselves to any manœuvre aimed at disengagement. The present government's position on this point is no different from that of its predecessors. What has happened is that a military and political mind, drawing on the lessons of the past and fortified by the wellnigh prophetic judgment it exercised before 1939 and again in June 1940, has brought its keen critical faculty to bear on the subject of NATO. Such a scrutiny was bound to be useful for the Atlantic Community. It led General de Gaulle to certain reflections and suggestions which he conveyed to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in a letter dispatched in September 1958.

From press reports about the contents of that letter and from the reactions of its recipients and their advisors it would seem that its meaning and implications were searchingly examined in the United States. Admittedly it gave rise to misunderstandings, and subsequent attempts at clarification have not entirely dispelled them. This situation is not something new. In the period 1940–1946 a whole series of meetings and discussions between General de Gaulle and Americans revealed how difficult it was for them to understand each other. General de Gaulle often expresses his thoughts in a very different manner from that to which Americans are accustomed. Yet eventually, after much irritation, the difficulties were always ironed out. I am confident the same will be true today. But that does not make the present misunderstanding any less deplorable, particularly as it coincides with a period of grave crisis in Europe. It seems to me that the expressions of ill feeling which it has provoked could and should have been avoided.

The changes which have taken place on the French political scene, however, are not exclusively responsible for all the current disagreements, and the American Government and public opinion would be seriously mistaken if they thought so. For a long time each succeeding French Government, whatever the régime and whoever the leader, has been asking its Atlantic partners, particularly the United States, certain basic questions. It is these questions which are at the root of the current disagreement between

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the French Government and some of the other NATO members as to the way the organization should function.

III

The Atlantic Pact was concluded ten years ago to meet a situation which has since then undergone profound changes. It was conceived as a regional pact to contain Soviet expansion towards Western Europe. Up to now it has fulfilled that task magnificently. Yet today as in 1949 NATO can still be defined as an organization of European countries resting on American arms and military resources, with the peculiarity that within the organization the United States maintains control of the decisive weapons.

During these ten years, however, considerable changes have taken place in the strategy and military resources of the Soviet Union. The Soviet rulers recognized that the military forces of NATO were determined to block Russian expansion towards Western Europe, that any aggression on the European continent would bring into action the American soldiers permanently stationed there and that American nuclear weapons would be used to protect them. The Soviet answer was to adopt an outflanking strategy, a strategy of encirclement. First Russia tested American and Western European reaction in Korea. Then it turned its attention to the Middle East and Africa. Tomorrow it may be South America's turn.

In such circumstances the geographical limitations of the Atlantic Pact have reduced its value, particularly for its members who have world responsibilities. They are three: the United States, Great Britain and France.

France, like Great Britain, has special and precise commitments to defend certain huge countries situated outside of Europe. These countries cover a considerable part of Africa. It is essential for the security not only of France and the peoples associated with it but also of the other nations of the free world that these countries be protected against Communist expansion, whatever form it may take. They are inhabited by tens of millions of people. They control important strategic points on the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. They contain raw materials of great value which must be kept accessible to the free world. The Atlantic Pact makes no provision for the defense of areas in which countries of the Franco-African Community are situated. Yet no one can deny that if they fell into the Soviet

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orbit the security of every nation in the area covered by the Atlantic Pact would be very seriously jeopardized. Western strategy therefore cannot afford to ignore them.

All French governments preceding this one have sought in one way or another to draw the attention of their Atlantic partners to this grave problem—and particularly of the strongest of them, the United States. When great changes were introduced in the French Constitution, elaborating France's responsibility to defend the new republics which had joined with her in forming the French Community, it was natural and inevitable that the new French Government and particularly the President of the Republic, who is at the same time President of the Community, should raise again and more forcefully than ever the question which had not yet been answered. The difficulties entailed in answering it arise, obviously, from the fact that some aspects of the situation are of concern to NATO while others are not. Yet it is senseless to go on ignoring it.

The French proposals of 1958 sought to associate France with the United States and Great Britain in the joint formulation of a strategy adapted to dealing with the wide-ranging and varied threats available to the Soviet camp. The need for such a strategy must be recognized in the United States and the elements in it must be under constant study. Rightly or wrongly, French opinion is convinced that Great Britain in one way or another is already playing a part in the formulation of this strategy. France, the only continental member of NATO which today has defense responsibilities of comparable magnitude to the British, would also like to have the means of making her voice heard.

The French proposal of September 1958 immediately caused misunderstandings. One assertion was that France was seeking to establish a sort of directorate of three in NATO. I think this is a mistaken interpretation, for certainly the French Government is aware that an attempt of that sort would drive the other members into opposition to France and would ultimately break up the organization. What France was trying to do was simply to get the United States to realize how important it is that the nations of the West stand together against the Soviet challenge and that they be so organized that they cannot be taken by surprise whenever and wherever that challenge is presented. The French thesis is that the surprises which the Soviet Union is adept at producing in all parts of the world may at any moment directly affect the

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territories of the French Community; and that in view of this it would be both logical and useful to allow France to participate in the formulation of global defense plans, since these must make provision for any and all eventualities. It wants permanent cooperation with the United States and Great Britain along these lines, whether through NATO or otherwise. In the event that a sudden threat arises outside the geographical limits of NATO, France does not want to find herself confronted with a *fait accompli,* unable to do anything but agree to the implementation of plans which have been drawn up by others and which in this nuclear age may have incalculable consequences.

This French attitude immediately gave rise to still another fear. Some thought France was attempting to drag her Atlantic allies, particularly the United States, into the military struggle which she is having to wage in Algeria. I think this interpretation too is erroneous. Ever since the trouble in Algeria began, all French governments have insisted that the restoration of order there is a domestic affair which France alone can settle. The Government of General de Gaulle can afford even less than its predecessors to abandon that position.

What France does seek is to have a part in the joint formulation of an over-all political, economic and psychological policy for the West. She would like the three powers with world responsibilities to consult together on a continuing basis and with a minimum of organization in order to define a joint political and strategic doctrine on a world-wide scale. As soon as any problem arose it could then be expeditiously dealt with in accordance with the plan. Obviously such a continuing evaluation of the world situation, of the gains made by each of the two camps and of the risks which the West could or could not afford to take, could hardly be undertaken by 15 nations. In other words, it could not be done within NATO. Equally obviously, however, a permanent consultative arrangement of this sort would strengthen the overall position of the West, which today faces different conditions from those it faced in 1949.

IV

In the ten years since the Atlantic Alliance came into being Soviet scientific efforts and accomplishments have completely altered the military situation. In 1949 the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and it appeared that it would be

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able to retain that monopoly, or at least a decisive margin of superiority over Russia, for a long time to come. This superiority made the territory of the United States practically invulnerable. And it was from there, as the Soviets were well aware, that the retaliation would come if they dared launch an attack on the free world.

That thinking had to be revised, particularly after 1957. During the summer of that year Mr. Khrushchev announced to the world that henceforth his country would possess the means to deliver nuclear warheads at supersonic speeds on targets several thousand miles distant. Two months later Soviet scientists succeeded in putting the first sputnik into orbit, thereby giving substance to the Prime Minister's claims.

The Western world, which in the past had relied for its security on the commanding scientific lead of the United States, had to give up that comforting assurance. The statesmen who had the thankless task of solving defense problems found even more serious significance in the Soviet conquest of space than was immediately apparent to the public at large. Henceforth the territory of the United States would be accessible to enemy attack. It was now as much in the front line as any country in Europe. The ballistic missile had narrowed the world's horizons, virtually cancelling out the advantages of geography. There was no longer, at least in the scientific-military field, a margin of superiority in favor of the West as against the Communist world. The strength of the two sides was now in all probability almost evenly matched.

The United States was the first to realize that the loss of its atomic monopoly and the Soviet possession of long-range missiles would make it infinitely more difficult to deter an enemy from aggression by threatening retaliation. The significance of the change was described in George F. Kennan's broadcasts over the B.B.C. and later thoroughly documented in the study by Albert Wohlstetter in *Foreign Affairs* in January of this year.

In Britain the revelation that there was a military balance between East and West led to a reappraisal of British strategic policy. A most disturbing fact, too, was that a large segment of British public opinion adopted a stand in favor of disengagement and denuclearization.

It was therefore hardly surprising that in France, as in the United States and Britain, the new situation should have been carefully analyzed. Some of those who realized the gravity of the

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threat which the Soviets now held over the free world began to wonder if there was not a risk that the guarantee of nuclear intervention hitherto so generously offered by the United States to all the free peoples might not one day be limited to the stakes which the American public considered most essential to its own security. However, the firmness and clear vision shown by Secretary of State Dulles convinced Europeans that they need not fear a weakening of United States policy; and Mr. Herter has adopted the same firm stance. The alarm caused by the new Secretary of State's reply when questioned by Senator Morse in April that he could not "conceive of the President [of the United States] involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of devastation . . ." was dispelled by the explanation immediately given that in using the word "we" he had had in mind not only the United States but also its allies.

Yet it cannot be denied that America's new vulnerability has produced not only in France but in other European countries as well a twofold apprehension. First, there is fear that in time a neo-isolationism may develop in the United States and that as a result it will hesitate to use its nuclear resources to defend Europe in its hour of peril. On the other hand—and this is more important, since responsible Europeans are fundamentally convinced that the United States will honor its commitments—there is the fear that the Russians themselves may make an error of judgment in this respect and open a limited action against certain countries of the free world in the belief that the United States will not be willing to expose itself to the horrors of retaliation simply because a distant country has been attacked either with conventional weapons or with tactical atomic weapons.

Stalin's successors are elated by the Soviet progress in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. They have not forgotten that in Stalin's time the United States, though firm in its reaction to the aggression in Korea, refrained from using nuclear weapons even though it still enjoyed overwhelming superiority in them and also in the means of delivery.

In France the two fears mentioned above have produced two complementary reactions. There is a desire to be associated with the plan for using nuclear weapons; France must not risk finding herself engaged alone in a nuclear conflict. And there is a desire to possess such weapons; France must not be entirely dependent on decisions taken by the United States. The first of those fears

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explains the difficulties which have arisen over launching sites and atomic warhead stockpiles in France. I think it is not quite correct to say that the French Government refuses to allow these to be established on French soil; its attitude is that if missiles are to be stockpiled in France it should have control over their use.

The French position with regard to nuclear weapons seems the same as the one adopted by Britain at the end of the Second World War. Just as the British did not want to be entirely dependent on American nuclear weapons for the defense of their island and of all that they might consider vital for their existence, so the French would like to have in their own hands a means of deterring a potential enemy from attacking their territory or that of the peoples associated with them in the French Community.

The changes in the world balance of power as a result of Soviet scientific progress have also made Europeans more acutely aware of what enormous risks the United States has assumed in undertaking to defend the free world. France feels that in establishing her own atomic arsenal she will be providing an additional safeguard for herself but at the same time will also help reduce the danger of war, since the Soviets will then know that an attack on French soil, even if limited to conventional weapons, will lay them open to nuclear retaliation.

Anyone who realizes what a vast financial and technical effort is required to enable a nation to become a nuclear power will understand that the French decision in this matter is a grave one. Indeed, the resulting burden is already being felt by the French people.

I do not think it is true that the French Government is trying to bargain with the United States for information and secrets which, naturally, would enable it to reach its goal more quickly. It is willing to make the effort required. Would it not be politically wiser, however, if our American allies recognized that France has enough talent and enough scientific and technical resources to do as well as Britain does in the production of nuclear weapons? French scientists played the pioneering role in research on fissionable materials prior to 1939; and French backwardness since then in the nuclear field was the direct consequence of the fact that it was in the front line of battle in 1939. France has no intention of playing a lone hand. She wishes to uphold the Atlantic Community and, indeed, to expand her coöperation with the United

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States and Great Britain in all parts of the world which may be threatened by the Soviet Union. In view of these facts, is not the United States simply adding one more hardship to all those suffered by France under the German occupation by obliging her to rediscover at great expense technical formulas which the Soviet Union already possesses?

▼

Another aspect of France's relations with NATO which has dissatisfied the present French Government is the distribution of commands.

Some military experts have over-simplified the reasons for the decision to withdraw certain units of the French fleet from the NATO Mediterranean command. The French know perfectly well that in an organization like NATO command positions cannot be distributed arithmetically according to the volume of the resources made available by each member. French concerns go much deeper, influenced by the memory of such events as the British retreat from Dunkirk in 1940. But above all they are motivated by a kind of philosophy of national defense expressed by President de Gaulle.

It should be remembered that every French Government since the time NATO was established has opposed a certain concept of military integration favored by the Anglo-Saxon countries. Under this concept each member country would have had to specialize in its military contribution. The United States, for example, would have put at NATO's disposal its nuclear weapons and strategic bombers, Great Britain would have been primarily responsible for providing tactical and defense aircraft, and the major part of the ground forces would have been provided by the continental countries, particularly France.

Our governments always countered this theory with the argument that every major power should have a balanced military establishment and that each of the principal members of NATO should accordingly furnish a part of each kind of equipment required, whether atomic weapons, aircraft, infantry or tanks. In financial terms this is not the most economical approach but it accords with certain national requirements, and the extra costs entailed for each country could be minimized by close coöperation in the matter of logistics and the manufacture and standardization of arms. This French argument, consistently upheld since

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the establishment of NATO, has now been expanded to include other considerations to which the President attaches great importance.

Under the Constitution the President is responsible for everything that concerns the defense of France and the Community. President de Gaulle holds that NATO, if only in the interests of efficiency, must avoid de-nationalizing the obligation to defend one's country; in democratic societies, he believes, recognition of this obligation must be rooted deep in the heart of every citizen and every leader. In an organization like the Atlantic Community there is always the danger that members will tend to rely on the efforts of others to make up for their own weaknesses or deficiencies. Steps should therefore be taken to prevent governments from gradually losing the sense of their own responsibilities for national defense. This is all the more necessary when the commands assigned to officers of a certain nationality do not adequately coincide with their own country's natural talents and vital interests. An example of a fitting assignment would be a British officer in command of anti-submarine operations; the knowledge that his own people's food supply depended on his efforts would inspire him to give his utmost in energy and efficiency.

As a matter of fact, this sort of thinking has always played a role in NATO, as for example in the assignment of the Central European Command to a French officer. Similarly, the present distribution of commands as regards Great Britain is satisfactory in this respect. The ground defense of British soil and command of the reserves stationed there are entirely a British responsibility. A British officer commands the North European theater, in other words, the northern air and sea approaches to Great Britain. Another British officer is deputy to the American Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces in the North Atlantic. Yet it is also British and American officers who are assigned to the highest naval commands in the Mediterranean.

Many French experts, taking into account the extension of French territory into Africa and France's obligation to defend African members of the French Community, feel that her responsibilities both in the western Mediterranean and in the sector of the Atlantic known as "Iberlant," which guards communications between the Gulf of Gascony and Dakar, would justify choosing French officers to fill the commands in those areas. The main prob-

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lem is that of the Mediterranean. With the exception of the American Sixth Fleet, which has a special mission, the NATO forces in the Mediterranean consist entirely of British, French, Greek and Turkish naval units. In 1953 the command of these forces was assigned, in recognition of his personal merits, to Lord Mountbatten, who had his headquarters in Malta. This command was exclusively naval, and it was subdivided into sectors headed by officers of different nationalities in accordance with the size of each nation's contribution. In 1953 the French and British contributions were equal. Since then the British contribution has been reduced while the French has increased. It would be only fair that any reorganization should take that fact into account.

On the other hand, the refusal of the French Government to integrate French national air units into NATO's over-all aerial defense system cannot, in view of the size of the European theater, be attributed to military considerations. Rather it must be interpreted as an expression of the ill humor of the French Government, which now inclines to make any new commitment to NATO dependent on agreement on the proposals which it has submitted. This attitude, it should be noted, creates certain serious difficulties in equipping the French forces.

VI

Should the attitude of the French Government be interpreted as indicating that it is weakening in its support of NATO? So far nothing justifies that conclusion. Its attitude seems to me simply to reflect two very basic concerns: one, that the West should be better organized for the protection of the free world; and two, that in the formulation of the West's global policy to meet Soviet threats France should be allowed to play a role in keeping with the scope of her capabilities, interests and strategic position both as regards metropolitan France and the Community of peoples associated with her in Africa.

Every Soviet manœuvre outside the European continent in the past few years has found the West disunited. Suez, Lebanon and Quemoy are striking examples. France insists that the three countries having world responsibilities be organized to facilitate united action. To the extent that this unity of action would not weaken the common front against Soviet threats the French position is logical.

None of the problems which General de Gaulle seems to have

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raised in his letter of last September to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan were new. What had happened was that the political situation in France, the changes in the relative strength of the West and the Soviet Union and the personality of the new President of the French Republic gave these problems new importance. It is not the fact that the problems have been raised which is serious so much as the fact that NATO has shown itself inflexible in regard to them and that the West has taken so much time to solve them. Probably there are no perfect answers to them. Yet with good will, imagination and breadth of vision on both sides it should be possible to find at least a partial solution, and this would at any rate help allay suspicions and eliminate the mental reservations which now characterize Franco-American relations. What Americans should realize beyond any shadow of doubt is that the vast majority of the French people hope to see a thawing of the present situation. They know that a close-knit Atlantic alliance, in which each nation could find its place in accordance with its responsibilities and potentialities, is a prerequisite for security and peace.

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OPERATION BREAKTHROUGH

By Paul G. Hoffman

THE most significant event in the historical evolution of the century, in the opinion of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, may one day be considered to have been not any of the questions now uppermost in the news but the revolt of three-quarters of the world's populations—nearly 1,700,000,000—against the continued acceptance of poverty, ignorance and ill health. The peasant in his rice paddy, the fisherman on the lagoon, the hunter in the steaming jungle, have awakened from centuries of lethargy. Their forebears endured patiently the evils of poverty and ignorance because they had no basis for even imagining a better life. The great surge of modern science and technology has changed all that. With the airplane bringing the peoples of the world closer and closer, and with the spoken word penetrating even to remote villages via the air waves, underprivileged people everywhere have come to believe that a better life is possible for them. They know now that malnutrition and disease are not inevitable and that it is possible to create conditions in which their children can grow in knowledge and dignity.

This great awakening has profoundly altered the world situation. Its potentialities for progress or disaster are far-reaching. Out of the yearnings of these millions of people can come a better world, or, if the yearnings are ignored, a very dangerous world for the richer nations. Improvement in the living standards of these people is by no means a complete answer to all their problems. But it is the basis of progress toward solutions of any kind.

The signs of this revolution are all about us. No less than 22 nations have insisted upon and won independence for their 800,000,000 people in the short period of the 1940s and 1950s. Several other nations comprising many tens of millions of people will become independent in 1960. And there is explosive unrest in many countries, on every continent—Africa, Europe, South America and even North America.

Some 60 nations of the 82 members of the United Nations would by any criteria be classified as less developed. In addition, there are 40 important territories which should be so classified. Quite a formidable array—100 countries, one billion people. Red

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China, not being a member of the United Nations, is not included in these calculations.

Our churches and other humanitarian groups have long been concerned with the plight of the desperately poor and underprivileged in other lands. For centuries missionaries have tried to bring them spiritual comfort, and have done what they could to relieve their hunger and improve their health. But it has been all too little; moreover, it has been philanthropy. Bettering their lot through economic development—by helping them help themselves—is a new idea, and one that has begun to take hold only in the last ten years. Until recently their resources were more exploited than developed. For that matter, even in the richer countries development of resources rather than exploitation is a relatively new phenomenon. Here in the United States not long ago we were exploiting our rivers and our forests and "mining" our lands rather than developing them.

A significant recognition that something had to be done for the people in the less developed countries—in the interests of all—was President Truman's Point IV Program. About that time, too, certain of the European powers with colonial possessions began to recognize that development was preferable to exploitation.

Our present decade of the 1950s has seen this idea grow most encouragingly. Assistance to the underdeveloped countries has increased substantially, and today virtually all the industrially advanced nations not only contribute through the United Nations but have country-to-country assistance and development programs, and many are participating in regional programs. President Eisenhower has supported foreign aid aggressively and today the United States not only maintains a huge program of bilateral technical assistance through I.C.A. and bilateral lending through the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund, but it also contributes generously through United Nations agencies, the Colombo Plan and the Latin American Development Association. Great Britain, France, the German Federal Republic, the Soviet Union and other countries have also established programs for giving technical and financial assistance to underdeveloped countries.

Then, there are the United Nations agencies. First are those concerned with economic development through capital investment—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation. Second, the group giving

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technical assistance: the United Nations itself, and also the Specialized Agencies set up to give expert advice in specific fields—education and science, food, agriculture, health, labor, civil aviation, atomic energy, and so on. And the Special Fund, of which I shall have more to say later.

In spite of these multitudinous national and international programs, there has been only a modest improvement in the living standards of the people of the less developed countries during the 1950s. There have been a few outstanding successes. For example, in the Western Hemisphere, Mexico has staged a real breakthrough from stagnation to rapid economic change, and Puerto Rico, with its "operation bootstrap," also seems to be well on the way. But the picture as a whole is not encouraging. Over-all, the average annual rate of improvement in personal living standards for the 100 countries, as nearly as it can be estimated, has been approximately 1 percent. Gross income went up at the rate of 3 percent but population increased at the rate of 2 percent, leaving a net increase of only 1 percent. In the last year for which figures are available, 1957, the income of these 100 countries was approximately $120 billion, or $120 per person. That same year the average per capita income in the industrially advanced countries was approximately $800; in the United States it was more than $2,000. One cannot get the true contrast in living standards through statistics, but so far as figures can tell the story, there it is: $2,000 per capita in the United States, $120 in the less developed countries.

Per capita income in the more prosperous countries has increased sharply in the 1950s. For example, in the United States between 1950 and 1957 it increased by $530; Canada, by $485; Western Germany, by $371; The Netherlands, by $299; Switzerland, by $372; and the United Kingdom, by $360. In that same seven years per capita income in the less developed countries increased by less than $10.

This rate of increase in the less developed countries is clearly not acceptable. It is slow—dangerously slow. Explosive situations are developing. Our war against need must be fought on far wider fronts, with intensified vigor and under a grander strategy.

II

Why has progress been so slow during the 1950s?

In the first place, the size of the job was underestimated both

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from the standpoint of its complexity and from that of the investment required for acceptable progress. Each of the 100 countries presents a problem differing in some respects from others, which means that there are 100 problems to be dealt with, not one. The amount of investment needed for an adequate program will be discussed later; however, speaking in general terms, too much has been expected too soon from too little.

Second, the industrialized countries have not recognized that development programs must be thought of in terms of decades, not years; not as temporary aid (or worse, "giveaway") but rather as long-term investments in people and prosperity. Because we have not regarded our aid programs in this light, *progress has been retarded by lack of certainty and continuity.*

Third, wholly inadequate attention has been given to investment in education, technical training and surveys of resources, all essential to economic development. It is impossible to develop sound programs without knowing what a country's resources are and without training the people to make effective use of those resources. There has also been too little investment in power development, roads, transportation, irrigation—projects which may not yield immediate returns but which are necessary to attract capital for industrial or other development.

Fourth, the underdeveloped countries, many of them enjoying new-found independence, have at times, through inexperience or otherwise, indulged in mistaken development planning. Too often they have given priority to glamor projects rather than to primary needs—a steel mill rather than a fertilizer plant, or boulevards in the capital rather than farm-to-market roads. Nor has sufficient account been taken of the need for strong incentives or for giving prestige to entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial activities. In many countries industrialists and businessmen are regarded as second-class citizens.

Finally, and this is of crucial importance, the industrialized countries have to a great extent failed to undertake economic development in the less developed countries as something good, desirable and rewarding in itself; too often they have extended economic aid to "win friends and influence people" and as an instrument in the cold war. I am firmly convinced that this attitude seriously diminishes the effectiveness of economic aid and development programs. In fact, it tends to defeat them.

Our guide in this matter should be the words which Secretary

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of State George C. Marshall uttered in his commencement address at Harvard University in June 1947:

> It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. . . . Any assistance that this Government may render should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.

Secretary Marshall's address resulted in the most successful economic aid program ever devised. The American people invested $13 billion in that program and on all counts it is one of the most profitable investments the country ever made. One of the most important reasons for its success was that it was carried on in the spirit of the words quoted above. As Administrator of the Economic Coöperation Administration I made them my constant guide.

The objective of the Marshall Plan was not political warfare or to win the Europeans as friends, but to assure European economic recovery. And the enterprise was carried on coöperatively through the Organization for European Economic Coöperation. The result today is a free and prosperous Western Europe. Could we ask for more?

The objective today should be to help the underdeveloped countries create self-propelling economies that will yield increasingly high standards of living and sustain internal freedom and political independence from any power, whether it be the United States, the Soviet Union or any other. To look for more is self-defeating.

Because the industrialized countries have too often been intent on getting full credit for every dollar of aid, they have failed to take full advantage of multi-national organizations to accomplish economic development abroad—even in situations in which it is clear that they can operate more effectively and at lower cost. The principal reason why multi-national organizations such as the United Nations can operate more effectively is because the less developed countries prefer to deal with them, hence their bargaining position is strong. This means that they can insist upon maximum self-help from the recipient countries. This is important not only from a standpoint of cost but also because when the

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receiving countries become deeply involved in projects they accept responsibility for them. A further reason for lower costs and effectiveness in execution is that the United Nations has the whole world to draw on for its experts.

The record of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance of the United Nations, which is now completing its tenth year of operation, demonstrates the advantages that lie with a multinational organization. Last year it had a budget of $32,000,000. But because it was a U.N. agency belonging to everybody rather than a single country which could be suspected of having ulterior motives, it was able to obtain from recipient countries $60,000,000 worth of local materials and local effort. Thus the $32,000,000 snowballed into $90,000,000.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) is, of course, the shining example of a well-administered international lending institution. It has established firm, non-political criteria for its loans and in consequence it has earned the respect of the world for the service it is rendering. Since its founding it has put more than $4.5 billion to work in revenue-producing projects, more than $800,000,000 in the last year; and it has operated profitably.

Multi-national organizations have a further advantage in that they are not—and I repeat the phrase quite deliberately—trying to "win friends and influence people." They can insist that agreements entered into be carried out meticulously by recipient nations.

III

The crucial decade 1960–1970 is just around the corner. In that decade half the world's people must find proof that they are on the road to a freer and fuller life. The very minimum they should expect is an increase in their income each year by 2 percent—as compared with the present annual increase of 1 percent. It is perhaps even more important that as many of these countries as possible make a real breakthrough to self-sustaining growth. It cannot come for all countries. But if it comes even for a dozen, it will be immensely worth while. There is a great need for examples—living examples of peoples who have made the effort and, with reinforcing outside help, have made the grade.

Can this be accomplished in the coming ten years? It is a task of staggering dimensions but I believe it can. My main reason

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for thinking so is that the peoples of the underdeveloped areas are on the march. Without insistence on their part, without their burning desire and effort, it would not be possible. When I first took over the administration of the Marshall Plan in 1948, I stressed that only Europeans could save Europe. Similarly, basic responsibility for the development of the less developed countries must rest with the people of those countries. Happily they seem eager to assume it.

There are other reasons for optimism. The immense scientific and technological advances of these times make it possible to speed up the pace of progress. We have more and better international tools for the job. We have acquired experience during the 1950s and can profit from past mistakes. We have come to know that most of the less developed countries are really rich—rich in material resources and latent human capacities which need only to be discovered and developed. However, if their potentialities are to be realized, a number of conditions must be met.

First, we must have a great deal more information about their physical resources. Each day at the United Nations brings new evidence of how little is really known about their mineral resources, their river flows and watersheds, about soil content, industrial potentialities, markets and the like. Resource surveys are a highly important prerequisite of economic development.

Second, there must be a great increase in educational and training facilities. The human resources of the less developed nations have been shamefully neglected. Only a very small percentage of the people who live in these countries have ever had the opportunity to acquire an education. Most cannot even read or write—and only a few have ever had positions of responsibility. There is an immense need for training of all kinds, from on-the-job training of artisans to the more complex sciences of technological institutes. And let no one believe that the people of the less developed countries cannot be trained to be good mechanics, good farmers, good engineers, good doctors, good administrators. I recall a myth current in the United States not long ago that the Russians could not even run a tractor; and then came the sputniks.

Third, there must be a substantial increase in capital investment, of two kinds: investment in projects that are immediately revenue-producing; and investment in basic facilities such as schools, hospitals, highways and communications, which cannot

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produce revenue overnight but which are the foundation for a sound economic structure.

Finally, many underdeveloped countries need assistance in administration. Modern government is a complicated affair even when it is not carrying the additional burden of a development program. These countries must be able, if they wish, to call upon the more experienced countries, preferably through an international agency such as the United Nations, for well-qualified persons who can temporarily serve them in an operational, administrative or executive capacity.

IV

How much investment is needed to effect acceptable progress in the underdeveloped countries?

In the year 1957, the last year for which figures are available, it is estimated that $9 billion was devoted to capital formation by the 100 less developed countries. Of this amount, $6 billion came out of the meager $120 billion income of the countries themselves, and $3 billion from outside sources in the form of public and private investments and grants. If capital formation and investment from outside continues at the 1957 rate, some $90 billion would be available in the decade of the 1960s.

Experts are in surprising agreement as to the amount of *additional* investment which will be required to assure the minimum acceptable increase in per capita income during the decade. It is between $35 billion and $45 billion. Let us take the average and call it $40 billion. Of this amount, $10 billion can come from increased capital formation in the countries themselves; $30 billion must come from increased investment in those countries from outside sources.

Where might this additional $30 billion come from? Some from increased private investment, some from an increase in World Bank loans, some from increased investment by colonial powers in their overseas territories, some from increased provision of agricultural surpluses which, under certain circumstances, are capital. The remainder will have to be supplied in the form of development loans from existing or new national or international institutions. The exact mix will largely depend on the speed with which knowledge of the natural resources of the developing nations is acquired and people are trained to make effective use of them.

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If maximum emphasis is given to such programs and if a total investment program is going forward expeditiously with assurance of adequacy and continuity, I estimate the following:

(1) That private investors in the advanced countries may, over ten years, increase their supply of capital to underdeveloped countries, over present levels, by $7 billion.

(2) That the World Bank, with recently doubled capitalization, may over ten years supply the underdeveloped countries with funds over and above present levels by $4 billion.

(3) That the colonial powers may increase investments in their overseas territories, during a ten-year period, by $3 billion.

(4) That the agricultural surpluses supplied to the underdeveloped countries during ten years may be increased over present levels by $3 billion.

These figures add up to $17 billion. The four sources enumerated are not only capable of expanding their investments to the estimated levels, but if all goes well may be predicted to do so. This would leave $13 billion in additional investment funds to be supplied over the years by increases in development loans supplied through national development loan programs (such as the U.S. Development Loan Fund), by regional development associations (such as the Latin American Association and the Colombo Plan), and by international development associations which would be established.

It is in this last category that there is least assurance of either adequacy or continuity of funds, and the greatest need for new thinking and the creation of new financial institutions. The greatest unfilled need of the underdeveloped countries today is for additional investment in what in modern terminology is called "infrastructure"—the schools, hospitals, roads, communications, irrigation and other facilities which are not immediately revenue-producing but which must be present before revenue-producing investment can be expected in any volume. Here is the greatest challenge to the more advanced countries: to have the vision and confidence to make investments of this kind which are adequate and which have an assured continuity over a period long enough to enable the developing countries to bring their economies to a point where they are self-propelling.

A number of national development loan programs and regional development associations are already functioning. For example,

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the Development Loan Fund of the United States has been investing at the rate of $700,000,000 per year, the new Latin American Fund is scheduled to invest between $100,000,000 and $200,000,000 per year, and the British Colonial Development Fund, the Colonial Development Corporation and France's FIDES are also putting out substantial amounts. However, the need for development funds will not be satisfied until an international development association is established. Such an association is needed not only to supply additional funds but also to give leadership and coördination to regional and national programs.

In all the discussion about investment and sources of capital, one point should be emphasized again and again. It is not dollars, pounds or marks that these developing countries require—it is mainly goods, and some services. They need wheat and other agricultural products which are surplus in other countries. They need steel, trucks, machines, tools, electronic instruments, road-building equipment, mining supplies, construction machinery, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, transport equipment and so forth. And a great many of these items can be manufactured out of unused capacity in the advanced nations, thereby recovering the huge social and financial costs of idle men and idle machines today and avoiding these costs tomorrow.

V

The newest tool for accelerating economic growth in the less developed countries is the United Nations Special Fund established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1958. It is a semi-autonomous organization, responsible to a Governing Council elected by the General Assembly and supported by voluntary contributions of the member nations. In 1959 the United States agreed to contribute two-thirds of the total amount received from other countries. The amount available for 1959 is presently estimated at $26,000,000. The outlook for 1960 is much more encouraging. The indications are that something over $50,000,000 will be subscribed.

The Special Fund is not a lending institution. It provides no investment capital and engages in no field operations. Its function is to help bring into being some of the pre-conditions for successful private and public investment. For the most part it supports relatively large projects which may be expected to lead to early results and have the widest possible impact in accelerating devel-

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opment in the countries concerned. And it seeks, where possible, to enlist local effort and financial support for the projects undertaken.

The Special Fund now envisages, or is engaged in, financial support for projects of three main types. The first is surveys of natural resources—geological surveys, soil surveys, hydrological surveys, timber surveys, fishery surveys—all intended to disclose wealth that has not previously been used for the benefit of the country.

The second is the establishment of research laboratories, for scientific research can disclose greatly expanded uses for local materials. The third is the establishment of training institutes. People everywhere will respond to training, but the required education facilities have not been available. The Fund cannot help in providing basic education, a special problem with which UNESCO has been concerned; but it will train people to train people, particularly in vocational, scientific and administrative skills.

The success of the Fund will not be judged by the number of reports added to the shelves, but by the number of new investments made possible and by the skills learned. The aim is, through the expenditure of a few million dollars, to lure billions—to bring out a vast amount of undisclosed wealth, to make bankable many undertakings which would otherwise at most remain but interesting ideas. And it is to develop the talent and increase the productive capacity of increasing numbers of people.

There has been no dearth of projects during this first year of Special Fund operations. With approximately $26,000,000 available to the Special Fund in 1959, there have already come 116 requests from governments asking for a total of more than $100,000,000 in financing. These projects have not all been evaluated, and undoubtedly some will be declined, but more are coming in every week.

The first 13 projects approved by the Fund's Governing Council, in May 1959, while not a representative pattern, suggest the nature and scope of the operations. The allocations, covering periods of three to five years, and totaling $7,550,000, are as follows:

Argentina: Electric Power Survey	$ 250,000
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador: Central American Research Institute for Industry (ICAITI)	900,000
Ghana: Survey of Volta River Flood Plain	305,000

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Greece: Pilot Project in Groundwater Development	245,000
Guinea: General Development Survey	400,000
India: Industrial Instructors' Training Institute	860,000
Israel: Pilot Project in Watershed Management	320,000
Jugoslavia: Training of Vocational Instructors	905,000
Poland: National Center for Training Supervisory Personnel in Industry	700,000
Thailand: Investigation of the Silting Conditions in the Bangkok Port Channel	600,000
Turkey: Middle East Technical University	1,500,000
United Arab Republic: Pilot Project for Drainage of Irrigated Land	300,000
United Arab Republic: Soil Survey from Aerial Photographs	265,000
Total	$7,550,000

Each of these projects holds exceptional promise. For example, the Volta River survey seeks to determine whether suitable soils and topographic conditions exist for large-scale growing of sugar cane, cereals and other irrigated crops. If this survey, costing the international community a few hundred thousand dollars, has favorable results, it will bring into cultivation more than 50,000 acres of flood plain, and provide a basis for the establishment of a new industry in Ghana, the cultivation and refining of sugar. It could, in fact, start a chain reaction.

Another of these promising projects is the expansion of the Central American Research Institute for Industry. This Institute is the product of coöperative action by five Central American governments—Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica. Its success to date in helping governments and private enterprises develop new industries and expand existing ones clearly demonstrates that it can contribute mightily to strengthening the economies of the five countries.

On the training side, a vocational training institute is projected in India, which is expected to train 800 craft instructors each year through courses in 14 different fields, extending from carpentry and plumbing to mechanics. The instructors so trained will in turn instruct many thousands of trainees. The Special Fund is providing experts to train the instructors, and also necessary equipment.

All of the projects approved by the Special Fund call for substantial contributions by the government concerned. In the case of the Indian training institute, for example, the Special Fund's

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contribution is estimated at $860,000, the Indian Government's will be $2,140,000. If outside assistance is to be taken seriously in a receiving country and have its fullest effect, that country must bear a heavy share of its cost and of responsibility in operation.

It is expressly forbidden to use the Fund's assistance as a means of foreign economic or political interference in internal affairs of the countries concerned. Nevertheless, strict conditions and accountability are demanded of the receiving governments and the "executing agents" to ensure the effective use of international funds.

VI

Are the advanced countries justified in making the additional $30 billion investment in the next decade? The answer is an emphatic yes, for several reasons.

First, we must do what is possible for our own sakes and for the sake of our children; there can be no peace in the mind or in the world if the present admiration of the poorer nations for people in advanced nations should, because of frustration, turn to envy and hatred. They expect us to join them in a magnificent enterprise, a new practical humanism on a world scale. And here idealism and realism can at last be united, for even from the standpoint of our own most immediate economic interest we must carry out this program.

Our aid is an investment in the stability and well-being of the forgotten nations, and investment in our own prosperity. The advanced countries must look to the less developed countries—in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America—for most of the raw materials they need, and for the additional quantities they will need in the years to come. And they can also look to the less developed countries as the largest potential consumer market in the world. These are the new economic frontiers. To take only the case of the Americas: the less developed countries, even with the present very limited improvement in their situation, are spending twice as much on American goods as they did at the end of World War II, five times as much as they did in 1938. As the poorer countries develop, so will their purchasing power and the volume of their trade. Rising prosperity in those countries will ensure rising prosperity elsewhere. Our own development is geared directly to theirs.

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The most compelling reason of all for increasing our investment in the underdeveloped countries, however, has to do with our security. We are living in an unsafe world, and our greatest problem today is to prevent its blowing up. The United States alone is spending for defense at the rate of about $45 billion a year—$450 billion for defense in the next decade, if the present rate is maintained. The authorities say it is going to increase, and we are not asking: "Can we afford it?"

One of the reasons why our world is unsafe is, as I stated earlier, that hundreds of millions of people in the less developed countries are refusing to accept their present condition as inevitable. Economic advance in these countries is not a complete answer to the question how to achieve peace, but it is a step toward peace. It lessens the social and political instability that springs from discontent and resentment and it lays a more stable basis for sound economic relations among nations. I believe that if over the next decade an additional investment of $30 billion by the advanced countries does help to move the world in the direction of peace, it will save many times that sum in defense expenditures.

The goal which has been set forth for the coming decade—a doubling of the rate of increase in per capita income in the underdeveloped countries—may seem to be over-modest. It would mean an increase of the average per capita income of the less developed countries from $120 to about $140, or perhaps a bit more. That increase may seem insignificant to us, but for hundreds of millions of people it would mean clean water, better medical facilities, protection against epidemic and endemic diseases, more schools, a chance to learn to read and write and acquire knowledge. And just to get perspective, let me recall that today's average income in India is only $68 per capita.

However, the most important point is that this decade could be used to lay the foundations for a number of countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. Such a breakthrough by a few countries—a first lurch off dead center—would inspire all underprivileged peoples. For the entire community of nations it could be one of the most spectacular events of the century. It could give such momentum to a forward movement that no one can say how far it might carry. In this connection we should consider the experience of the European Recovery Program. It was the highest hope of most of us involved in it that within the four-year period

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agricultural and industrial production would be restored to prewar levels. But the Europeans, once they were assured of adequate assistance, went to work with such spirit and drive that within two and one half years industrial production in Europe was 40 percent ahead of the prewar level and agricultural production 20 percent ahead.

This much is certain. If we can accelerate the pace of economic development in the 1960s as we hope, and if it is maintained, it will come close by the end of the century to banishing the poverty, illiteracy and chronic ill health which have plagued the human race since the beginning of time.

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FOR PRINCIPLED NEUTRALITY

A New Appraisal of Indian Foreign Policy

By Acharya J. B. Kripalani

As India before independence formed part of the British imperial possessions, the British Government decided her foreign policy. British interests were supposed to be also the interests of India. The foreign policy of England during the nineteenth century was directed to preserving her far-flung empire and safeguarding her world-wide economic interests. These objectives she tried to attain by a threefold strategy. One was to safeguard the routes to her imperial possessions. For this purpose she had to keep a strong navy equal to the combined navies of any two countries on the Continent. The center of the Empire was India. Therefore, the route to India was dotted with military bases in the Mediterranean—Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus. England also dominated Egypt, the Suez Canal, the Arab countries and the Persian Gulf.

A threat to Britain's imperial possessions and her economic interests could come only from the industrially advanced countries of Europe. To avoid this contingency was the purpose of the second plank in British foreign policy: to keep the balance of power in Europe.

But Russia was both a European and Asiatic power, with expansionist designs in Asia. Therefore the third plank of British foreign policy was to contain Russia within her Asiatic borders.

After she won independence India had to evolve a foreign policy of her own, devoted to her own interests. However, it would be wrong to say that before then India had no foreign policy aims apart from those of Imperial Britain. The Indian National Congress, from the time the independence movement gained strength under Gandhi's leadership, developed its own foreign policy and this was generally accepted by the country. Naturally it had little to do with what is strictly called international diplomacy, carried on through envoys and other agents accredited for the purpose. India had none of these. Indian foreign policy before independence was confined to the enunciation of basic principles which would guide the country's diplomacy after independence. These principles, influenced as a matter of course by the principles that

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directed our whole struggle, were based on non-violence and truth. These are moral principles, but translated into political terms they mean disarmament and open diplomacy, principles enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson during World War I. India stood for the freedom of all nations and peoples and against all colonial or racial domination of one people over another; therefore she sympathized with all national struggles against imperialism. She stood for progressive disarmament and for world peace, supervised by some international organization wherein all nations participated equally.

After independence these principles were reiterated. At that time, the new expansionism of Communist Russia had not yet shown itself in its true colors. Soon, differences arose among the Allies who had fought the war against the Nazi and Fascist powers and Japan. Soviet Russia had been allowed to occupy the countries of Eastern Europe from which it had driven the Nazi armies with the help of local liberation forces. As these countries had resisted German occupation, the Russian occupation, like that of France by the Western Allies, was considered temporary. But soon it was apparent that Russia had no intention of withdrawing her armies and allowing these countries to manage their own affairs. On the contrary, through political coups supported by Russian armed forces, she imposed Communist régimes on them, subservient to her. The result was the cold war. The Western powers sought to strengthen themselves against expansionist Communist Russia by forming military alliances and pacts—NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. As a countermove, the Russians made so-called treaty arrangements with the satellite states—the Warsaw Pact. But the countries signatory to the Pact were not free agents, as was made plain when there was a general rising against the Russian-dominated Communist government in Hungary. A short-lived régime there, supported by the popular will, wanted to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and remain neutral in the cold war. Soviet Russia would not allow this. One cannot imagine coercive action being taken by the dominant Western partners against any country that wanted to withdraw from one of the Western pacts!

In the present international circumstances, India, following her basic principles, has taken a position of non-alignment or neutrality as between the two power blocs, the Western and the Russian. But the Prime Minister of India has often said that

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Indian neutrality is not passive but dynamic. He means that India will freely express her opinion in international affairs and show her sympathy and solidarity with victims of aggression and injustice.

In spite of the fact that independent India was new to international diplomacy, her prestige in international affairs was somehow high, especially among Asio-African nations. This was due in part to the size of her territory, her geographical position and her vast population. It was also due to the unique character of the Indian struggle for independence, which put confidence and courage in colonial peoples everywhere by demonstrating that even an unarmed nation, if determined, could win its freedom. It was further felt that both before and after independence India's basic principles were just and humane. Though Western democracies mouthed the same principles, they were suspect, since they still held in an iron grip the remnants of their empires. The United States was not imperial in the West European sense, but it was thought to desire domination of other nations through its economic power. Its good faith was further suspect because of its alliances with imperialistic democracies and with non-Communist totalitarian and military régimes whose actions it could not control. The doctrine recently enunciated by President Eisenhower of "filling the vacuum" created by the dwindling influences of England and France in West Asia caused further distrust of American political motives. Both in Korea and Indochina the Western nations supported what Asians considered reactionary régimes. Naturally, therefore, Asio-African nations looked to free India for sympathy, support and guidance. Their representatives in the United Nations often consulted their Indian colleagues before making up their minds about policy decisions.

India's prestige in international affairs was enhanced when it was offered, and accepted, the chairmanship of international commissions appointed after the deadlock in Korea and Indochina. The big powers which had indirectly come to grips in these two regions knew that any further fighting might lead to a third world war. They found a way out by consenting to cease-fire agreements on the basis of the status quo and the appointment of international commissions to solve immediate problems. But they were not willing to play the game to bring about peace in these countries and their ultimate unification. The international commissions formed under Indian chairmanship therefore could not

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discharge their responsibilities effectively and in course of time they seem to have faded away.

Indian prestige was further enhanced when an Indian, a woman at that, was elected President of the U.N. General Assembly. It was not generally realized that owing to the jealousies and rivalries of the big powers this position of prestige, without power, could go only to prominent politicians in militarily weak countries.

Whatever may have been the failings of the Congress Party government in internal affairs, it could always with some justification show that it had added to the prestige and standing of India in the international world. But all this prestige did not advance any vital interests of India or diminish tension on her borders. Our relations with Pakistan are as strained as ever. The Kashmir issue remains internationally confused. In the case of the tiny Portuguese imperial possessions in India, no progress has been made; indeed the situation has deteriorated. On her northern frontier, India allowed the annihilation of the buffer kingdom of Tibet without a protest; we have recognized the legitimacy of the Chinese claim there. The question of the citizenship of Indian nationals domiciled for decades in Ceylon still hangs fire. There is no improvement in our relations with South Africa.

II

Why is this so? It is because the Indian Government thought that the whole business of diplomacy consisted in enunciating the principles of international policy. But international politics is not concerned merely with enunciation of abstract principles. It is very much concerned with international diplomacy, strategy and tactics. To use the old metaphor, it will not do to lose sight of the trees in contemplating the beauty of the forest, for it is the trees, after all, which yield useful fruit and timber. To take a historical example: President Wilson during World War I enunciated important moral and political principles to regulate international affairs, but after the war his weak diplomatic strategy failed and paved the way to World War II.

It is true that the international complications which faced India, and still face her today, especially on her borders, are not of her creation. They are historical legacies. But what is successful diplomacy? It is not that a country should enjoy international prestige, desirable as that may be, but that it should be able to safeguard its vital interests, without recourse to war. At least it

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should be able to reduce tensions. Successful diplomacy should counteract the adverse effects of historical circumstances.

Another condition of successful diplomacy is to take appropriate action at the proper time. In politics, national or international, opportunities once missed are generally missed for good, or at least do not arise again in the same favorable form. The nation which fails to take advantage of a favorable opportunity has often to pay the full price of its mistakes, even as the merchant must for his miscalculated deals. The law of *Karma* is inexorable.

Let us take the example of the China-Tibet conflict. In resolution after resolution, the Indian National Congress before and after independence had denounced the domination of one nation over another. India never recognized unjust historical claims. If she had, her own struggle for independence would have had little justification. So it was, then, that immediately after independence when we invited to our country a conference of Asian countries, Tibet was included as a free nation. When the so-called Chinese liberation army marched into Tibet our government rightly protested. In surprise our Prime Minister asked: "From whom is Tibet to be liberated?" For this protest, Communist China dubbed us "the running dogs of imperialism." I am afraid we yielded to the usual Communist bullying tactics and allowed China a free hand in Tibet. Perhaps we were misinformed by our representative there about the nature of Chinese Communism. However that may be, we had no right to give our conscience a sop by taking refuge under the historic right of suzerainty claimed by Communist China. This suzerainty, as we know, or as students of history we ought to have known, was imposed upon Tibet by powerful imperial countries but was never accepted by the people or rulers of Tibet.

The question often asked is, what could India have done? We could not possibly go to war on this issue; but the alternative to war is not acquiescence in injustice. We denounced the aggression of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt, but this did not involve us in war. Today we side with the Algerian struggle for independence, but this has not meant the cutting of our normal and friendly relations with France. Acquiescence in aggression amounts to appeasement, which merely whets the appetite of the aggressor, as was seen at the time of Munich. England was not prepared for war with Hitler. But Chamberlain's mistake was to acquiesce in Hitler's aggression against Czechoslovakia by de-

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claring it a distant country about which the English people knew little. In the case of China, we could have recognized the de facto Communist rule on Chinese soil and continued diplomatic and trade relations with the new government. We have such relations with France in spite of Algeria and with Russia in spite of Hungary. We have them with England even though she has not freed all her colonies. We have not ceased to be a member of the British Commonwealth, though some of its members are not friendly to us and indulge in racial discrimination against us. It is usual to recognize de facto governments, within their own borders, whatever their origin. However, when the means used to acquire power are of a doubtful character, the de facto *and the de jure recognition should not be accorded immediately*, especially the latter. One must wait and see if the new régime is accepted by the bulk of the people, without undue coercion. It was not even amiss to advocate the cause of Communist China's membership in the United Nations. It would not have been the first or only imperialist power represented in that august body. But we should never have put the seal of our approval on the rape of a virtually independent nation. India herself renounced her extraterritorial rights over Tibet, acquired under British imperial rule. We renounced these rights because we believed in the freedom of nations in spite of historical accidents to the contrary. India did not renounce these rights in favor of China but of Tibet. Even though we were assured that, unlike Soviet Russia, Communist China was democratic and progressive, we should have known that a régime that insists on unjust historical rights, derived from previous governments which it considered imperialist and reactionary, cannot be liberal or progressive. In their international affairs the Communist régimes in both Russia and China follow the expansionist and imperialist policies of the Tsars and of the Chinese emperors and Chiang Kai-shek.

In any case, by 1954, when the treaty between India and China was signed, the character of this régime was, or should have been, clear to the Indian Government. Yet by that treaty we confirmed the suzerainty of China. Since 1950, mine has been the solitary voice raised in the Indian Parliament against the recognition of the suzerainty of China over Tibet and in favor of Tibetan independence. Speaking in the House in 1958 on *Panchsheel,* I said that it "was born in sin in as much as by it we put the seal of our approval on the annihilation of a free nation." Subsequent tragic

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events have justified my criticism. Our recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is in clear contradiction to what our Prime Minister has often said: "Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral." This is dynamic neutrality. In the case of Tibet we have not been even neutral. We have dynamically sided with the aggressor.

Another example of the failure of our diplomacy is provided by the way we have handled the Kashmir problem. According to the "Instrument of Transfer of Power" from Britain to India and Pakistan, the rulers of the Indian States were free to accede either to Pakistan or India. The Kashmir ruler acceded to India. Legally, therefore, the integration of Kashmir with India was complete. Yet we made it a condition precedent to our accepting the offer of accession that power be handed over to the representatives of the people and that the Prince occupy the position of a constitutional ruler. This was done. Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the popular party representing the people of Kashmir, was asked to form a democratic government. Thus not only was the condition laid down by the British Parliament about the accession of a princely state fulfilled, but India went further and helped in the establishment of a democratic régime in Kashmir. Yet we went out of our way to say that the accession of Kashmir would not be complete until a plebiscite had been taken. This was to create confusion about our legal and moral rights. Further, though we rightly described the action taken against the raiders from the North-West Frontier as a police action, we ordered a cease-fire without clearing the whole of Kashmir of outside raiders who were responsible for looting, murder, arson, rape and other atrocities on the people of Kashmir, both Muslims and Hindus. A police action does not come to an end by a cease-fire agreement with any foreign power, even at the instance of the United Nations. It is a matter of internal law and order, which cannot be ended unless the whole territory is cleared of the raiders from outside. However, if after the cease-fire we still stood by the promise of a plebiscite, we should have advised the Kashmir administration to arrange it in that part over which it had control, as soon as the situation was normal as regards law and order. But we did not do this.

Soon the Kashmir government under Sheikh Abdullah decided to convene a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution for

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the region. This Assembly was obliged to review the question of accession even though it had already been decided legally. The Constituent Assembly's confirmation of the earlier decision should have laid at rest the question of a plebiscite. However, the Indian Prime Minister even then declared that the calling of the Assembly was without prejudice to the issue of a plebiscite.

No wonder that nations which are not necessarily prejudiced against India for reasons of their own misunderstand our position in Kashmir. Our representatives in the United Nations have laid most stress on India's legal rights there. The fact is that there are other more weighty, practical and humanitarian considerations for not disturbing the present position. If it is disturbed, there will again be a movement of population both ways and India and Pakistan will have a fresh refugee problem to face, even before the old one is satisfactorily solved. Further, the incorporation of Kashmir in Pakistan will be justified only on the assumption that religion is the basis of citizenship and nationality. The two-nation theory based on religion is reactionary and was never accepted by India. If it is accepted, every Muslim in India will be an alien in his country and every Hindu in Pakistan will be an alien there. Pakistan may welcome this, but a modern democratic nation like India can never accept such an undemocratic, reactionary and obscurantist solution. It will be the repudiation of our political principles, nullifying all our past. It will upset the whole of our mental thinking. India will have to make a new constitution. It will be in a sense totalitarian in as much as a large part of the community will not enjoy full citizenship rights. Further, India cannot and should not countenance a solution which will make Indian Muslims aliens in their home. This position can be better appreciated by the modern mind than insistence mainly on our legal rights.

III

There is always a danger in overemphasizing moral and ideological principles in international affairs. There are bound to be contradictions in the actual conduct of nations in dealing with each other. Our Prime Minister is never tired of repeating that "War solves no problems." Yet the expenditure on the Indian Army has been progressively increasing. As I once said in the Indian Parliament, supposing Pakistan was foolish enough to attack India, or if today China did so, would India fight? If she

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did, it would mean war. Would such a war be fought by India in the belief that war solves no problems? Armies are not maintained or military expenses incurred or wars undertaken on the assumption that war solves no problems. Rather the assumption is that, as long as the world has found no peaceful way of redressing international wrongs, war, in the last resort, is the only way of vindicating international justice and maintaining national dignity and independence. Today no nation maintaining an army which swallows a large part of its revenues, sometimes 50 percent and more, can with any logic or honesty hold that war solves no problems.

We also often say that the cold war is the result of fear. This is true. But we cannot talk too often of it, if we ourselves are afraid of Pakistan and of China. We cannot make light of the Russian fear of the United States, or vice versa. Even more, we cannot blame the Western European nations if they are afraid of Russia or if today the Asian nations fear expansionist China. Military power even for defense is born of fear. Only a determined nation, believing in non-violence, prepared for annihilation but unwilling to yield to injustice and tyranny, can really be fearless. This is what Gandhiji taught us, and he was right. It is no use reminding other nations of the faults from which we ourselves are not immune. Moral platitudes can be mouthed by politicians once in a while, but if they are repeated frequently, without appropriate action, their authors cannot escape the charge of hypocrisy.

For instance, the United States claims that if it ever goes to war against Communist powers it will be in defense of democracy and the free world. Do we believe these high and altruistic assertions when in pursuit of them the United States enters into alliances with imperialists and dictators? Would it not be better for the United States to say that it wants to safeguard its national freedom and is afraid of the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union? In that case, alliances with military dictators and imperialists to strengthen itself, however opportunistic, will not look so incongruous and hypocritical as they do today. If we are reluctant to believe in the pious utterances of others, we may be sure that such utterances by us, unsupported by appropriate action, will not be believed. Repeated platitudes will only confirm the belief, now so general, that the words of politicians have no meaning. They are blub, blub, blub. If words have no meaning, communication becomes difficult.

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Take again the *Panchsheel.* Its principles if analyzed would amount to maintaining the status quo in international affairs, however inequitable. Neither the aggrieved nations nor the aggressor nations want or can maintain this status quo. For instance, there can be no peaceful coexistence between nations which have diametrically opposite apostolic missions to discharge and which want to do it through violence, war and crooked diplomacy. Nor can a conquered nation consent to peaceful coexistence with its imperial masters of whatever hue. Algeria can have no peaceful coexistence with France, nor for that matter can the Arab nations. Hungary cannot live in a state of peaceful coexistence with Russia or Tibet with China. The Portuguese dictator takes refuge under the *Panchsheel* doctrine of peaceful coexistence to deny the right of India in Goa or of the inhabitants thereof. Peaceful coexistence in such cases will be that of the lamb with lion, when the lamb is safe in its belly.

The same applies to other principles of *Panchsheel.* One cannot respect the sovereignty of imperial nations over their colonies, yet international law recognizes it as a fact. The independence of nations must be recognized and realized before there can be peaceful coexistence or mutual respect of each other's sovereignty. The *Panchsheel* principles are not moral imperatives that can be adhered to unilaterally. In international affairs, even moral principles have no unilateral application; much less can *Panchsheel,* which depends upon mutuality of rights and obligations. It is therefore no wonder that recently while on a visit to Nepal the Indian Prime Minister when questioned about *Panchsheel* was constrained to say, in effect, "Where is *Panchsheel?* It cannot be worked in the present international situation. It has become merely a slogan."

When all nations believe in war, in the ultimate, as the solvent of international problems, there is something to be said in favor of the doctrine of "brinkmanship," enunciated by the late Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles. As a matter of fact this is no new doctrine. It has been enunciated by politicians everywhere when they say, "Believe in God but keep your powder dry." On the basis of violence, no other kind of diplomacy is likely to succeed.

Unfortunately most nations have not powder enough to keep dry. It is also true that even the most powerful nation today cannot defend itself singlehandedly. It is therefore natural for nations to enter into military alliances for mutual protection. But there

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are countries which enter these alliances not for the purposes of defense but to safeguard their imperial interests or work their designs on their neighbors. For instance, Pakistan, as she has often said, has only one enemy—India. But for India, she would be neutral like most of the Asiatic countries which have recently achieved independence. France uses the military help she receives from the United States against Algeria. Portugal is in NATO to safeguard her imperial possessions. But in the confused international world of today this is inevitable, when both parties to the cold war want to strengthen themselves by any alliance, however doubtful.

It nevertheless is good that, in spite of any strength they might gain from military alliances, some nations have chosen to remain neutral. They do so for valid and weighty reasons. Not only do they have no expansionist designs, but they also feel that if they ally themselves with more powerful nations, and especially if they allow them military bases (ultimately it will come to that), they will impair their independence. Further, they believe that if more nations are linked in military alliances there is a greater danger of world conflagration, which, with the present nuclear weapons, may destroy humanity. If the number of neutral nations increases there will be a greater possibility of settling international problems through negotiations and conferences, below or at the summit. It will also mean more and more reliance on the good offices of the United Nations, thereby strengthening that organization. Even as it is, its services are utilized when the rival big powers feel that any further fighting in which they are directly or indirectly involved, if not speedily stopped, will produce complications leading to world war. This happened in Korea and Indochina and during the Suez and other West Asian troubles. In any case, regional military pacts weaken the standing and authority of the United Nations.

The underdeveloped Asio-African countries which have recently achieved freedom have so many political, economic and social problems of their own that they feel they must confine their attention to the solution of these rather than dabble in partisan international politics. They do not want to annoy any of the big powers. Furthermore, nations which have recently cast off the Western yoke are not quite sure that the colonialists have altogether abandoned the idea of regaining their old dominant position, given the opportunity. They therefore utilize the anti-im-

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perialist assertions of Russia to keep in check fresh ambitions of the West. At the same time they are not enamored of the political and economic setup in Communist Russia or China. They therefore remain neutral. Further, they do not believe in the apostolic mission of reforming the world that both sides claim for themselves, one more fanatically and more aggressively than the other. No nation has been commissioned by God or His substitute, Historical Necessity, to reform the world.

These are good reasons for neutrality as between the two blocs, and they appeal to India. Therefore the policy of the Indian Government in this respect is generally accepted by the nation.

IV

But with all these advantages, there is no guarantee of non-interference, direct or indirect, by the power blocs if they feel that their real or fancied interests are affected. Under these circumstances the neutrality of uncommitted nations can be useful to themselves and to the world only if it is born of strength of conviction and not out of weakness or opportunist considerations. In the latter case they cannot stick to it under strain from one side or the other. Their moral influence can count only when they refuse to yield to the threats and bullying tactics of powerful nations. There must be no compromise on clear issues, involving questions of international justice and peace. It must be understood that no nation can keep intact its independence and whatever moral influence it has without taking risks. To suppose that right conduct, whether in the individual or the group, involves no risks is not true to the facts of life and historical experience. As we have said, the risks involved in appeasement in the long run are greater. Where physical resistance is not possible, one must not shrink from moral resistance to evil. That is the only way to save one's liberty and self-respect. Unfortunately, the world is so constituted that right conduct does not save one from material loss and suffering. In the struggle for independence, even though it was non-violent, India had to take great risks at critical times; and she did not hesitate to take them. Neutral nations have to resist the temptation of inclining to one side or the other to gain temporary advantage. They must be impartial. They must avoid any action which may undermine the confidence of other nations in their neutrality and do everything that will strengthen it.

It is natural that India should want to be friendly towards her

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Communist neighbors. Neighbors are most likely to have conflicting interests and to find ready cause for a fight. In Europe, West and East, I have been told by every country that it was friendly to India. My reply usually was: "Why not? We are not neighbors." That India should be anxious for friendship with Communist Russia and China, in spite of difference in ideology, should not be difficult to understand; but this anxiety should not blind us to whatever they say or do, particularly where the freedom and interests of other nations are concerned. For instance, our condemnation of Russian action in Hungary in 1956 was so halting and belated that it lost its merit. We were more forthright in condemning British, French and Israeli action in Egypt, and also American and British action in West Asia, when troops were landed in Lebanon and Jordan. In the case of Tibet as I said earlier, our attitude from the beginning has been in contradiction with our avowed principles. It has had the appearance of weakness and opportunism, of purchasing Chinese friendship at the cost of Tibet.

On occasions, we have allowed our guests from Communist countries to denounce Western democracies, with whom we are on friendly terms, from our soil. We cannot stop nations from denouncing each other. But if they do so they must do it from their own country and not from ours. It is possible for nations so attacked to feel that we share the views of our guests. In any case, they naturally feel aggrieved.

In assessing historical events, we should not forget contemporary facts. Whatever the world has suffered and is suffering from overseas imperialism, we cannot ignore the fact that, for whatever reasons or on whatever pretext, a new variety of imperialism has made its appearance. It nibbles at its neighbors and swallows them. It waits for some time, brief or long according to circumstances, to pounce on other victims. It has not the merit of being democratic even at home. In a Western country the existence of democracy at home mitigates to some extent the rigors of its domination in colonial lands. In England, Labor as a party, and some of its leaders individually, advocated democratic reforms in India. Ultimately, the Labor Party not only supported the cause of Indian independence but negotiated on that basis. In Communist countries there can be no vocal public opinion against their aggression or tyranny. Not a single voice was raised or could be raised in Communist Russia or China against the aggression

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in Hungary or Tibet and the atrocities committed in these hapless and helpless lands. Within democratic France there is a section of socialists and the whole bloc of Communists who advocate Algerian independence. (In non-Communist countries, the Communists, though not very ardent patriots, are always the most passionate advocates of civil liberties and the freedom of the colonial peoples.) In the imperialist democracies, usually, when civil liberties are denied to colonial people or there is executive tyranny, some groups or individuals in parliament protest and rouse public opinion. This does not and cannot happen under dictatorships—Fascist, Communist or military. In the colonies of Western democracies, also, the legal system is generally modelled on the pattern of democracy at home, which affords some protection against executive highhandedness and tyranny. The legal system in totalitarian countries or their dependencies affords the individual no protection against political and executive highhandedness.

Toward the danger of this new imperialism the Indian attitude has not been as strong and unequivocal as it was toward the older imperialism from which India herself suffered. The old imperialism is thoroughly discredited and is on the decline. It no longer gets support from progressives and intellectuals even in imperialist countries. This does not mean that it does not weigh heavily on those who suffer from it. But the new Communist imperialism, now fast beginning to show its paws and claws, is more dangerous. It embraces in its vise both the home country and the dependencies. Moreover, it is imposed in the name of high principles and noble ends which may have an appeal for many intellectuals and idealists the world over.

As matters stand today, a neutral nation cannot afford to lean heavily on large loans from outside for the development of its internal economy, if it wants to maintain its independence of opinion and action. The anxiety for large loans has sometimes put India in an awkward position. Often when our representatives have gone to the West, especially to America, they have impressed upon their audiences the idea that if large loans are not advanced to India she will be overwhelmed by Communism; the great bastion of democracy in Asia will thus be destroyed. This appears to be a humiliating position for a great nation to take. If Communism is bad, India must resist it, loans or no loans. Unarmed India did not rely on foreign powers or foreign financial aid in

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order to win its independence. Today it cannot rely upon huge foreign loans to meet not only its economic needs but also an internal Communist danger. Furthermore, Western nations understandably do not appreciate our criticizing them, even on issues which do not adversely affect our vital interests, at the same time that we ask them for large loans. An independent nation which wants to maintain its right to free criticism and action will do best to rely upon its own resources for its economic development.

To sum up, then, the principles upon which the Indian foreign policy of non-alignment is based are correct. They are generally accepted by the country and are in keeping with the genius of our people. If more nations will accept the same attitude there will be a definite lessening of international tension. It is in details of diplomacy that our foreign policy has been weak and has sometimes gone wrong. Our mistakes have to some extent impaired our moral standing as a neutral nation and have often injured our interests in various ways. But, after all, India is new to diplomacy, and the world situation is extremely complicated.

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ISLAM AND THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

By John S. Badeau

IT IS related that Abdul Malik ibn Merwan was reading the Koran when he received news of his succession as ruler of the Arab Empire (A.D. 685). Closing the sacred book, he said regretfully, "This means a parting between me and thee!"

Thus early, if apocryphally, did Muslims discover that the demands of their faith and the necessities of practical affairs might stand in conflict. Many times in subsequent generations this lesson was repeated. In every age and area, the role of Islam has been affected by contemporary political movements, national policies, economic needs and cultural patterns. An eminent Muslim scholar has said that Islamic history can only be understood as a constant tension between the "ruling institution" (politics, economics, society) and the "religious institution" (law, theology, savants).

This tension is particularly acute in the Middle East today. The same forces of modernity that have reshaped our Western world are invading Muslim lands and society. But the rate of invasion is vastly accelerated; changes with which the West made its peace through four centuries of adjustment have been compressed in the East into a scant century and a half. The result has been an explosive dislocation of the old ways that augurs a "parting" from traditional Islam far more radical than anything that has gone on in the past. There is both pathos and penetration in the words of a young Muslim scholar who wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century, "The days have cast us, together with our religion and our honor, into a field with ravenous lions."

It is therefore understandable that many observers predict the rapid decay of Islamic influence in the Middle East. Yet, though the evidence of the practical impotency of traditional religion in many current affairs is unmistakable, this conclusion is unwarranted—at least as a generalization. Throughout its history, Islam has been in constant interplay with the processes of society and the result has been a working compromise between Muslim and non-Muslim elements that reflects the conditions and needs of each era. To say that Islam is changing its role today is not necessarily to say that it is on the verge of disappearing—only that

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one more compromise is taking place, the final form of which cannot yet be determined.

There are two basic difficulties in assessing the part played by Islam in the Middle East today. The first arises from the negative emphasis that is always the most prominent characteristic of periods of turbulent change. The loss of Islamic influence in the state, society and individual life is far more apparent and dramatic than the religious elements that quietly endure. Such a radical departure from the past as the dropping of Islam as the "religion of the state" in the provisional constitution of the United Arab Republic is a repudiation of many centuries of Muslim political form. But because Islam is not mentioned in the constitution does not mean that it ceases to operate in the mind and ideologies of those who direct the U.A.R.—to say nothing of the masses.

The second difficulty comes from the nebulous content of the term "Islam." Since the Muslim religion, in origin and theory, lays claim to regulate the totality of human activity, it has historically been the "cell wall" of the social organism. While many elements, non-Muslim in origin, have always operated within the life of Muslim communities, these have been fitted into the framework of Islam. In a sense almost everything that has gone on in the Middle East since the rise of Islam can be labeled "Islamic."

But to define Islam so inclusively makes it almost impossible to isolate the specific role religion plays in social and political activities. This difficulty is escaped when Islam is defined in concrete institutional and theological terms. For, in the Caliphate, Sharia Law, Savants (*Ulema*) and theological systems, there are influences whose content and current status can be determined. But to adopt this more specific definition is to rule out historical and psychological influences which, profoundly if subtly, affect the life of the modern Muslim community even when its outward religious observances have weakened.

It is partly because of these contrasting definitions of Islam that judgments on the religious situation in the Middle East differ. Some observers are apt to assign to Islam a dominant role in many of the area's problems. This was the theme of a recent book entitled, "Islam Inflamed,"[1] which in these words suggested that the basic factor in Middle East turmoil is an Islamic reaction

[1] James Morris, "Islam Inflamed." New York: Pantheon, 1957.

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against the West. Observers who penetrate more deeply into specific political and social situations[2] take an opposite view. While noting the façade of Islamic loyalties, vocabulary and institutions, they find that the actual operating forces in the Middle East are quite un-Islamic. One such observer has concluded that Islam emerges rather as a side issue or, in the minds of Middle Easterners themselves, as a means to secular ends. The central theme is no longer the religious one of the past, but the secular one of modern nationalism.

Both views have their truth because they are not talking about precisely the same Islam. As a hue coloring Middle Eastern life, Islam is indeed everywhere evident. It provides the history in which national movements seek their justification, the vocabulary that supplies significant terms for modern life, the family and social milieu in which masses of common people still live. Yet Islam is chiefly a hue; the political and social organisms which it colors are more and more deriving their substance from influences and institutions that lie outside the Muslim tradition.

The problem posed by contrasting definitions can be avoided by recognizing that "Islam" is not a single term (either inclusive or exclusive) but a general heading. Under it are gathered varieties of activities and influences, each of which has its own role in shaping the Muslimness of society and the individual. Only by considering these multi-form "Islams" can an estimate be made of the current situation in the Middle East. Yet useful as this approach is, it contains a measure of artificiality. No one "Islam" exists in isolation from its neighbors and the interactions between the various "Islams" must not be neglected. Moreover, one never meets "Islam" in the Middle East—but only specific situations and individuals. It is in these that the religious heritage is incarnate and through them plays its role in passing events. With this caution, a preliminary estimate of the role of Islam in the modern Middle East can be made under various categories.

1. Political Organization

From its inception under the Prophet, Islam has claimed to provide a political organization for the Community of the Faithful. While the elaboration of this into the medieval Muslim empires involved the absorption of many non-Islamic elements, the

[2] The author has profited from participation in a discussion group of the Council on Foreign Relations, and especially from papers presented there by Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, William R. Polk, Lewis V. Thomas, T. Cuyler Young and Don Peretz.

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state operated behind the façade of a Muslim theory of government. In this, rule was exercised by the Caliph (successor of the Prophet) to whom the citizenry owed obedience on the basis of religious loyalty. But the Caliph was only the executive and (through his appointment of judges) the judiciary of the community. The legislative function was supplied by Canon Law (Sharia) which passed judgment upon, if it did not always originate, the enactments of the state. In practice the Caliph presently ceased to be the effective political ruler, this role being played by a "man of power" (Sultan) in which was revived the traditional Oriental despot. To maintain the fiction of the Caliph's leadership, the Sultan was usually confirmed in his rule by the Caliph and supposedly acted in his behalf.

What is the place of this political Islam in the Middle East today? The most evident sign of its weakening is the lost hope of pan-Islamism. Although there have been suggestions both from Islamic leaders and Western students of a pan-Islamic revival, there is little evidence that this can or will take place. For one thing, the period when the Middle East could be described as a Muslim political entity is both historically remote and temporarily brief. Original Islam did indeed envision a growing community in which religious faith was the basis of the social and political bond. But this ideal received historical embodiment for little more than a century and a half, coming to an end with the fall of the Omayyad dynasty nearly sixteen centuries ago. Then, revived Arab tribal rivalries, sectarian schisms and the rebirth of national and cultural self-consciousness among conquered, non-Arab peoples rent the fabric of the universal Islamic state. Once Islam lost the battle to contain and over-rule dynastic struggles and particular loyalties, it permanently gave up the possibility of holding together heterogeneous peoples within a single religious-political empire.

Moreover, pan-Islam is difficult to conceive as the basis for a modern empire because it is almost impossible for any group of states today to become integrated into the international structure when they are based upon a political and ideological pattern at variance with the rest of the world. So long as Islamdom contained the center of its own gravity and was self-sustaining politically and economically, it could afford to maintain its own distinctive political organization. But today it is difficult to perpetuate such isolated political "monads" and assume that they

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will move together with the rest of the world in a preëstablished harmony. Increasingly all areas are part of an international society, interdependent economically and politically and moving within the same milieu of ideas.

In these circumstances no group of states can set up a bloc built upon radically different political concepts without being in continuous tension with the rest of the world. Islamdom cannot insulate itself against the seepage of the most universally accepted political concept of our times—nationalism. Nor can it act harmoniously in international affairs unless it shares in some measure in commonly accepted political forms. The cold war emphasizes this fact. There is an air of unrealism about many discussions of coexistence with the Soviet bloc because they assume that two political and ideological systems as different as the Soviet and democratic ways can live side by side without continuing and violent interaction. Only if both blocs could completely isolate themselves would a "peaceful" coexistence be possible.

It is therefore not surprising that there have been no serious attempts to amalgamate the present Muslim states into a pan-Islamic political system. In the early struggle of the Indian Muslim community for political selfhood, Mohammed Iqbal did indeed call for the revival of pan-Islamism and even suggested that the Constituent Assembly of republican Turkey might assume the historic functions of the Caliphate. But this was a bit of political philosophizing that aroused no answering enthusiasm in the Muslim world. Perhaps most significant is the fact that when the Arab states of the Middle East established their first area organization, they chose the concept of an "Arab" league rather than a "Muslim" league. This was done partly because a Muslim league would have excluded officially Christian Lebanon, but also because the leaders of the combining states were committed to a national, rather than a pan-Islamic ideal.

Further evidence of the hollowness of the pan-Islamic conception is found in the fact that Muslim states in their foreign policies do not appear to differentiate between their Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors. National interest, rather than shared religious tradition, is as much the basis of foreign policy in the Middle East as in the West. Although Jordan is a Muslim state, Egypt attacked its government with as much virulence as though it had been the United States itself. It might be expected that the Islamness of the Middle East would result in a common policy to-

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ward the State of Israel. But Turkey and Iran do not share the Arab world's reaction against Israel, and Turkey has not hesitated to have commercial dealings with the new country, thus angering her Arab (Muslim) neighbors. Indeed the "Muslim" factor between Muslim states seems as impotent and illusory as the "Christian" factor between Christian states.

In contrast to this illusory pan-Islamism, the separate national states of the Middle East embody much Islamic political influence and activity. At the beginning of the modern period, with most of the Muslim world under the control of Western and non-Muslim powers, the only effective revival of Islamic political selfhood possible was in the form of nationalistic activity. Thus the nineteenth-century prophets of an Islamic political renaissance accepted the modern national state as inevitable and saw in its patriotic fervor an implement that could be used to dispossess the foreigner and reëstablish Muslim self-determination. This was Iqbal's theory, for he called first for the creation of a series of strong, individual Muslim states which later would give up their identity to merge into a pan-Islamic empire.

This program appeared logical, but was in fact vitiated by the hidden conflicts between nationalism and Islam as inevitably rival political systems. For the modern national state, the community is determined by geographical boundaries and/or ethnic origins. But for Islam it is neither geography nor race which undergirds the body politic, but a community of faith governed by religious law. Separate national states can therefore be Islamic only in a sense radically different from the traditional political theory of the Muslim community.

Moreover, in the formation of modern states, a new political element emerged. This was the parliamentary system of the Western world, whose assumption of legislative authority curtailing the absolute power of the ruler clashes with historic Islamic concepts. It is this factor, more than any other aspect of nationalism, that began the disinheritance of the Muslim political system. Those countries which have not adopted some form of modern parliamentary rule (such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan) are still marked by strong Muslim political influence, even though they are theoretically as "nationalistic" in the separateness of their existence as republican Turkey.

The result of these factors has been to reverse the connection that early modern Muslim leaders envisioned between national-

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ism and Islam. Instead of nationalism being the servant of Islam and providing it with a new and vigorous political form, Islam has increasingly become the servant of nationalism. The most complete expression of this is in modern Turkey, which deliberately repudiated the Islamic basis of the state in favor of Western secular concepts. In so doing it did not abandon Islam, but attempted to "Turkify" it in the same way that the English Reformation "Anglicized" the medieval Catholic heritage by creating a separate Church of England. Indeed, this historic precedent was cited by apologists of the Turkish Revolution in explanation of the place of Islam in the new Turkey. "Turkification" of Islam meant not only its disestablishment, but the use of Turkish as the language of ritual and devotion and the control by the state of religious institutions and clergy. Islam's "universal" Sharia Law was abandoned in favor of a national Turkish legal system modelled after the Swiss Code and based upon enactments of the legislative assembly.

In the Arab world, this lead has not been followed. The separate Arab states are still formally Muslim, with Islam as the state religion. Sharia Law has continued to have a place in the national legal system and Islamic institutions play an influential role. Yet in most of the Arab world Islam is steadily losing power as a political form and increasingly serves as the façade behind which the forces of nationalism operate. In theory, if not always in fact, Muslims and non-Muslims are equal in social and political privileges, and parliamentary enactments (outside the sphere of personal status) are not dependent upon the canons of Sharia Law. Most significant is the fact that the current wave of enthusiasm for "Arab unity" and the "Arab nation" contains few explicit Islamic references. Apologists of the movement define and justify the basic concepts of Arab nationalism in terms drawn from racial and tribal concepts rather than from any ideas of a common Islamic bond. Abdul Nasser is a good example of this. While Islam is mentioned in his "Philosophy of the Revolution," it plays a much less important and specific role than the other two circles which he sees as influencing revolutionary Egypt's future. This was made clear in the formation of the United Arab Republic, where any mention of Islam was excluded from the provisional constitution—the reason being that Syrian Christians played a significant role in the Baath Party, which strongly supported the union. This is to say that nationalistic political expediency was

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more basic than the Islamic concept in setting the pattern of the new state.

Although Islam is thus increasingly subservient to nationalism, in many specific situations it still exerts important political pressures. The balance between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities was a major factor in the recent Lebanese civil war. In Iran there have been occasions when conservative Islamic leadership has been given its way in order to avert dangerous pressure on the government—the clearest case being the attack on the Bahai Center in Tehran several years ago. Even though parliamentary or military governments, such as Nasser's and Kassem's, exercise complete legislative authority, they must take into account the religious reactions of both the *Ulema* and the masses. Several years ago, the Egyptian Government began a popular birth-control program, with at least the tacit approval of the then Rector of al Azhar. But when the new Rector of al Azhar disapproved of the program, the government quietly relaxed its efforts until some form of religious backing could be secured. Even in "secular" Turkey, political leaders at all levels have found it expedient to maintain an identifiable Islamic loyalty in their appeal for the village vote.

It is natural that in many cases national policy should use Islamic feeling for its own purposes. While the Egyptian Government has paid less attention to Islam as an internal factor than might be expected, externally it has fostered the Islamic connection with parts of Black Africa where the government is seeking political influence. The historic Muslim universities in Cairo, Fez, Marrakesh and Kairowan are being used as training grounds to inculcate a spirit of nationalism in African students, whose numbers have grown remarkably in the last five years. This has led to the curious phenomenon of Negro Muslim religious leaders vigorously preaching "Arab" nationalism to their fellows in some parts of French West Africa.

From this review it would be easy to conclude that Islam has completely lost the struggle to nationalism. Yet it must be noted that in recent years there have been a number of political movements striving to reëstablish the Islamic basis of the modern state. In the Arab world, several of these had their origin, or were particularly active, in Egypt: the National Muslim Party, Muslim Youth, Iron Guard, Young Men of Mohammed, Muslim Jehad, Society of Islamic Brotherhood and (the most influential)

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the Muslim Brotherhood. These combined intense nationalistic fervor with the belief that the Muslim religious state should be the pattern of a purified and revived national life. While such movements have failed to capture the field from secular nationalism, they are reminders that the tinder of religious feeling can still be ignited by the spark of patriotism. Islam may have ceased to be a decisive influence in shaping the form of the state, but it is certainly not politically dead among the masses.

2. Institutional Life

Islam is not only a political structure, it is also a series of institutions represented by legal codes, centers of learning, philanthropic agencies, bodies of *Ulema* and such social practices as the system of *Wakfs* (property endowment for religious or charitable purposes). How does this aspect of Islam fare in the Middle East today?

Here three significant changes are apparent. The first is that the graduates of religious institutions no longer play a major role in staffing important posts in government or as political leaders. A century ago, Mohammed Abdu was both Rector of al Azhar and a popular political leader. The position of his class was due partly to the monopoly of religious institutions in producing an educated élite, and partly to the traditional respect for religious learning. But with the growth of national, Western-inspired systems of education, intellectual leadership from Muslim institutions is no longer preponderant, nor is it trained to cope with the problems of the modern state. The formulation of national development, both political and social, has passed almost entirely out of the hands of religious leaders into those of the new intelligentsia who have entered deeply into the practices of the modern world. For them, Islam has ceased to be an all-embracing loyalty; while they may practice it as a personal ethic, they have intellectually repudiated (or unconsciously bypassed) much of its social and political content. Consequently, Islamic institutions have steadily lost their leadership role in the more modern Middle Eastern countries.

A second change has come in the increasing limitation of the area in which Sharia Law operates. In most of the Middle East today, the Sharia is confined to matters of personal status (divorce, marriage, inheritance) but even here the state has not hesitated to inject its influence of modernization.

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The third change is the control by the national government of many of the institutional activities of Islam. Muslim charities must register with the Ministry of Social Affairs in some Arab countries and conduct their business along lines determined by the state. While mosque schools and Muslim universities continue, the state no longer uses them as a major instrument for popular education and they are patronized chiefly by those who expect to enter the religious profession. In the more extreme forms of nationalism, the *Wakf* system has either been abolished or sharply curtailed, although this is one of the most venerable Islamic institutions.

Yet, as in the political sphere, Islamic institutions are used by nationalism for its own purposes. Faced with the necessity of evolving a "national pattern," the modern state frequently makes the teaching of Islam obligatory in state and private schools (both religious and secular), and prescribes the curriculum to be used. Muslim missionaries were sent to the southern Sudan, both because this has been an area of major Christian activity and because the paganness of the tribes made for political resistance to the control of the Muslim government in Khartoum. The Soviet Union has on occasion stimulated the pilgrimage, hoping that Muslims from Russia could serve as propaganda agents both for Soviet accomplishments and the religious "freedom" of Muslim communities in Russia.

3. Social Structure

Islam as a constituent of the social structure lives on long after political and institutional life has become secularized. Attitudes toward authority, the customs of family life and the relations of individuals to their fellows are still set by the classic Muslim pattern for much of Middle East society. However, it is highly significant that in the modernizing social programs of the Middle East, little attempt is made to utilize Muslim social institutions or practices. The village mosque, for instance, is almost entirely neglected as the basis for community work and few attempts have been made to train and use the Mullahs as educational and social leaders. Indeed when the writer suggested to one Middle East country that the mosque might be "institutionalized" on the pattern of the Western community church and the Mullah trained as a literacy leader, he was met with complete indifference and almost pitied for his naïveté for making such a suggestion!

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Most of the social program of modernizing states like Turkey, Iran and the United Arab Republic draw their basic concepts from the Western world and make little attempt to pick out of the Islamic past institutions or programs that might be woven into the new pattern. The reason for this is simple. As Middle Eastern countries orient themselves to modernity, they must evolve some new form of society that will both realize political ambitions and bring a better way of life to the masses. But to accomplish this involves a repudiation of the political and economic autocracies of the past. It is becoming increasingly evident (as in the Turkish and Egyptian revolutions) that such a new society can come into being only if the traditional "ancien régime" is destroyed. But that régime is embodied in institutions that in fact or in theory claim to be Islamic. Therefore the social revolution inevitably (if somewhat unconsciously) is directed against the Islamic past and results in its eventual destruction.

If there were a vigorous movement in the Middle East to reinterpret the social concepts of Islam, this destruction might not be inevitable. But most Muslim thinkers who undertake to defend the traditional system do so with such rigidity as to rule out any real pertinancy to modern conditions. A typical example is a defense of Islam by a professor of al Azhar under the title "Social Justice in Islam." His thesis is that traditional Islamic society contains all the elements necessary for the modern state—but the defense consists of little more than reiterating the theoretical validity of the very social practices that must be altered if national development is to take place.

4. Theological-Philosophical System

Islam, like Christianity, developed a complete intellectual formulation of life. This was embodied in classical Muslim theology, which is still the intellectual reservoir for modern religious thought. While this tradition operates more widely than the social and political elements of Islam, it is increasingly losing its vitality. The masses of Muslim people (like the masses of Christian people) were seldom critically theological. The intellectual élite, who might be expected to preserve and rework the classical heritage, is the very group that is drinking most deeply from the springs of modern science, sociology and politics. It is in these, rather than in Muslim classicism, that they find the operating principles for much of their life.

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There are indeed many "defenses of Islam" in modern literature, but the very phrase "defense" reveals what is happening. In the past, Muslim thought was the standard by which the activities of man and his society were judged since it was the eternal truth revealed by God. Today few writers take this attitude. Implicitly and explicitly, the intellectual content of the modern world is accepted as normative, and attempts are made to show that Islam fits in with it. But this gives away the whole show—for when religion loses its claim of ultimate validity and becomes an instrument for defending or furthering some other values, it ceases to be religion at all.

This failure to provide a modern reinterpretation of Muslim thought has much more than religious implications. If either the reality or the pertinency of the Muslim tradition disappears, it may leave the chaotic modern world of the Middle East without any framework of alternate values to assist in directing its destiny. One of two things is apt to happen. It may be that nationalism will become the ultimate loyalty and the sole determiner of all values. If so, there is no point at which religious thought can stand in criticism of the extremes of national hysteria or xenophobic emotionalism. The other possibility is that Communism, with its completely organized intellectual life, may come in to fill the void. Since Communism is a kind of latter-day scholasticism, all-inclusive in scope and based upon a rigid logic, it is often readily accepted by restless and vacant-minded intellectuals who have lost the foundations of their historic faith, yet seek something more effective than the uncertain tides of nationalism.

5. Ideological Milieu

While it is clear that many of the outward and formalized forms of Islam are losing their relevance in the Middle East today, there is obviously a residual deposit of attitudes and reactions from the centuries of the past which in some measure determines the way modern Muslims react to their problems.

First, there is the feeling that Islam creates about the community. The body of the Faithful is, in fact, the incarnation of the divine will in history. Mohammed did not announce merely a personal ethic; he founded a community, governed by divine law and embodying God's pattern for human society. This means that in the Muslim mind the community claims primacy over the individual. Even when society has ceased to be religious, and

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finds its political and social forms in modern secularism, the feeling for the social organism persists. Movements like the Egyptian revolution rest not so much upon the police power of the state as on the feeling that the state (which is the community) is an entity to which the individual is in a measure subservient. For this reason, the concept of the "strong man" (or dictator) is more at home in the Middle East than in the Western world, where it clashes with a sense of the individual's absolute value.

A second element in the intellectual milieu is the sense of Islamdom being set over against Christendom. From the beginning of its existence, the Muslim community has been in continuous tension with the Western world. Its original expansion was accomplished by conquest of Western territory, and the returning tide of the Crusades brought the battle to Muslim lands. This is not to say that the fact of religious difference is an overt operating factor in the relations between Islamic and Christian countries in the modern world. Yet it is not unfair to say that in some countries within the Middle East there is endemic anti-Western feeling (or suspicion) which grows out of the religious conflicts of the past. This may be one reason for the "positive neutralism" that is popular in the Arab world. Beneath this neutralism is the feeling that Islamdom has its own destiny and cannot be hitched to the cart of the non-Islamic world.

Third, it must be noted that in most Middle Eastern countries full nationality is either openly or unconsciously identified with status as a Muslim. The non-Muslim—Jew or Christian—is seldom considered quite the equal of the Muslim. This is true even in Turkey, where the state has repudiated any religious connection. The only exception is Lebanon, where the balance between Christian and Muslim is so nearly equal that each must accept the other as fully Lebanese. Almost everyone who has lived in the Middle East is aware of this subtle pressure. While the enlightened modern Muslim is perfectly sincere in maintaining that he does not discriminate against his fellow citizens on a religious basis, in fact he often has a different attitude toward his non-Muslim compatriot. No matter what guarantees of equality may be given by the state, this identification of "Muslimness" and nationality will probably long continue.

Of course the Muslim milieu contains much more than the few elements noted here. It is a reservoir, formed through thirteen centuries of rich and varied development, from which Muslims

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will continue to draw attitudes, feelings, assumptions and unconscious reactions that will give their future, as their past, a distinctive Islamic hue.

But that hue will have its own unique shade. With Tennyson, Muslims will learn that "God fulfills Himself in many ways," and that the last word on Islam has not yet been spoken. But whatever that word is, it will not be a repetition of the classical past. Dr. Shafiq Ghorbal, one of Egypt's most perceptive Muslim historians, puts the matter succinctly when he writes:

> The period of 150 years which began with the French invasion of Egypt (1798) witnessed the emerging of our Islamic society into the world society of the present era. We, the members of the Islamic society, have not been fully aware of all the implications of the events of this period . . . the influence has been so great that even when the Islamic people have regained their political independence they have found that a return to the traditional way of life was not possible—even if it were desirable. It needs to be emphasized that such a return is not deemed desirable even when lip service is paid to the glorious traditions of the past.[3]

[3] "Islam—The Straight Path," edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. New York: Ronald Press, 1958, p. 78.

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ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION IN EUROPE

By Agostino Soldati

THE European Economic Community, or E.E.C., has been in operation since the first of this year. Products from France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries are now circulating among these nations with greater freedom than ever before. Within a few years' time these products will be in a position to compete freely with local goods in all six home markets. No one whose heart is set on economic expansion can have anything but praise for the creators and architects of this undertaking; we are used to hearing grand words nowadays, but the E.E.C. is in truth a major enterprise.

Nor is the goal of the E.E.C. confined to the creation of a common market among the Six, or to the alignment of their tariffs. From the start, the Six governments have looked beyond the "great European market" to the harmonization of economic legislation and agricultural policy—to the creation, in other words, of a broad economic zone in tune with the modern age and one which could contribute toward the prosperity of Europe and of the world. This is all to the good of Europe and its partners and friends everywhere.

It is not at all surprising that both the prospect and the operation of such a grand scheme have resulted in a number of acute difficulties. These have been sharpest in regard to the so-called Eleven, the countries that have enjoyed, with the Six, the advantages of common membership in the O.E.E.C. but now find themselves for all practical purposes excluded from what is in fact a preferential customs union. In discussion of this situation, it is generally the opposition of the United Kingdom that is stressed. But Britain can actually meet the Six on equal terms: only 14 percent of its total exports go to the Common Market countries and, after all, it has world-wide interests. The other ten O.E.E.C. countries have, however, been the traditional suppliers and above all the traditional customers of the Common Market area.[1] For them, easy trade with the Six is a *vital* matter. It is therefore

[1] In 1958 the following percentages of total exports went to the Common Market area: Denmark, 36 percent; Norway, 31 percent; Sweden, 39 percent; Austria, 52 percent; Switzerland, 57 percent.

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totally false to regard criticism of the Common Market and of its relations with other nations as nothing more than a British plot against European unification. There is every reason for more acute concern in continental capitals than in London.

Let us look more closely at some of the effects of the almost total exclusion of the Eleven from the E.E.C. Clearly, the political effects have not been good; the extended and often exacerbated negotiations that led to the present division have resulted in much strain, particularly between France and Britain. This problem even played a part in Germany's most serious internal political crisis since the war. It is at the root of present misunderstandings in the Western world.

On the economic side there are a number of fears. For example, within a very few years the E.E.C. will have a common external tariff which is expected to average nearly 18 percent. The Eleven, on the other hand, particularly the smaller countries which are substantial importers from the Six, have very low tariffs, the average level of import duties being between 5 and 9 percent. How to meet such a situation is already causing considerable anxiety. To be sure, the E.E.C. has extended most of its initial tariff concessions and quota reductions to the Eleven, but there is no assurance, nor any likelihood, that these will be continued when further barriers are removed within the Community.

Concern is also being caused by the argument often heard among the Six that, because their volume of trade with the outside world makes them perhaps the biggest importing and exporting unit in the world, they should *above all* forge links with the underdeveloped countries. The E.E.C. has already started to look for important responsibilities in other continents. It has already begun to evade its responsibilities toward its neighbors and partners in Europe.

The countries on the threatened fringes of Eastern Europe—Greece, Turkey and Austria—are particularly vulnerable economically. Under the new scheme, these nations will no longer be treated as equal partners in the great markets of continental Europe. German goods will have preference over Austrian goods in Paris, Brussels and Rotterdam, as well as in Milan. Oranges and tobacco from Macedonia and Anatolia can no longer be offered in Hamburg on equal terms with the products of Italy or of the overseas territories of the Six. In other words, the European countries which for reasons of geography or economy are the

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most vulnerable will no longer enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the great Western European market. This may be consistent with the GATT agreement and may even be regarded by some as consistent with the aim of strengthening the European continent. But the question will certainly be raised one day as to whether the concentration of strength in Western Europe sought by the Six was not purchased at too dear a price of indifference to the fate of Central and Southeastern Europe—isolated and made an easy prey to external forces.

Others among the Eleven argue against the Common Market on a different basis. Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland buy more from the Common Market countries as a whole than they sell to them. In spite of this, the market of the Six absorbs from 30 to 60 percent of the exports of these small nations. And, in the bargain, these countries enrich the Common Market through their adverse trade balance with it.

What does the economic future hold for these countries if their exclusion from the Common Market continues? Their adverse balance of trade with the Six will increase because they will export less to the Six than before. They will have to surmount the common external tariff of a great Community, free-trading within and protectionist toward the outside world. Experience shows that tariff obstacles tend to be heightened by others which, though indirect, are no less effective than tariffs in restricting trade.

It is clear therefore that the Eleven will sell less to the E.E.C. if developments continue along their anticipated path. Will they buy more? Possibly, as the result of the rationalization and standardization of production in the Six countries. But will not the Eleven in their turn take action against imports from the new Community, so as to restore some semblance of balance to their trade with the Six European partners? Will they not place increased obstacles in the way of imports from the Six? Can their right to do so really be contested from the economic point of view? Anxiety over their balance of payments and their employment situation, as well as the law of reciprocity, will compel them to do so. We would then witness declining trade and economic war between Europeans. A sorry outcome for the efforts to achieve greater European unity! In bitter fact, European unity has never been more remote than it has been in recent months.

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II

The present situation is particularly disheartening because, from July 1956 to the end of 1958, strenuous efforts were made to prevent the schism that divides the Six from the Eleven. It is even more disheartening because the plans that were worked out were technically feasible; they failed only because of obscure political motives and legal and political sophistry.

Let us retrace the chronology of events briefly. In June 1955 the Six, meeting at Messina, decided to begin the examination of a Common Market, a decision that resulted in the generally favorable Spaak Report of April 1956. In July 1956, in response to a British proposal, the Council of the O.E.E.C. in its turn decided to set up a Working Party to study the possibilities of some sort of free trade area between the Six and the other O.E.E.C. nations. That a free trade area of such dimensions was technically possible was made very clear in the Working Party's unanimous report in January 1957 and on a number of occasions since.[2] To put it in very general terms, the Eleven proposed that the free movement of goods within the Common Market be extended on a reciprocal basis to all the interested countries of Western Europe, starting with the O.E.E.C. countries. Those nations that belonged to the free trade area but not to the E.E.C. would retain control over their individual tariffs, but the free movement of goods among all seventeen O.E.E.C. nations would be encouraged by a variety of means. For the sake of argument let us concede that the United Kingdom actually launched this project and that it took the lead in the negotiations. Let us also forget for the time being that the Six may possibly have no real intention or inclination to welcome outsiders into their group!

Drafting and negotiation on a free trade area took a great deal of time. By November 1958, however, there was agreement, or near agreement, on 15 specific points relating to a close economic association among the Seventeen. Its structure was to have been brother to that of the E.E.C. The Seventeen were also not far from agreement on general and common economic problems, such as the harmonization of wages and taxes and a certain degree of alignment of external tariff and trade policies. There was agreement that the extension of freedom of commerce to goods

[2] See for example, "Negotiations for a European Free Trade Area," *Documents Relating to the Negotiations from July 1956 to December 1958*, London: H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 641, January 1959.

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from the Eleven would involve special regulations applying to chemicals, textiles, engineering, pulp and paper, and non-ferrous metals. A start had also been made on the study of the individual and differentiated terms on which especially "aggressive" products from the Eleven could be admitted to the attractive market of the Six.

Further cause for optimism was to be found in the July 1958 proposal of the European Commission of the Six that a provisional multilateral agreement, to come into effect no later than the starting date of the E.E.C. on January 1, 1959, be signed by all Seventeen nations. The general purpose of this agreement was to enable the Seventeen to stand on an equal footing by the time the E.E.C. was launched. Also important in evaluating the course of the discussions was an E.E.C. memorandum of October 17, 1958, which stated: "The European Community solemnly reaffirms that it is determined, both for economic and political reasons, to arrive at an agreement which will make it possible to associate with the Community on a multilateral basis the other Member States of the O.E.E.C."[3] Important suggestions were made in this document concerning two serious obstacles to final agreement: the external tariff freedom of the Eleven and the matter of relations with the British Commonwealth. In both cases the suggestions were optimistic.

There seemed to be no doubt then that an economic association could be worked out and that it was in fact close to being worked out. The Six have themselves gone on record to this effect. And the Eleven have never ceased asking that their trade relations with the Common Market be regulated on a basis of parity.

In spite of these positive steps, the years of negotiation led to no fruitful result. A permanent solution inspired by the spirit of coöperation that characterized the postwar years and the Marshall Plan era—in other words, a multilateral, non-discriminatory, pan-European organization—has been rejected, primarily because of the intransigence of France. One cannot escape the conclusion that even members of the Atlantic Alliance are being drawn into opposing economic camps with quite different economic structures. There is no case in history in which the flow of trade has not in the long run also influenced views on foreign policy and defense. Within the Western world, we are already witnessing a policy of disengagement on the primary plane—the eco-

[3] See "Negotiations for a European Free Trade Area," *op. cit.*, p. 97.

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nomic. Today, the integration of the Six, tomorrow, the disintegration of the rest.

III

In spite of the present discouraging outlook, the question for the future must be: how can a stable and multilateral form of association among the European countries be reached? How can the economic dislocation of the Continent be prevented even while the legitimate and more ambitious interests of the Six are protected? Experts on both sides have submitted any number of plans. They all come down to one thing: it is essential to create here and now a stable organization embracing all Seventeen and subscribed to by all of them. Such an organization would, under the terms of its constituent agreement, give every guarantee of gradual movement toward an economic zone united not only in its trade relations but also by a harmonization of general economic policies in Europe. Everything cannot be done at once; it would perhaps be wise to allow one of the organs of the proposed economic association to decide which products would move freely throughout the zone from the outset and which, being considered "difficult," would not be granted such freedom for the time being. Such an organ, on which the Six could be given a majority vote, would also decide when and on what terms, at the price of what reconversion by certain producers in the Six, a market of 300,000,000 consumers covering practically all items produced in Western Europe, could be achieved. Under such a scheme, the very large majority of goods from the Eleven would compete freely, on a reciprocal basis, in the market of the Six. Admission of all goods from the Six to the markets of the Eleven could not fail to strengthen and develop this great zone of free competition.

In order to realize these purposes, a European Economic Conference should be called to meet outside the existing economic institutions, to reëstablish contact between all the governments directly or indirectly concerned. This Conference should at the outset establish the points on which there are no insuperable difficulties. This done, the immediate resumption of trade on a basis of parity among the Seventeen would follow; after all, this was the practice from 1948 until the E.E.C. first began to operate in January 1959. The Conference should also create organs empowered to make suggestions for the progressive introduction of solutions to problems on which immediate agreement might not

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be possible. Technical organs operating on a system of majority voting should also be established to decide under what conditions and in what period of time certain products from the Eleven would or would not be likely to disturb the market and producers in the Six.

These steps would reassure the smaller countries that they are not being "expelled" from the European family, and abandoned to an economic fate which could hardly prove constructive for any of the European nations or for the Western world as a whole. A feeling of cohesion, of coöperation and unity would be re-introduced by such a Conference, if successful. Already there exist carefully drafted, relevant plans in the O.E.E.C. and E.E.C. alike. A most constructive scheme, the Scherpenberg Plan, has been prepared in Bonn; others are available in Rome and Brussels. Whatever plan is adopted, it should provide for the admission of non-O.E.E.C. states such as Finland, Jugoslavia and perhaps others,[4] so that they also may have an opportunity to progress in the great concert of free economies. Only then can Europe as a whole remain the stronghold of Western economic liberalism.

This is an essential and urgent task. We must put an end to the futile and unaccustomed quarrels which, in the economic sphere, have never reached such a pitch before. Europe must free itself from the sterile doctrinal quarrels that could weaken and degrade it faster than any external threat. There are few examples of good political understanding between countries divided by conflicting interests and polemics.

IV

Since the European Economic Community took the initiative in breaking off negotiations last November, the other O.E.E.C. countries have been given no concrete assurance by the Six that there is any immediate possibility of resuming the move towards a coördinated and comprehensive pan-European economy embracing the Seventeen countries. Even the efforts of the Hallstein Committee, which was set up by the Six themselves and sat last January and February, have not met with the approval of the Six.

In April 1959 the E.E.C. set up another body, the Rey Committee, equally entrusted with the task of finding a form of multilateral association between the Six and the Eleven. So far as

[4] Spain became a member July 20, 1959.

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is known, this Committee is still genuinely looking for the formula which is apparently so difficult to find, but it is encountering grave and so far insuperable difficulties from its own members.

It is therefore not surprising that the more industrialized countries excluded from the E.E.C. have been seeking ways and means of arriving on their own account at a freer and easier exchange of goods. In this way the Seven, as they are known, are trying to put into practice the liberal, non-legalistic and non-protectionist views which they have supported from 1956 to 1958. These efforts have been stigmatized by many authoritative commentators in E.E.C. circles as unrealistic, bogus and even as "tainted by British inspiration."

One of the foremost economists in E.E.C. circles has said that any enlarged economic area not equipped with compulsory rules about the origin of goods, deflections of trade, competition under conditions of protection, manpower, common external commercial policy, salaries and wages, pensions, taxes and so forth would be just a "doodle" and not a workable international economic scheme.

Would it not be fair to leave the Seven to try out among themselves the practical experiment of the free exchange of goods between sovereign countries with autonomous economic policies and no central economic planning? Experience will show whether more is needed than a code of good conduct, broad consultations on economic policy and common decisions where necessary, based on the experience and needs of partners acting in good faith and good will. Some of us do not think it essential that every possible difficulty which might theoretically arise in future should be solved in advance on *a priori* grounds, with a Court, set rules of procedure and an abundance of conversion funds and substantial commitments in every branch of economic life.

The Treaty of Rome, as at present interpreted by certain governments, takes the view that it is essential to have rigid rules laid down in advance to meet every future difficulty. The Seven, on the other hand, believe that a simpler scheme is workable, consistent with the GATT conception of a free trade area. It now seems possible that starting July 1, 1960, the Seven will try out this less legalistic formula, unless (as most, if not all, of the Seven would prefer) there were general agreement to return to the more informal approach represented by the "Ockrent Paper" of October 1958 (so-called after the Belgian Member). This was pro-

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duced by the E.E.C. countries as their common view and accepted by the other O.E.E.C. countries as the basis for further negotiations among the Seventeen, on the few difficult issues which remained to be settled in November 1958.

It is well known that some of the Seven countries could not, for constitutional reasons, agree to join the Community and abandon sovereign control of their economic life to a supra-national authority. This is the case of Austria (because of international obligations), Switzerland (for many reasons, including her century-old policy of permanent neutrality) and the United Kingdom (because of its obviously intricate links with the Commonwealth and the Sterling Area). Others, for geographical or structural reasons, could not join a customs union. How could these countries be expected to refrain from doing their best in their own way to achieve specialization of production and large-scale exchange of goods—objectives which in the case of the Common Market rightly received everybody's blessing? There are more ways than one of liberalizing international trade and of rationalizing production. There is no greater reason to doubt the motives of the Seven than there is to question the sincerity of those who wrote in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome that their purpose was to "contribute, through a common commercial policy, to the progressive lifting of restrictions in international trade." It is regrettable that their words no longer apply to their actions.

It is not too late to reverse the sorry trend of events in Europe. Close economic links among all European countries are still possible. Such links are even more vitally needed today than in 1948, because there is less agreement among European countries in other areas, and because the challenge—including the economic one—is of an altogether different dimension.

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ARMS FOR AFRICA?

By Arnold Rivkin

THE lengthening procession of new African states making their debut on the world scene must soon confront American policy-makers with still another difficult problem—the question of whether to grant them military assistance. It is all but inevitable that these countries will insist on exercising the fundamental right and responsibility of sovereign nations to raise and maintain military forces for self-defense. It is equally certain that the creation of national military establishments will impose burdens which their underdeveloped economies and unstable political structures are ill-prepared to sustain. It is also certain that the emergent states will seek to share these burdens and will look in many directions for military assistance—to the former metropoles, to the United States, to the Communist bloc.

If these premises are correct, what are the principal considerations which must be accommodated in the formulation of U.S. policy with regard to military assistance programs in Africa?

The relationships between Western European powers and their African colonies are being drastically transformed as a result of the political revolution sweeping the African continent. The conflict which this has engendered has presented the United States with one of its most serious foreign policy dilemmas; and the horns are likely to be sharpened as the former colonies turn to the United States for military assistance.

In North Africa the Algerian rebellion continues to agitate France's relationships with her two former protectorates. In Sub-Sahara Africa, where France is engaged in a last urgent effort to hold together her remaining African territories in a new French Community, the very presence of the secessionist state of Guinea represents a constant threat to the cohesiveness of the new Community. It is a foregone conclusion that the provision of American military assistance to these new African states would meet with sharp French disapproval. France would view such assistance as an attempt by the United States to displace her influence or undercut her policies in the area—as she did when the United States proposed to provide limited quantities of small arms to Tunisia. The shipments were authorized over French protests only after President Bourguiba had made thinly veiled allusions to looking

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elsewhere for arms. The issue of providing additional American military assistance to Tunisia remains and is being sorely aggravated by the continuous conflict in neighboring Algeria. It is also clear that military assistance to Guinea would, if anything, call forth an even stronger reaction from France in light of the uncertain prospects of the new French Community.

The act of withholding requested military assistance from newly independent African states is similarly fraught with grave difficulties. What Bourguiba threatened to do, President Sékou Touré of Guinea has in fact done. Guinea has received three shipments of arms from Czechoslovakia. This has caused considerable concern in the West. Apparently stung by the outcry of criticism in Western Europe and the United States, Sékou Touré has publicly stated that he accepted the Communist arms only after his request to the United States for rifles for Guinea's 2,000-man army was "spurned."[1] He stated in explicit terms why he believes his request for U.S. military assistance was ignored:

> There is incontestably a sort of hiatus in these relations [between the United States and Guinea], conditioned, I think, on the side of the United States by French-American relationships. If you prefer, we have a feeling the evolution of our relations with the United States is closely dependent on the evolution of relations between France and Guinea.
>
> There is a sort of subordination of our interest, which has been particularly marked recently.[2]

This kind of reaction is likely to be characteristic of African leaders who may be rebuffed in their request for arms. A refusal by the United States is likely in their view to be just one more instance of our choosing the side of the former colonial power.

Happily not all the transformed relationships between Europe and Africa are as troubled as those just described. In the British area the advent of an independent Ghana and the transition of Nigeria toward independence have been accomplished under more friendly auspices. Nevertheless, if for any reason there should be a difference of opinion between the United Kingdom and one or the other of the new members of the Commonwealth over arms policy—as has been rumored to be the case with respect to Ghana's desire to establish an air force—and if the United States is looked to as an alternative source of supply, we would obviously face a dilemma. Hence, even where there is a friendly accommodation between the European metropole and its former

[1] *The New York Times*, April 30, 1959.
[2] *Ibid.*

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colony, the question of whether to grant or withhold military assistance may still be a difficult one for the United States.

The demise of Italy as a colonial power has removed Libya and Somalia from the Italian defense umbrella. The provision of limited quantities of arms to Libya has not dismayed Italy, nor would larger shipments to the two former colonies be likely to do so. The problem here is the vacuum left by Italy's departure from Africa. The presence of a major American air base near Tripoli implies a commitment to defend Libya, but what will be our policy with regard to Somalia, which becomes independent next year?

The emergence of new states in Sub-Sahara Africa has acted to reawaken the two older independent African states of Liberia and Ethiopia. They are now competing for leadership with the new African states, which are themselves in competition with one another, with conflicting and overlapping plans for federations and unions. This competition is likely to be accentuated next year when the new states of Nigeria, Somalia, Togoland and the Cameroons make their appearance. In North Africa there is a vying for position between the newly independent states and Egypt. Tunisia has broken off diplomatic relations with Egypt amidst a storm of recriminations. There is also a growing rivalry between Egypt, with her aspirations to dominate the growing bloc of independent African states, and Ghana, with her dream of leadership of a pan-African movement which will embrace the entire continent.

The burgeoning rivalries between African states for prestige and leadership are being multiplied by a series of boundary and territorial claims by the new African states. The European "scramble for Africa" set off by the Berlin Conference in 1884 left a heritage of artificially contrived borderlines which newly independent African states are likely to seek to rectify. The divided Togolands and Cameroons and the fragmented Somalilands are obvious cases in point. There has already been an uneasy stirring of irredentist claims in all of these areas.

The introduction of American military assistance into this pan-African sweepstakes for political leadership inevitably means altering the balance of power between and among African areas. The situation is ripe for a dozen Indian-Pakistani situations where military aid to one party in a local dispute will inevitably cause a grievance in the rival country. If, as is likely, the com-

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peting country turns elsewhere for military assistance, then an armaments race is set in motion between African states and indirectly between the United States and the Communist bloc—or perhaps Egypt. Even more painful is the prospect of competition of this kind between the United States and one of its Western allies. Guinea, in its efforts to develop a military force, poses this very question. The growth of military power in Guinea is likely to induce the French to develop a stronger military establishment in the neighboring Republic of the Ivory Coast. In the first instance this will be a French force; but given the present rate of political developments in the French West African territories it seems likely that the Ivory Coast will soon have control over military forces based on its soil. If the United States should feel it necessary to attempt to supplant the Communist bloc as a source of arms for Guinea, we would then be presented with the spectacle of two NATO allies providing arms to rival African states.

II

In addition to the international implications of providing military assistance to newly independent African states, we should consider the impact of such assistance on the underdeveloped economies and unstable political structures of the nascent states. For any military effort above the minimum required for internal policing will affect the use of their resources and the distribution of political power.

The immediate danger is one of distorting the economic development pattern, as well as retarding the rate of development, by decisions to invest in military bases and production facilities rather than in productive sectors of the economy. Expansion of military forces involves not only the allocation of scarce material resources but also the diversion of limited supplies of skilled and semi-skilled manpower into the armed forces. Significant military expenditures in the absence of sufficient expansion of available consumer goods are also likely to create inflationary pressures which all too often bedevil underdeveloped countries striving to expand their economies rapidly.

Looming large on the political side is the problem of the distribution of power within the society. Changes in the size, quality and direction of a military effort in an underdeveloped state may well involve shifts in the balance of power from one political group to another, and, more often than not, in the relationship

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between military and civil authorities. This has led to a profusion of military dictatorships in Asia and—to a lesser extent—in Africa.

The pattern of independence movements fragmenting into multiple political factions, followed by political paralysis and administrative breakdown, has led to a series of military coups d'état in newly independent states. Large military efforts, supported by external assistance, have generally resulted in the enhancement of the military as a focus of power, prestige and stability in the presence of general political instability and economic stagnation. The part that external military assistance plays in raising the stature of military leaders should cause us to question the responsibility we bear for political developments—not all of them lamentable—in a number of countries. At the very least we should recognize that significant military efforts in unstable or underdeveloped states have ramifications of which the people of a wealthy, stable democracy can hardly be aware.

For example, it is next to impossible to ensure that U.S. assistance will not be misused by the recipient government. The use of armed force to suppress political opposition and to impose authoritarian rule is not unknown in newly independent states or in underdeveloped countries with unstable political régimes. There are already worrisome signs that Africa will not be different from other areas of the world in this regard. A recent report of a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, recommending the reduction and eventual termination of grant military assistance to Latin American countries, is particularly apposite when it declares that "the use by a régime of U.S.-supplied armaments in civil strife has garnered us the wrath of people (not only in the country affected but throughout Latin America) who tend to equate our armaments with the régime using them."[3]

Similarly it has not been unusual for newly independent or underdeveloped states confronted by serious internal difficulties to look to external ventures as a way out. The U.S. Mutual Security Act which governs the *sale* of military assistance attempts to guard against such eventualities by requiring that the United States obtain a commitment from a recipient nation that it will use such assistance "solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense

[3] Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, *Report on United States Relations with Latin America*, May 12, 1959, p. 7.

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of the area of which it is a part . . . and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state."[4]

The provisions controlling *grants* of military assistance are approximately the same, and in addition impose a requirement for continuous observation and review by "United States representatives" of U.S. military assistance.[5] Notwithstanding these provisions, experience in Latin America led the Congress to stipulate that military assistance to Latin American countries could be authorized by the President only when he has found that the assistance is "in accordance with defense plans" which require "the recipient nation to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."[6] Nevertheless, recent events in the Caribbean involving Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Venezuela, among others, make these controls and statements of intention of dubious value when a sovereign state is intent upon evading them. Hence, there is considerable risk that U.S. military assistance provided for self-defense will be misused either in internal suppression of political opposition or in external aggression—with unfavorable results for the United States.

III

In reaching policy decisions as to military assistance to African states, the United States must, of course, consider the alternative sources to which they might turn. The availability of the Communist bloc as well as the possible role of Egypt as an alternative source must be considered. Nasser's image of Egypt's tripartite role in world affairs—within the "Arab circle," the "African continent" and the "Islamic world"—is especially relevant to Africa, where all three roles converge, and where Egyptian propaganda and foreign policy are being pitched to these threefold interests.

At present it may be assumed that, with the exception of Egypt, most of the leaders of the independent African countries would rather receive military assistance from the United States or the West generally than from the Communist bloc or Egypt. This certainly is true of Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia and Liberia, and probably is true of Morocco and the Sudan. Recent Communist-bloc shipments of arms to Guinea raise a serious question as

[4] Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, ch. I, § 106(a).
[5] *Ibid.*, ch. II, § 142(10).
[6] *Ibid.*, ch. I, § 105(b) (4).

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to her basic posture in world affairs. The arms situation, moreover, is complicated by the Algerian conflict. Military equipment and supplies have been provided to the rebels from Egypt—and perhaps from more distant lands—through Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. It is hard to estimate what, if any, lasting effect this may have on the "pipeline" countries.

Military assistance, much more than economic and technical aid, implies a type of intimacy and even collaboration which may involve taking sides in cold-war disputes. This is likely to be true even if the military equipment is purchased rather than received as a grant, for purchase may involve a credit agreement which, as in the Egyptian case, takes the form of a Communist mortgage on the one crop in a mono-crop economy.

The provision of military assistance, by sale or grant, generally involves a military mission to explain and demonstrate the uses of the new weapons and to train the forces of the recipient country in their maintenance and operation. As already noted, in cases of grant assistance the United States requires the presence of an inspection team to guard against misuse of the equipment provided. In one guise or another Communist nations require similar representation. Military assistance is also likely to impose on the recipient state a continuing dependence on the supplying country because of the need for spare parts and for modernization, renovation and replacement. The total implication to be drawn is that an African state, once committed to receiving military assistance of any volume, would find it extremely difficult to break away from the orbit of the supplying nation—whether the United States or any other. Thus a prime consideration in reaching a military assistance policy for Africa must be the fact that a program of arms aid assiduously administered by the Communist bloc would be a more formidable threat to our national interests than the more widely advertised threat of Soviet trade and economic aid.

IV

In the light of these considerations, what are the possible courses of action? First, we can provide military aid on a bilateral basis—the usual practice wherever the United States is supplying or selling arms as part of a military assistance program. Even where a regional organization exerts over-all responsibility for defense planning, training and operations, the bulk, if not all, of

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the U.S. military assistance is being provided on a bilateral basis. In Africa, the United States already has bilateral agreements with Ethiopia and Liberia and has sold arms to Tunisia.

The United States could continue to adhere to the policy of making such ad hoc arrangements wherever it was deemed in the United States interest to do so. But what has already been said suggests that an ad hoc bilateral approach is *not* the best way of furthering U.S. objectives in Africa. Such a policy might both retard the economic growth of many African states and, in some instances, influence the course of political evolution in ways incompatible with United States interests.

Alternatively, the United States could adopt a policy freezing the status quo, and thus limit its arms agreements in Africa to those now in existence. This would imply a judgment that, even if present commitments were still honored as a matter of good faith, military assistance programs—grant or sale—are not the best way of furthering American objectives in Africa. It is doubtful, however, that the United States would be able or willing to hold the line in the absence of a suitable regional or wider international agreement to assure the security of Africa and to control the introduction of arms into the area.

The United States might undertake to formulate for Africa a doctrine somewhat analogous to the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East. This could take the form of a declaration of principle, by which the United States would underwrite the territorial integrity of states in the area against specified types of external aggression. Circumstances do not recommend a unilateral American declaration of this type. The existence of British, French, Belgian and Portuguese dependent territories in Africa would make a unilateral declaration all but impossible. In any case, such a declaration would have little value. The United States and the states and territories in the area share no common view as to what might constitute a clearly definable threat; and the independent states in the area, with the exception of Tunisia, and possibly the Sudan or Libya, remain unwilling to recognize openly the Egyptian threat of subverting their independence or sovereignty.

Another set of possibilities involves a multilateral approach on a country-by-country basis or on an area-wide basis. In a sense the American sale of arms to Tunisia could be viewed as multilateral, since the United Kingdom was consulted and agreed to participate in a coördinated transaction. This type of ad hoc

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multi-national approach, although in certain circumstances somewhat less objectionable than the strictly bilateral, is none the less subject to essentially the same limitations and shortcomings in that it would have an adverse effect on the economic and political development of African states.

There are more promising possibilities in a general multinational approach of the NATO powers, or at least of those NATO powers with African dependencies, plus the United States. Such an approach might take the form of a multilateral defense umbrella for all of Africa, supplemented by highly restricted arms assistance for the maintenance of internal law and order. This might well, of course, meet such strong opposition by the Communist bloc and Egypt that some African states would be deterred from responding; and it would raise awkward problems for any state which sought to obtain military assistance from the Communist bloc or Egypt. Egypt itself would probably have to be excluded by definition from the area to be covered by the guaranty because of her existing military-aid involvement with the Communist bloc; but almost any multilateral approach to Africa that involved arms limitation would exclude Egypt—if not for this reason, then because of her role as a Middle Eastern power.

Another possible multi-national approach would be an attempt to develop and negotiate within the framework of the United Nations an international convention which could guarantee the African area (probably excepting Egypt) against external aggression and externally supported subversion. At the same time, the agreement should impose a moratorium on the shipment of all arms other than those absolutely required to maintain internal law and order. A United Nations inspection force would be called upon to police the agreement. Such a convention might well be considered a preliminary step in the U.N. disarmament negotiations. Alternatively, an agreement of this kind might be negotiated outside the United Nations directly among the major powers.

Such a convention would largely remove the motivation of independent African states to maintain military forces for other than internal police purposes. The risk of irredentist adventures would be minimized, competition for prestige derived from military stature would be abated, and the whole climate for concentrating on development of viable economies and stable political

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institutions would be considerably improved. Of major importance, the danger of adding still another explosive issue—armament competition—to the highly charged African political situation would be for the most part removed.

Is such an agreement possible? A number of circumstances make the chances quite favorable.

First, at the *present time* (and the possibility of change puts a premium on speed) Africa is not a center of political, economic or military power of any considerable magnitude, and certainly not of a magnitude to affect the balance of power in the world for the foreseeable future. Hence neither side in the cold war would have to give up any substantial advantage which might accrue from military alliances or military assistance agreements with African states. On balance, the advantages to be derived from such a convention would appear to be with the West, because it has more to gain from a measure that avoids the diversion of African resources and efforts away from internal development.

Second, evolving military technology and strategic concepts make it most unlikely that in the long run either side in the cold war could have any over-riding need for bases in the African area. The Communist bloc has none now and is not likely to seek any. The United States position in Morocco is an extremely tenuous one. Similarly the French hold on its naval base at Bizerte in Tunisia is precarious. It is conceivable that the proposed convention could provide for a phased withdrawal which would not be more rapid than is likely to be the case anyway, as a result of insistent Moroccan and Tunisian pressures. The value of the United States and British bases in Libya, the American installation in Ethiopia, and the proposed British base in Kenya would have to be set against the advantage of a settlement which would further our objectives in all of Africa. It may be that as a trading matter the bases in Libya, the installation in Ethiopia or the potential base in Kenya could be retained as an offset to the Communist program of military assistance in Egypt. It may also be that a realistic appraisal of the changing political scene in Africa would indicate that the installations now in being or contemplated are likely to have a limited usefulness and a short life. Even Libya, whose economy is almost totally dependent on American and British aid, appears to be embarking on the dangerous game of "upping the ante" for use of bases on her territory. In North Africa, the United States and other Western pow-

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ers are tenants who run the risk of being dispossessed at any time. Finally, it may be that developments in military technology will go further than they have already in reducing the importance of African bases.

Third, the African states have already shown some indication that they would be agreeable to accepting a guaranteed neutrality as a substitute for maintaining armed forces beyond their internal needs. In the "Resolution on International Peace" adopted at the Accra Conference in April 1958, the independent African states, after condemning plans for atomic tests in the Sahara, appealed "to the great powers to make every possible effort" to achieve a reduction of conventional armaments. The widespread desire of African states to avoid having to take sides in the cold war would suggest that they are likely to view guaranteed neutrality by *all* the great powers as a satisfactory arrangement.

If this is so, then from the Western viewpoint the chief obstacle to adoption of such an international convention is probably our North African bases. We should carefully weigh their value against the benefits to be derived from removing Africa as a new theater of cold-war competition for alliances and bilateral military relationships. If an assessment of the factors involved indicates that a phased withdrawal from these bases is strategically feasible (and perhaps politically inevitable), then it would seem highly desirable that the United States take the initiative in proposing such a convention at an early date.

Success in negotiating an agreement would help substantially to create an environment of security in which the emergent states of Africa could devote their energies and resources to the massive tasks of developing viable economies and stable political institutions. Failure to achieve the proposed convention because of Communist intransigence would clear the air and might demonstrate to Africa and the world at large the source of the generating force for the armaments race and of international tensions.

In any case, the United States is not likely to lose by taking the initiative and making the proposal in conjunction with our Western European allies. A negative response from the Communist world would leave us in no worse position than would otherwise obtain. On the contrary, it would emphasize throughout the Afro-Asian world our desire for peace and our willingness to take constructive steps to limit the involvement of such states in the cold war.

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AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN JAPAN

By Wolf Ladejinsky

SINCE the end of the Second World War, "agrarian reform," or "land to the landless," has been a trenchant slogan in Asia. Variously understood and interpreted, it has come to epitomize much of the problem and promise of Asia. The Communists have made their successful bid for power by claiming that they—and only they—were the reformers. But postwar free Asia did not neglect the land issue. Not all of the Asian countries placed the peasant, as Nehru put it, "in the center of the piece," but a movement to improve the peasant's lot is under way in many Asian countries.

That movement had its inception neither in Communist Russia nor in Communist China. The general pattern was set and the stimulus was given by arch-conservative Japan before the Chinese Communists promoted their brand of agrarianism. In late 1946, Japan promulgated, and within three years implemented, a program which indeed gave the land to the landless. A decade later it stands as a great landmark in the history of Japan. The unprecedented renaissance of present-day rural Japan demonstrates that only free people and widely distributed private ownership of land can make the best use of the productive forces of the village. By the same token, it demonstrates that the land problem can be dealt with resolutely, without the Communist gospel and free of the tragic upheavals unleashed by the Soviet and Chinese agrarian revolutions.

II

Japanese society before the reform was not nearly so monolithic as painted by the legend-makers of Japan. The village with its over-exploited, insecure, rack-rented tenantry was the chink in its armor. The landlords had the money, the leisure, the culture and the power which they did not share with others. The Japanese farmers, on the other hand, were allegedly the bearers of the nation's traditional verities, serving the interests of a feudal and industrial Japan with equal self-denial. The realities were much grimmer than the sentimentalization of the farmer deep in the muck of the rice fields. The majority of the tenants and part-tenants, comprising 70 percent of the farm families and

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cultivating more than half of the land, had little stake in that society. They met the exactions of their many masters with the produce from fragments of overworked land not large enough or rich enough to support their families.

This state of affairs did not go unnoticed in Japan. Before the Second World War there was a body of public opinion, including the military, which recognized that the foundation of Japan, rural Japan, needed shoring up for the sake of the farmers and the nation as a whole. And much of this was recognized also by the American Occupation. There was another motive: the danger of agrarian unrest as a source of Communist power, and the belief that postwar rural Japan—as Japan in general—presented a fertile field for Communist penetration. The idea of taking the political wind out of the Communist sails was as tempting as it was imperative.

It was out of recognition of these factors that General MacArthur, in his now famous land-reform directive of December 15, 1945, ordered the Japanese Government "to take measures to insure that those who till the soil of Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor." The legal provisions into which this directive was embodied in October 1946 called for (a) the compulsory sale at fixed government prices of all the land of the absentee landlords; (b) the compulsory sale of all the land of the resident landlords save for the permissible retention of 2.5 acres—the average size of a Japanese farm; (3) cash rentals and security tenure for those remaining on the land as tenants. These were the principal measures,[1] conceived with an eye for the widespread ownership of land among the tenants.

The MacArthur directive went beyond the redistribution of land. It was not an end in itself but rather a means "to remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression." The very sweep of the pronouncement against the background of a seemingly changeless agrarian society caused many to doubt its ultimate effectiveness. Nevertheless, when in 1947 the farmers of 11,000 villages of Japan went to the polls to elect representatives to administer

[1] "The Promise of Agrarian Reform in Japan," by William M. Gilmartin and W. I. Ladejinsky, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1948.

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the land reform program, the first step was taken toward a fundamental change in rural Japan.

Similar revolutions in Russia and in China have caused heads to roll and darkened the sky with the smoke of burning noblemen's nests. The traveler passing through Japan's countryside in the years 1947–1949 would never have known that a basic economic and social change was being attempted. It is in those years that the Government succeeded in buying and reselling 5,800,000 acres of land. Whereas before the reform 54 percent of the cultivated land was owner-operated, after the reform 92 percent of the land was owned by the farmers of Japan. To a Japanese farmer "a farmer without land is like a man without a soul;" three years after the beginning of the implementation approximately 3,000,000 farmers acquired "souls." Individual ownership of land rather than tenancy became the hallmark of rural Japan.

A decade has gone by since Japan became a typical country of individual small-holders. Judging by the solid core of landowning farmers, the reform has been a success. But one may rightly ask: What lies behind the bare statistical bones of so many landlord acres sold to so many farmers? Has widespread, individual ownership of land been conducive to a rise in agricultural production and peasant welfare? Have the new owners held on to their windfall, or have they bartered it away as so many had predicted? Has it loosened the domination of the old village oligarchy and has it brought to the fore a leadership more in tune with the new conditions? Has the role of the village in local and national politics undergone any change, or has the "boss" system of delivering the farm vote en bloc and at will remained unchanged? Has the undisguised favoritism of industry versus agriculture given place to a more equitable treatment of the country's basic economy? In short, has the shift in ownership stopped short of breaking the notoriously hard cake of custom of rural Japan, or has it come close to giving meaning to the lofty aspirations of the MacArthur directive? The answers to these crucial questions shed much light on what the land transfer was really about, and on the character of the agrarian revolution it set in motion.

III

An interested observer cannot but be struck with the fever for improvement that has swept rural Japan with the implementation of the reform. It would appear that all of the land was in

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need of face lifting. The unavoidable impression is that the farmers have declared war on the severe limitations imposed by the one to two-acre holdings, trying to eliminate widespread fear among them that "if we stand still we shall be swept away." This aspect of the agrarian revolution is well expressed in post-reform village posters: "May our agricultural production multiply the size of our holdings."

Economic and psychological factors have combined to bring this about. It is difficult to measure the pride of ownership and the heightened sense of social position as a source of greater initiative to improve and accumulate, but their effectiveness cannot be gainsaid. Even the new folksongs reflect it:

The same paddy fields, but now my own;
Heavy is the crop and light is my heart;
Bright shines the sun on my own piece of land!

The immediate result of the transfer of ownership was the sharp increase in the accumulation of rural capital. Just as the postwar inflation relieved the farmers of the burden of heavy indebtedness, in the same manner they were relieved of land purchase obligations to a considerable degree by paying for them in inflated currency. This, followed by the elimination of the former high rentals (which formerly constituted nearly half of his farming costs), together with good crops and good farm prices, enabled the farmers to invest in the improvement of their land and modernization of their equipment. In 1957 such investments were roughly four times those before the war.

The zeal to modernize and to improve, favored by good weather conditions, has resulted in higher production. By 1958 it was 20 percent above prewar. Considering that rice output per unit of land was very high even before the war, the national increase of 10 percent attained in recent years from almost the same acreage is particularly significant. The desire to "expand" the size of the holdings has led, for the first time, to a fuller appreciation of animal husbandry as a source of income.

Encouraged by recent land improvement experience and determined to reclaim approximately 1,500,000 acres of marginal undeveloped land, the Japanese Government in 1957 launched a very ambitious five-year plan. If successful, farm income will increase by 25 percent. Wheat and rice production will be augmented by 12 and 8 percent, respectively; output of dairy products more than doubled; roughly the same for sugar; and raw silk produc-

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tion, with an eye to increased silk exports, will be augmented by 50 percent. Whatever the actual attainments, the chain reaction commencing with the land redistribution is still on, and its ultimate aim is higher production and a higher standard of living.

But the outstanding feature of the village after the reform is the upsurge of farm mechanization, and the emphasis on labor productivity as well as land productivity. For the first time in the modern history of Japanese agriculture, mechanization has extended into practices which an inexhaustible labor supply could do as well. A tractor in a Japanese rice field was unheard of until after the Second World War. But immediately after the reform, in 1949, there were 10,000 small, garden-type tractors in use; a decade later there were nearly 150,000 of them. While the problem of using machines for transplanting young rice shoots and for harvesting has not been resolved yet, the Japanese label recent attainments as "epoch-making" and "revolutionary." A comparison of the number of machines purchased by farmers between 1947 and 1957 is dramatically illustrated by a few figures. During this decade electric motors increased almost 5-fold; gasoline motors, 7-fold; tractors, 15-fold; power-sprayers nearly 20-fold; power-threshing machines, 5-fold; and rice-hulling machines nearly 4-fold.

It might seem paradoxical that the villages with surplus labor should be concerned with labor-saving devices. Part of the explanation lies in the availability of the means to buy the equipment and in the evidence that the release of the farmer from manual-labor drudgery in no way inhibits higher yields. Given these two factors, the troublesome problem of a rising surplus of farm labor is mitigated somewhat in the face of improved economic conditions, and particularly against the background of the changes in the peasant's outlook. The reform has stimulated the discontent with the narrow boundaries of the old way of working and living. Farmers also wish to share in the progress and comforts caused by the tremendous expansion of Japan's industry in the past decade. For this reason, the rapid mechanization of agriculture is a phenomenon far greater than its technical aspects imply.

IV

Friend and foe of the land reform are agreed that the farmers are better off now than ever before. Although the per capita

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farm income is lower than for the rest of gainfully employed Japanese, in 1956 average farm disposable income was 50 percent larger than before the war. Between 1950 and 1957 farm and non-farm income per household jumped from an equivalent of $587 to $1,005. Farmers have been spending twice as much as they did before the war on productive and consumer goods, but the balance has been in their favor.

The Japanese village became an important market for Japan's industrial output. And not only of the new and expanding farm-equipment industry. The village elders with memories of strain and stress may shrug their shoulders at the "indecent extravagance," but many a farmer doesn't deny himself a motorcycle, tiled kitchen and running water, a refrigerator and washing machine, sometimes a television set, and, not least, putting aside some money for a son's or daughter's college education. It is part of the new mental outlook, which may well represent a more fundamental change in Japanese society than the more readily discernible surface changes in conventions of everyday life.

One of the significant landmarks of the post-reform Japan is the recognition by the Government that the long-established practice of discriminating against agriculture in favor of industry is no longer tenable. The farmers can no longer be taken for granted with impunity; the politicians know that the farmers can be bearers of political gifts. This awareness of their ability to influence government actions was pithily expressed by a farmer: "We support those who support us."

The post-reform policies of the Government to assist the farmers are motivated by still other considerations. The national interest has something to do with it, and so has the changing temper of public opinion as a whole. This temper has been mainly emotional and "touchy," idealistic, and with a strong tinge of welfare-state notions. Cautious, practical and calculating Japanese régimes have had to take notice of it. The idea that only industry and commerce are entitled to official nursing has gone out of fashion. Hence the spectacle of borrowing money from the World Bank to be used, at least in part, for agricultural development; huge government investments for land reclamation, which in recent years averaged more than three times those of prewar years; the creation of the Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation for long-term improvement loans; a revision of the tax structure more in consonance with farm in-

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terests; and the official rice price policy which guarantees the farmer a profit for his crop.

This is, indeed, a departure from all previous official attitudes toward the farmers; from the Tokugawa age, when, in the felicitous phrase of Sir George Sansom, "statesmen thought highly of agriculture, but not of the agriculturist;" from the agricultural settlement during the early Meiji era, which while abolishing some features of feudalism gave rise to wholesale peasant expropriation; and from the less blatant but none the less "beast of burden" treatment of more recent times.

V

The change in the attitude of both Government and farmers and the successful attempts to put the land in the service of greater expectations are telling commentaries on the dire predictions of a decade ago. The anti-reform spokesmen argued that land ownership would be a poor exchange for the economic security offered by the landlord. Worse, they foresaw a serious economic and cultural deterioration throughout rural Japan if landlords were removed and tenants became small owners, all allegedly equally poor and with no interest in the general welfare of the community. In Japan, a decade without landlord domination has not borne them out either in the economic or in the cultural field.

The most vivid impression of a trip in any part of rural Japan is the quest for education. The first thing that strikes the traveler is the extensiveness of the school facilities, the enlargement of the old schools and the building of new ones that would do honor to any metropolitan area of Japan. Village appropriations for education range from 35 to 40 percent of the total budget. In this respect "feudal" Kagoshima Prefecture does not differ from the highly literate and sophisticated Nagano Prefecture: the same passionate devotion to education, the same demonstrated effort for improvement, and the same evidence of mental horizons which are not limited by the village vistas of Kagoshima.

The yearnings assume a variety of manifestations. A half-dozen miles from Kagoshima City one comes across an anthropologist's treat: a village of Samurai descendants. There are none outside of the prefecture, and this is one of the very few in Kagoshima. The general appearance of the settlement with its straight lanes upon which the two-sworded men once practiced archery

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from fast-moving horses; the age-tinted stone walls which give the impression of surrounding the village and yet dividing it into neat compounds; the design of the gates, and the layout of the living quarters so as to give time to prepare for an unwelcome intruder—all these take one back a century or centuries. Even the accompanying Japanese friend cannot help but remark on this surviving vestige of a feudal society. But in reality it is only a museum piece. Far down the end of the same lane in a large, new school auditorium, young Japanese carry on as if they were ages removed from the Samurai ancestors and what they represented. More than a thousand of them watch goggle-eyed as the Sugar Plum Fairy and the supporting cast of dancers, aged 10 to 12, perform "The Nutcracker" in classical ballet costume. Not every village has its "corps de ballet," but the one reared in the so-called citadel of feudalism provides its own commentary on the "changeless" Japan on the one hand and the people's hopes on the other.

Mass primary education is in the Meiji tradition but the urge to expand it has never been greater than in post-reform Japan. No one is interested in "economizing" on it, and the question of "affording" does not enter into the building of a multi-million yen school. The rise of the standard of living, the consciousness of the new position of the farmer, and the generous governmental subsidies to education have all had much to do with the education rush. But there is another explanation which reveals the darker side of the Japanese village, whether before or after reform. This relates to the second and third sons, who do not in effect inherit the land, despite the inheritance provisions of the new Constitution, and must shift for themselves, looking for opportunities in urban Japan.

A village mayor made this problem clear to the writer:

> My prefecture has neither raw materials nor finished products to export. All we can export is human beings. In the past we exported them to China, Korea, the United States, and above all, to the industrial and commercial centers of Japan. Myself, I was an exportee to Manchuria. The time has passed when we can continue this process with the new generations. We can only try to export them to other parts of Japan and there they are bound to meet severe competition. The very least we can do for our surplus men is to provide them with the best education obtainable. Once educated, they will not remain in the village; they will have to go to the cities and let the cities take care of them. We will have discharged our obligations towards them, and we will have done our duty to the cities by giving them the best

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export goods the village can furnish. If they remain with us, uneducated and with no future, there will be no end to our misery.

This is a national and a rural problem and the farmers try to meet it in their own way. However, the schools are not only for the second and third sons. As in everything else, the landlords have been the intellectual leaders of the village, but the cultural tradition to which the landlords lay special claims shows no signs of drying up in the post-reform village.

VI

Everything about the reform pointed to an alteration in the social structure of the Japanese village. Begun with the Meiji Restoration upon the elimination from the village of the feudal lord and the warrior-retainer, it was virtually completed with the reform when the village became mostly owner-farmer. One need not be an economic determinist to note that with the transfer of the land to the tenants at nominal prices the landlords lost their affluence and with it a good deal of their influence. Now, new and old owner-cultivators are found in positions of responsibility as members of agricultural commissions, farm-coöperative boards, village offices and school boards. The former landlords have much to say about the absence of the customary homage the tenants used to bear them, feeling somewhat bewildered by the emergence of a new leadership and the need to deal with it on equal footing.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the new leadership has completely displaced the old one, or that it will soon do so. Tradition still counts for much, and resident landlords with two or three acres leased to the remaining tenants, and the relatively small number of ex-landlords with timber holdings, continue to exercise influence. What is taking place is the sharing of power between the two. This is a new and welcome development. Japan's agriculture after the reform still is a marginal economy with acre and half-acre farmers. It needs all the available skills and social peace and stability to deal with the ever-present problem of six million farmers on 15–16 million acres of land.

In his classic work, "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State,"[2] Herbert Norman speaks of "The Janus head of the Japanese peasant"—he can be alternately conservative or radical. There

[2] New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940.

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is ample evidence to justify this view, and yet, ever since modern Japan put the ballot to use, the peasant vote has been invariably conservative. The vote brokers, the gentry, the local political bosses, the tweedledum-tweedledee type of political parties, and the conservative side of Janus' head—all these contrived to that end. Nevertheless, the old pattern has undergone a change, part of it being the rise of the powerful Socialist Party. Elections in the past decade demonstrate that the peasants still vote the conservative tickets, but they also vote for Socialists and independents. Local politicians are still in business, but they are in a quandary; the vote can be, and often is, divided in too many ways to suit their customary want.

A Japanese writer refers to the reform as the event that "injected the breath of democracy among the farmers." If this is the case, one of its effects is that political labels have lost a good deal of their pull, and that the farmers vote their individual preference. They pick and choose, and the economic interest is the motivation. Aside from the candidate's own proven concern with farm conditions, the record of his party's agricultural policies is equally decisive. Whatever action a government in power may choose to take with respect to fertilizer prices, the price of rice, scope of land-improvement work and short or long-term credit funds will vitally affect the distribution of the vote. Clearly, "we support those who support us" has a modern democratic ring.

There is only one group for which the Japanese farmers do not vote—the Communists. They are among the authentic losers of the agrarian revolution. Whether the tenantry of Japan would have flocked to the Communists' colors if the country's fundamental farm issue had not been met cannot be answered with certainty. The radicalism of the peasant might have asserted itself, but, having blindly opposed the reform because the Soviets pronounced the "MacArthur reform" as nothing more than a plot "to sell the farmers down the river," Communist political strength in an ocean of small proprietors came to an inevitable end.

VII

In the final analysis, the basis of all the changes is the stake in the land shared by virtually all the farmers. Whether these changes are sustained depends upon the retention of the land by the owners. One of the most widespread predictions by the critics

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of the reform was that most of the peasants who received the land so easily would just as easily dispose of it, setting in motion the old familiar process of accumulation of land in relatively few hands and the pauperization of many others. Official land prices were decontrolled in 1950 and they have increased fifty to a hundred-fold since then, but, so far, the predictions fall far short of fulfillment.

Land is being bought and sold under the supervision of local agricultural commissions, but the rate of such sales at any given year has been less than 1 percent of the total, or one-third to one-fourth of the prewar sales. There has been a considerable change in the content of the transactions. No land can be bought for lease to others, which would create new tenancies. The sales are made chiefly by part-time, often postwar, farmers, whose major source of income does not come from agriculture and who became possessors of a minute holding following the reform. The elimination of such holdings, which are undersized even in Japanese terms, is a healthy development, ending as it does in somewhat larger, more efficient farms. In general, whatever the reasons leading to the purchase and sale, and whoever the participants in the transactions may be, there have been hardly any cases of land accumulation reaching the permissible ceiling of 7.5 acres, let alone exceeding it.

It is not surprising that they hold on to the land; everything in the long agrarian history of Japan underlines the quest for it. The monuments erected to enshrine the agrarian reform that made it possible, and the multi-volume histories published in every prefecture of Japan to preserve the memory of the quiet and yet stirring days when "land to the landless" was being put into effect, are the more dramatic expressions of the peasant's deep-rooted attachment to the land. This is an important answer to the most crucial of questions: Will the reform last?

Important, too, is the fact that landlords do not claim the return of the land, although their demands upon the Government for "reasonable" compensation persist. They cannot regain the land; the political climate favors the preservation of the reform. While many a reform measure enacted under the Occupation has since been revised or legislated out of existence, the agrarian reform is a conspicuous exception. When former Prime Minister Yoshida, no land reformer, points with pride to the fact that the enabling legislation was passed during his first postwar

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Cabinet, he speaks for all politically conservative governments of Japan who appreciate the political capital they enjoy in the countryside. The credit claimed by conservatives is painfully annoying to the Socialists, one of whose leaders, a former Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hiroo Wada, is the real architect of the revolution. From the point of view of how lasting it will be, this is a happy augury. So long as diametrically opposed political creeds vie with each other for the honor of having fathered the land transfer program, it is politically safe.

VIII

This record of the single most important change in postwar Japan would not be complete without some consideration of the role of the United States. The Japanese and foreign literature are replete with references to the "Occupation land reform." The less learned farmers are more discerning. Fearful lest a visitor's remark carried the implication that Mr. Yoshida had fathered the reform, a farmer took it upon himself to set the record straight as he saw it: "No," said he, "not Mr. Yoshida, but Mr. Hiroo Wada and General MacArthur." To the present writer, a participant in and close observer of the reform, this seemingly strange partnership of a left-wing Socialist and an American five-star General, and in the order cited, comes closest to defining the role of the Occupation in helping bring about Japan's agrarian revolution.

Contrary to a widespread view, the land reform program was not American-made, packaged and delivered in Japan. The idea was as indigenous as the conditions which impelled it, as the numerous prewar (albeit unsuccessful) efforts bear testimony. And yet, the Occupation played a crucial role in overcoming the reluctance of the Japanese Government, in speeding up the process, in the active concern with certain phases of the legislation and in the steadfast support of all reform-minded Japanese.

The entire character of the Occupation was a singular demonstration of a conqueror binding the wounds of the conquered. What was true of the whole was particularly true of the attempt to help set rural Japan free. The Occupation would not have incurred the displeasure of American or Japanese public opinion if it had elected to stand aloof from this issue. Instead, it had chosen to champion the proposition that those who work the land should own it, harking back, even if unconsciously, to Sen-

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ator Thomas Hart Benton, of Andrew Jackson's day, who had this to say:

> The freeholder . . . is a natural supporter of a free government; and it should be the policy of republics to multiply their freeholders, as it is the policy of monarchies to multiply tenants. We are a republic, and we wish to continue so; then multiply the class of freeholders; sell for a reasonable price, and give to those who are able to pay; and give, without price, to those who are not. . . .

With variations, and in a different setting, this is roughly what has taken place in Japan, and this is where the American Occupation has left its mark on the face of Japan. The mere daring to come to grips with the fundamentals of rural Japan carried conviction to the farmers of the American concern for their welfare. In its effects upon Japan, and against the background of the general malaise which still finds large parts of the agrarian world restless and discontented, the United States acted with farsighted statesmanship. The Nestors of Japan have taken note of it.

IX

A decade after the farmers became land proprietors, the agrarian revolution in Japan stands out in sharp contrast to those of Communist Russia and China—in one, productive forces reaching out for new horizons; in the other, never-ending struggle to subdue the peasant into an acceptance of an arrangement which denies him his lifelong ambition. In Russia as in China, the old régimes were buried under the peasants' longing for the landlords' acres. Both Communist régimes have ridden to power by "cornering," as Marx put it, "the peasant chorus without which the proletarian battle cry will degenerate into just another swan song." But having cornered them, and firmly in the saddle, the Communists took away the land, herded the peasants into collectives and communes, and wrote "finis" to the short-lived but exhilarating experience of freeholding.

The forced collectivization begun in 1929–30 was Soviet Russia's second revolution and ushered in a social upheaval which nearly disemboweled the Soviet Union in the process. The opposition was drowned in blood or starved to death, but even the "victor" was nearly overcome by its fearfulness. Collectivization and communization of agriculture in China had no such immediate disruptive results, but it is undeniably true that this is

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also China's excruciatingly difficult, and uncompleted, second revolution, upon the outcome of which the future of the régime depends.

In the light of this, Japan's experience shows that, given the will, a conservative government can become an authentic "agrarian reformer," and with no recourse to blood and thunder. A peasant can attain his goal as a free and independent producer. When a government in power has the resolution to meet the land hunger of the landless, it has the political support of the peasantry. If in seizing power the Communists have performed any service at all, it is in proving that in the predominantly agrarian countries a government must have peasant support; failing that, it has no support at all.

It is the irony and bedevilment of Communism in the countryside that it threw away that support and substituted in its place a reign which only brute force can maintain. The Japanese agrarian revolution, on the other hand, has not perverted the idea of land to the landless, and has pointed the way for agrarian, non-Communist Asia as to how to satisfy the aspirations of the peasants without destroying in the process much else a nation lives by. That Korea, Taiwan, free Viet Nam, Burma, India—to a degree—and more recently Pakistan have already acted upon the lessons taught by the two types of revolution is a welcome promise of the shape of things to come. But if in the process of Communist imperialism some of them are overwhelmed, the driving force will no longer stem from the once welcome and enticing Communist bait of "Land and Liberty in Asia."

X

Such, in the main, are the consequences of Japan's land program. Even allowing for the relatively short period since the transformation, the village "after" the reform is not the same as "before." But whether from now on the attainments will be further advanced and deepened lies not with the reform. Directly and indirectly it will have added some new acreage, but this will not change the holding pattern to any significant degree. The rising farm population is bound to reduce the holdings still further and increase the number of farms as the sons and grandsons take over.

The somber fact is that while in the United States between 1920 and 1957 the number of farm units was reduced by 22 per-

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cent and the working farm population by nearly 40 percent, in Japan, during the same period, the comparable categories have both increased by 10 percent, despite the country's striking industrial upsurge. The current prosperity of Japanese agriculture cannot hide these harsh realities. Japan's non-agricultural economy has served as a safety valve by providing the farmers with approximately 40 percent of their income. If there is, therefore, any lasting answer for Japan's 37,000,000 agrarians, it must be sought outside of agriculture in expanding industrialization and its capacity to absorb rural unemployed and underemployed.

To note this is not to minimize the great ameliorative effects of the reform on the farmers of Japan and on the country as a whole. The countryside is at peace. The farmers own the land; they are unencumbered by debts, and they are a political and social force to be reckoned with. Many a bent back has been straightened, and the dignity of individual life and work has grown side by side with greater productive resourcefulness. In this lies a partial escape from the severe handicaps of small-scale agriculture pressed upon by a huge farm population.

The Japanese village is in a state of "uplift," which has enormously stimulated the desires for betterment. By the same token, the gap between anticipations and fulfillment will probably grow. The task of post-reform rural Japan is not complete fulfillment, but rather to prevent the gap from getting out of hand. But whatever the future holds in store for Japan's farmers, to date the widespread influence of the reform has been sufficiently profound to make it an epoch-making event in the agrarian history of Japan and an important guidepost for postwar agrarian institutional changes in other countries where they are long overdue.

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THE FUTURE OF THE SUBMARINE

By Paul Cohen

THE ability of technology to alter the international balance of power was mentioned recently by no less a commentator than Nikita Khrushchev, who declared in a note to President Eisenhower that the "heyday of surface navy power is over. In the age of nuclear and rocket weapons . . . these once formidable warships are fit for nothing but courtesy visits, gun salutes and as targets for . . . rockets." Surface ships are, in fact, fit for these functions, and for a few more which submarines are still not ready to fill adequately. Yet it is true that the submarine is already playing a far more important role in sea power than it has in the past; and it is likely to become the dominant naval vessel in the future.

The principal reason for the submarine's rise to prominence is its sudden emergence as a device for strategic bombardment. This development is the result not of any new property of the submarine but of a combination of technological advances in other fields. One is the creation of relatively light nuclear warheads; the other is the over-all advance in the guidance and propulsion of long-range rockets—particularly the development of efficient solid fuel propellants having large thrusts. The marriage of a relatively simple, nuclear-armed missile to the most stealthy and hidden of naval craft has created a new threat to the world's populations—the ballistic missile submarine.

The submarine's new capability should not, however, blind one to its limitations, which recent developments such as nuclear power plants and new inertial navigation devices have not removed. If the submarine is to be considered as a major naval vessel rather than an auxiliary, then it must establish its ability to carry out a wide variety of military tasks. The variety of missions which a modern navy may be called on to perform is reflected in the multitude of vessel types it possesses. That submarines have relatively few types is an indication that they have not as yet taken over many naval roles, although there are signs of proliferation. Except for such boats as were available at the outbreak of hostilities, we fought World War II with one type of submarine—the 1,500-ton "fleet boat." Today, the nuclear equivalent of the fleet boat displaces about 3,000 tons, and from it has evolved an

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entirely new and much larger form—the ballistic missile or Polaris boat. There are reoccurring attempts to build a specialized (and small) anti-submarine submarine, one form of which is our SSK (submarine killer), displacing 765 tons.

Clearly, the submarine is not expected to develop the capabilities of all other naval vessels. But in each of its roles—present and potential—it faces the handicap of inadequate means of communication. The ability of surface ships to work in concert with each other and with aircraft, guided by excellent communications of great capacity, is not yet paralleled by equivalent sonic techniques fit for submarine use. Little has appeared to indicate that the coördination of submarine wolf-packs or of submarine-surface teams would be much easier today than was the case in World War II. And an underwater missile launcher is of no value if it cannot be reached with the order to fire. Submarines do not lend themselves easily to convoy duty, and it is hard to picture them as efficient in anti-aircraft operations.

One could be much more condescending toward the submarine, in view of its many limitations, were there any certainty that in an all-out war surface ships would remain alive long enough to carry out their functions. But since this is not the case, submarines may be asked to undertake tasks for which surface vessels are inherently better suited—except for their vulnerability.

Meanwhile, the submarine retains unequalled capabilities as an instrument of attrition and blockade. In forms of war where nuclear weapons cannot be used, its really overwhelming ability to destroy surface ships would be unmatched. The point has often been made that ocean commerce is the cement that binds the Western Alliance together. Even the greatest of sea powers cannot survive the steady attrition of its cargo carriers, let alone its military vessels. Here the advantage lies all with the Soviet Union, which has a vast superiority in numbers of submarines and is not itself dependent on surface shipping to sustain its alliances.

But submarines can blockade submarines as well as surface ships, and this is a tactic to which Russia is quite sensitive. Whether it would be feasible to blockade all of the European coast and all of the eastern shore of Asia is another matter. During World War II, our submarines sank about 22 Japanese submarines and two German U-boats as an incidental to their other duties. With much improved sonars and somewhat better weapons, and with submarines a major rather than a minor objective,

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the score could probably be more impressive. Once the location of a submarine is known rather precisely, it is quite vulnerable; the problem is to find it in the first place and then to assemble the forces to track and destroy it.

In addition to their role in anti-submarine warfare, submarines also make good mine layers; and they are suitable for all sorts of odd jobs such as rescue and scouting missions.

It is rather futile, however, to speculate on how the submarine will be used tactically in a war of unknown rules and in an era of rapidly changing technology. It may be more useful to discuss its essential properties and the nature of its environment as a means of assessing its probable future role.

II

The submarine's main defense continues to be its ability to submerge and thus hide from its enemies. This "cloak of invisibility" is its sole armor, for it is among the most vulnerable of ocean-going vessels. If its inner (or pressure) hull is breached, it has little chance of ever surfacing again.

The sea, however, is an excellent hiding place. The sonars of World War II destroyers, for example, could at best pick up a submerged submarine only a few thousand yards away. Because salt water is a conductor of electricity, electromagnetic radiations of virtually all wave lengths are, for all practical purposes, barred from effective use. In fact, visible light will penetrate about as far as any practical wave length; and even in the clearest water the range of light is but a few hundred feet. Sound, therefore, remains the primary means of sensing below the surface. Although there has been much progress since World War II in the application of sound as a method of detection, it has been accomplished with the aid of increasingly large and complex equipment. It would be optimistic to describe these advances as breakthroughs. The sea contains non-uniformities, such as temperature and salinity gradients; beneath these layers the submarine can hide, screened even from the sonars.

But though the submarine is hard to find, it has in the past been handicapped by a grave loss in performance when submerged. Until the closing days of World War II, a submerged boat could do no more than seven or eight knots. At that pace its underwater endurance was about an hour; at best, it could stay down about a day. The main difficulty was the inadequacy of the energy supply.

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When the diesel engines of a submarine are running they can exhaust the air inside the closed hull in a matter of seconds; this makes it impossible to use them or any air-consuming reaction to generate power when the submarine is submerged, except by the limited expedient of snorkeling. Energy had to be obtained when the boat was surfaced and stored in electric batteries for later use.[1] When driven below by enemy destroyers, submarine commanders would resort to every possible means to conserve energy, such as turning off motors in their refrigerating and ventilating systems, or even turning off lights. But eventually, a surface vessel that maintained contact with the submarine could slow it down and kill it.

The hard-pressed Germans, who depended most heavily on the submarine, developed some of the clearest thoughts regarding its design and use. Late in World War II, they exploited the existing means of propulsion to the utmost in their famous Type XXI design. These boats could do over 15 knots submerged, for about an hour. This was accomplished by doubling the amount of battery capacity and by streamlining the hull, stripping the deck of its bristling array of heavy and light guns. The Type XXI had a snorkel so that its diesels could operate with minimum exposure of the submarine to visual or radar sighting. Fortunately for the Allies, the war ended just as this submarine started its patrols.

The performance of the Type XXI was, of course, an improvement in degree, not in kind, though it was sufficiently remarkable to attract imitation by those powers which had enough strength left after the conflict to continue with a naval building program. The new models continued to be closely tied to the surface and were still grossly inferior to surface craft in endurance.

Such was the past. With the launching by the United States of the first nuclear-powered submarine, the *Nautilus,* an irreversible change occurred in naval warfare. It gave the submarine an advantage which the application of nuclear power to surface ships cannot redress. Although surface vessels will acquire tremendous benefits from the use of nuclear power, the unique ability of the reactor to produce heat without using oxygen is not one of them. But it is of vital importance to the submarine. The surface craft

[1] It is an interesting fact of modern technology that no very good means of storing energy is presently known. In terms of weight per unit of energy, batteries are not significantly worse than any other practical means. The hydrogen-peroxide submarine, which stores oxygen in a compact, chemically combined form, claims better performance than is achieved from batteries. Whether the improvement is worth the added risks and complications is a moot point.

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always had virtually unlimited endurance. Now that the submarine also can have unlimited endurance, the advantage shifts in its favor. For, while both employ the same sensing devices, the submarine retains its invisibility and its ability to locate the surface ship before that vessel is alerted. As far as visual means are concerned, the reasons are obvious. The periscope, which is from two to five inches in diameter near its top, and sticks out of water only five feet or so (or, on occasion, as little as a foot), is a much smaller object than a vessel and is hard to spot by eye or radar in rough water. As for sonar, submarines can be made quieter than surface vessels. For hydrodynamic reasons, a sonar dome itself gives off more noise the closer it is to the surface. Most important, the submarine can vary its depth, finding the optimum location for its sonar in the complicated and changing stratification of the ocean.

Nuclear energy has cured, or greatly alleviated, not one but two of the submarine's greatest weaknesses as compared to surface craft. Until now it not only has been limited by its energy supply but has also had the unenviable distinction of being the most inefficient load carrier that goes to sea. Its pressure hull, tanks, engines and various internal appurtenances weigh so much that it has carried a ridiculously small payload. Armed with chemical explosives, then, it could not be a serious threat to land targets, for it would exhaust its ammunition before it had made more than a small dent in a really large or "hardened" target. The purpose of the three-inch deck-mounted gun which most submarines formerly carried (a few have carried much heavier weapons to no good purpose) was to sink small, undefended vessels and thus spare the use of a valuable torpedo.

With all its limitations, the submarine of the past was deadly when it could attack shipping unobserved. Against large and technically competent surface forces, German U-boats almost stopped the Allies in two separate wars. In the war against Japan in the Pacific, our submarines operated against a navy which failed to produce a top-flight defense and as a result they bled the Japanese Empire to death. After the war, the Japanese Government gave as the basic cause of its defeat the loss of its merchant fleet. Even so, we lost more than 50 submarines in the Pacific in World War II, perhaps half to direct enemy action. The Allies, in breaking the back of the German submarine effort, sank some 700 U-boats.

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Today nuclear energy has made the submarine infinitely more dangerous. The concentration of destructive power in a small warhead has entirely altered the hitherto small "carrying" capacity of the submarine. One submarine today can carry enough explosive power to devastate the entire coastline of a continent. A fleet of submarines, even crudely deployed, can ravage a great power in one salvo.

Thus at the same time that nuclear energy has made surface ships more vulnerable, it has made submarines more mobile, more flexible and more destructive. Their longer range now gives them an increased, and increasingly important, ability to enter waters denied to surface ships by superior air, submarine or even surface power (and, it may be added, by climate). At the moment, the United States Navy can choose to disregard enemy surface power as a factor, but there was a long period after Pearl Harbor when our submarines were the only American vessels able to operate in the reaches of the western Pacific controlled by the Japanese. As air-to-surface missiles of greater range and accuracy are developed, large areas of ocean adjacent to lands controlled by a strong enemy will be denied to our surface navy. Okinawa offered a foreboding example of what air power can do against surface fleets. And nuclear-armed, supersonic missiles homing on a target are much harder to knock down than the Japanese suicide planes of World War II.

Finally, the voyages of the *Nautilus* and the *Skate* under the Arctic icecap indicate that even this ocean, which gives the shortest routes between North America and Eurasia, is potentially open to the submarine for military purposes, for the supplying of bases, and perhaps for trade. More than 60 percent of the Soviet Union's maritime frontiers are in the Arctic. The Arctic routes which lead into the Bering Sea, however, present severe navigational problems. The waters north of the Bering Strait are shallow, in general less than 200 feet deep except for one small valley. To get under or leave the icecap on the Alaska side can be something of a feat.

From the point of view of the Western powers, the most disturbing fact of geography as it relates to the submarine is that every one of the major nations except Soviet Russia has the bulk of its urban population within 200 miles of tidewater. And where people are concentrated there also are the major industrial plants, the transport and communication centers, the research and devel-

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opment groups, and many of the military installations—in short, the vitals of the economy. Using 1950 population figures, we find that missiles of 150-mile range, fired from just outside the nearest unblockable tidewater, would cover 78 percent of the urban population of Europe and 55 percent of that in the United States, but only 13 percent of Russia's. However, a 1,200-mile missile could cover virtually all the urban centers in the Soviet Union if the launching areas were optimally deployed. In other words, while a 200-mile missile launched from submarines is a grave threat to Europe and this country, a longer range missile (but one well within the bounds of present technology) is needed to create a similar threat to the U.S.S.R. Since at any given stage of technological development higher accuracy can be achieved at shorter range, the advantage will remain to some extent with the Soviets.

This close relationship between range and accuracy is one reason why the intercontinental missile will not lessen the importance of the submarine as a missile carrier. In the future as in the past, the ability to hit a specific target accurately will confer a fundamental military advantage. But much more important may be the ability of the national economy to survive the first strike. Even if land-based launching sites can be simplified and partially concealed, they can be located by the enemy at leisure and long-term plans can be laid to neutralize them. The ability of the missile-launching submarine to escape detection provides better protection than the thickest concrete. And though land-based missiles can also be made mobile, they cannot achieve the flexibility of the submarine, which needs neither roads nor rails. Finally, the submarine combines high mobility with some degree of protection from the sea itself. Surrounded by water on every side, it is remarkably well shielded from any immediate effects of fall-out or from thermal and radiation effects of nuclear explosions.

A further consideration in assessing the value of the submarine as a missile launcher is that it is free from political limitations. No elaborate treaties are needed in order to place Polaris submarines on the high seas, and their use can remain within our own control without becoming elements of discord in the domestic politics of other nations.

III

One important property of the submarine has not yet been exploited—its capacity for speed. Potentially, the submarine can

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be made faster than surface craft which must use the displacement-type hull (as opposed to hydrofoil, which is currently impractical for large ships). A surface ship, operating between water and a much less dense medium, air, must throw up waves as it moves. At low speeds, this does not involve an important loss of energy; indeed, the lower skin friction of the surface ship as compared with a submarine of equal weight gives it less "drag." But as the speed rises, wave-making becomes a more important factor. The point at which a submarine begins to have less drag than a surface ship of the same size depends on the waterline length of the vessel. Our Guppy class submarines, which are about 300 feet long and displace approximately 2,000 tons, begin to use less power submerged than on the surface at about 18 knots. And as the speed of surface craft increases, wave-making eventually absorbs so much energy that, regardless of the bow shape used, the ships cannot practically be driven faster. Even for large ships in relatively quiet water this limit is reached at about 40 to 50 knots. But the oceans are not always quiet and, as storms raise waves higher, ships must slow down or suffer damage. Thus, the *Queen Mary,* which can do better than 30 knots, sometimes finds itself moving at 10 or 12 knots in the winter months. Destroyers are deprived of their top speed by wave action more often than larger ships; which is why an 18-knot submarine can frequently, under realistic conditions, outrun a 35-knot escort.

The top speed of an underwater vehicle is limited by a phenomenon called "cavitation." This is, by a crude analogy, something like the change from subsonic to supersonic flow for airplanes. Just as Mach number is a function of temperature and pressure, so the onset of cavitation is influenced by depth. The deeper the submarine, the faster it can go before cavitation starts to increase drag sharply. If its hull design is governed primarily by hydrodynamic considerations a submarine can approach 60 knots before cavitation becomes a serious drag problem. The submarine must be buried to a depth four or five times its diameter before it ceases to raise a surface wave, which means that in the case of a hull 40 feet in diameter, the keel would have to be close to 200 feet down before the engines could be "opened up" with full effect. Efficient propeller action may still be a problem at such depths, and the suppression of cavitation noise would also call for greater submergence.

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IV

If the development of this new technology means in fact that surface shipping can be wiped out in any prolonged war, the submarine's capability as a cargo carrier must be studied seriously. Of course, if the next war is a one-day exchange of megaton weapons leaving the world in chaos, the whole question of ocean commerce is irrelevant. But many American and Russian students of warfare consider it likely that wars will continue and that either they will be limited or there will nevertheless be sufficient survivors of a first blow to continue a classic battle of attrition. In either event a nation can win only by landing men and supplies on enemy soil. With regard to men and arms, Henry A. Kissinger estimates that "it would require the entire available United States airlift, including the civil reserve fleet, over 30 days to move one division from the United States to the Middle East, provided all transport units were in position when the crisis occurred and provided they were not required for any other mission —two most unlikely contingencies." He goes on to discuss the recently organized Pentomic divisions, which weigh about half as much as the standard division and therefore could be moved in roughly half the time. He concludes that "the minimum requirement would seem to be a capability for moving the combat element (5,000 short tons) of one new type division simultaneously. To move the combat element of one such division to the Middle East simultaneously would require 200 C-133s at a cost of $1.9 billion for procurement. To airlift the entire division within 10 days would require 272 C-133s at a cost of $2.6 billion."[2]

Even with stockpiling, the United States is dependent on heavy imports of raw materials. If we could not keep bulk cargoes of oil, iron ore, manganese, copper, etc., coming in continually, we would not for long be able to send supplies out to our troops or allies abroad. Emergency phases of this job could perhaps be done by airplane, at enormous cost; but for the long pull sea-going vessels would be required. If we continue to depend on surface craft we are gambling on the ability of our merchant marine again to operate satisfactorily in wartime. If we lose—and we are betting against the trend of military technology—there seems to be only one recourse: we must develop submarine cargo carriers.

The reasons for turning to the submarine as a cargo carrier are those of necessity rather than convenience—except, perhaps, in

[2] "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." New York: Harper, 1957, p. 163 and 164.

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the case of liquid cargoes. As far as dry cargo is concerned, the submarine is inherently hard to load and unload, and, compared with surface ships, is apt to remain so. Ships can have hatches large enough to pass in a herd of elephants if necessary. Although these hatches must be reasonably watertight, they need not have the absolute integrity required of submarine hatches, which are traditionally small and few in number. And designers and engineers have long since learned that submariners are distrustful of any added or enlarged openings into the pressure hull. Surface cargo carriers can be festooned with booms, masts, winches and other paraphernalia for the rapid movement of cargo through the hatches and onto the pier. A submarine, which must be as clean of surface excrescences as a fish if it is to go fast and silently when submerged, must do without such aids, or it must painfully retract them when it submerges. Troops, however, are one form of dry cargo which are self-loading and unloading.

Despite all its inefficiencies as a cargo carrier, the submarine nevertheless can easily prove superior to a plane. During World War I, the U-boat *Deutschland* successfully made a round trip from Germany to the United States and return. Outgoing, it carried dyestuffs reputedly worth twice the construction cost of the submarine. It returned with a cargo of rubber and nickel. Today, a much more practical underwater carrier could be designed. Even so, the submarine will never be an economical way to transport dry cargo in bulk.

However, the submarine is more adaptable to the hauling of liquid cargoes. This primarily means oil, which makes up about half the tonnage moved across the oceans. Liquids can be carried in relatively light exterior tanks fully exposed to water pressure and they do not need the elaborate handling gear of dry cargo. Oil may also be carried in a flexible, self-supporting container, towed by the submarine.

Preliminary efforts to design a cargo submarine are under way in Japan, Britain and the United States, either with private financing or government support. Although the studies are far from completion, engineering information is nevertheless being amassed. As conceived on paper, the cargo submarines range from 30,000 tons at 23 knots to an enthusiastic 80,000 tons at 50 or 60 knots, the latter to supply England with iron ore from the Hudson Bay area or oil from the Middle East. Such specifications are undoubtedly feasible technically. Nor is there much doubt that the

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submarine can, far more advantageously than a surface ship, translate the unlimited power of the nuclear reactor into speed. But peacetime economics are heavily against the submerged carrier.

In summary, trends in technology are favorable to the submarine as against the surface ship. In spite of the increasing—and to some degree productive—research being devoted to the problem of detecting submerged submarines, these retain essentially all their past invisibility. Nuclear weapons and improved performance have given the submarine a new strategic mission and should enhance its traditional roles in naval warfare. The surface ship, menaced by both air and undersea power, may have to forfeit many of its functions to the submarine; the extent of the shift will depend largely on the degree to which the submarine solves some of its own problems, particularly that of communications.

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THE BRITISH LIBERAL REVIVAL

By Patrick Lort-Phillips

THE British political scene today is one of unusual disorder. On the one hand we have a Conservative government and party, weighed down by eight continuous years of office and saddled with a record which includes a lost war in Egypt and what must be conceded to be the failure of its policies in Cyprus, Malta, East Africa and the European Common Market, yet going forward with ever-increasing confidence towards a third consecutive term of office. On the other hand we have a Labor opposition, armed with all the ammunition an opposition could ever dream of, its hunger for office sharpened by eight years in the wilderness, yet rent by schisms, devoid of initiative and barely holding its ground in the country. On top of all this, we have the spectacle of the Liberal Party, which a short time ago seemed moribund, now regaining its vigor to such an extent that, over the last two years, Liberal candidates have averaged 25 percent of the votes in every by-election they have fought.

Something has gone wrong with the works. This 25-percent Liberal vote is too hard and indigestible a lump for the comfort of the body politic: and until it is assimilated into the system the discomfort will continue, accompanied by much noise and wind. Something, to change the metaphor, has gone wrong with the pendulum. It swings easily enough to the Right; but on the return swing to the Left, something is catching.

There have always been two main strands of thought incorporated in the left wing of British politics, one fixed and permanent, the other variable and inconstant, one concerned with people as they are, the other concerned with ideas. The first is what we might call the radical strand. It is a strand found in all nations at all times. It is that body of opinion which represents the underdog, which is opposed to power, privilege and "the Establishment;" it is the party which seeks change, progress and at times revolution. Although it is permanent, it is always appearing under different names and guises.

In the last four centuries this radical strand has burst into vigorous life under at least four different guises—the Puritan revolution of the seventeenth century, the Whig revolution of the eighteenth century, the liberal revolution of the nineteenth

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century and the socialist revolution of the twentieth. The significant fact about it is that it is not permanently attached to any particular ideology. It attaches an ideology to itself according to the needs of the age. The Puritan revolution was moral and religious, the Whig revolution was political and intellectual, the liberal revolution was economic, and the socialist revolution was social. In each case, a new thread of ideology was woven into the original web of radicalism.

The original Liberal Party came into existence as one of the reincarnations of this radical strand. It wove a new pattern of economic principles which upheld a policy of free trade and laissez-faire. This body of ideas, stemming originally from the French physiocrats, but developed and expanded by Adam Smith and others, and later rationalized and generalized by the utilitarian philosophers, came at exactly the right psychological moment to become a mighty weapon against the vested interests of a reactionary landowning aristocracy in effective control of the political and economic power of the nation.

The Industrial Revolution required a radical new approach to economic problems. It had broken up the old social system of the country, with its rigidly prescribed class structure and its commercial immobility; and as a result men were searching for new rules of conduct on which to base a new order of society. Here were the new economic doctrines to suit the need, here were the bones of a policy which not only could make possible a vast increase of wealth for the nation (in the process overturning the old order of society) but which at the same time made self-interest "enlightened." Selfishness for the first time became a virtue; and what more could a politician demand? It was only natural that the radical opposition should seize on these doctrines with both hands and turn them to good political account.

The first great issue to be fought under the new banners was the repeal of the Corn Laws. It is hard for us in these days to recall what a tremendous issue this was, and how this one measure, which aroused the enthusiastic support of the mass of the people, set the tone for Britain's economic policies for nearly a century. But even in those earliest days this weapon proved a two-edged sword which could wound friend and foe alike. It certainly cut down the old entrenched order of society as with a scythe; but it cut cruelly into the life of the poor, the weak and the needy. The same doctrine which proclaimed the right of the capitalist

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and entrepreneur to trade freely without let or hindrance, equally sanctioned, if not encouraged, the exploitation of men, women and children under the most terrible conditions. The number of people who died of poverty around the factories of Europe in the nineteenth century probably exceeded the number of those who died in the concentration camps of the twentieth. Provided profits could be made, the social, ethical and aesthetic consequences of the operation must—not could—must be disregarded. Here were the seeds of disaster already present. The Liberal Party had for short-term ends allied itself to a dogma which in the course of the next century came near to destroying liberalism in Britain altogether.

This fundamental weakness of the new economic doctrine was from the start obvious to the early Socialists, and particularly to Karl Marx and his followers. It is of particular interest to us today to recall that laissez-faire liberalism and socialism share a common origin in the economic crisis caused by the Industrial Revolution; and that although in theory the two doctrines are fundamentally opposed, in practice they are united in a common belief in economic determinism as the ultimate factor in human relations.

For Marx, history was determined by economic laws based on the fundamental clash between different economic classes. For the classical economists, the market took the place of the class war. Both parties regarded warfare as the natural order of things. Success went to the strong, and the weak went to the wall. For both it was a case of *vae victis;* for both, humanity, justice and beauty were forced to give place to the iron laws of economic determinism. And for both parties this dogmatic approach to politics has in the long run proved fatal. Economic determinism all but destroyed the Liberal Party by the mid-twentieth century. It is fast destroying the Labor Party now. In Western political life at least, justice and humanity are proving more powerful and enduring than economics.

Political parties arise in response to a given challenge. But when the challenge is overcome, the party still continues, as if by the force of inertia, in the same original direction until the unreality of its actions becomes obvious even to its most fervent supporters; and then another force arises to take its place. What Hegel wrote of nations can equally be applied to political parties: "Every [party] ripens like a fruit. Its activity consists of accom-

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plishing its principle and not enjoying it. Each has its principle to which it tends as to its end. That end attained, it has nothing more to do in this world."

But there is one exception to this rule. The political party which in any country is called conservative is exempt from the workings of the rule for the simple reason that it is not compelled to move in any direction. And in saying that, I am not trying to be cynical. The principal object of a conservative party is to preserve all that is best of the past and the present; and this is an essential task in any nation. It resists change. It does not need an ideology to justify its actions.

It would not be true to imply that conservative parties resist all change, and have no driving force of their own. Of course not. But the main weight of conservative opinion is the weight of custom and tradition, the weight of inertia slowing the rate of change to the lowest possible speed. As a result, any party which wishes to accelerate the speed of change is bound to create some form of ideology to generate the steam necessary to overcome this inertia.

Since change for the sake of change is futile, it must have a purpose, and that purpose is usually expressed in the form of a set of principles, or ideology. It follows that political parties of the Right are stable and long enduring, while those of the Left rise and fall in response to the particular challenge of the age.

This state of affairs is illustrated to perfection by the political history of Britain over the last two centuries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the old forces of conservatism were based on the ownership of land and the mercantilist system of protected trade. The Industrial Revolution demanded change, a change to release the new sources of wealth and energy. The political vehicle for this change in Britain was the Liberal Party, and the ideology was free trade.

The liberal revolution reached its climax in 1906, in which year the Liberal Party was returned to power with a greater majority than any party received before or since. The principles for which it had fought had become to all intents and purposes the principles of all. A politician might well have said, "We are all Liberals now." But with the triumph came the inevitable nemesis. Liberalism became orthodoxy, the Liberal Party became "the Establishment." The ideology became a dogma and the forces of inertia took charge. Change, if change must be, was

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forced to find a new vehicle; and that vehicle was to be the Labor Party.

In this same parliament of 1906 there were four Socialist M.P.s. Few people in those days would have believed that within 20 years this same infant Labor Party would be forming a government, and that for the next 50 years socialism would be the dominant political force in the land. And yet the reasons why this would happen were there for all to see. Free trade increases the wealth of the nation, but it has nothing to say, naturally enough, about justice or political liberty. The free exchange of goods and the free movement of labor and capital have been among the great liberating forces of all time. But free trade does nothing whatsoever to ensure a fair distribution of wealth, nor to safeguard the nation's resources, nor to preserve the natural beauties and amenities of the countryside. The scars of nineteenth-century private enterprise are still burnt into the body of the country today. The enterprising prosper, and the unenterprising fail. But how few people are ever in a position to be enterprising? Perhaps 10 percent. The remainder are mere pawns in the game.

At the end of the nineteenth century the average working man had no control whatsoever over his own destiny. However skilled, honest, hardworking and loyal he may have been, if his employer miscalculated or was negligent, or if the winds of economic competition blew unfavorably for his business, all that workman's skill and loyalty were of no avail. He was involved in a ruin over which he had no control. The laws of the society in which he lived were principally concerned with the protection of capital and the property which had accumulated from this process of capitalism. The working man's interest in this property was limited to the seven days which elapsed from one pay day to the next. In the midst of great wealth there was great poverty and wretchedness; and, possibly worst of all, there was bred the feeling that for the masses there was no place in this society except as labor to be hired and fired, but otherwise forgotten.

This, needless to say, was a situation which the working classes of Britain were not prepared to accept. They were of the same flesh and blood as the successful capitalists, and if these latter could build up a political system to provide themselves with security and a good life, so then could the working classes. And there ready to their hand was the creed of socialism, the ideology to generate the necessary steam for a new political advance.

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Any true Liberal today will sympathize with the objectives of that new movement; and indeed many thousands of Liberals did in fact transfer their allegiance to the new party. The same radical strand which had been the backbone of the Liberal Party in the nineteenth century became the backbone of the Labor Party in the twentieth.

The working classes of Britain were not concerned with abstruse points of philosophy or dialectic but with the hard facts of life; and it is impossible to deny that the facts of life were very hard indeed. Hunger, poverty and fear inhibit all other human preoccupations. It is useless to explain the virtues of political and economic liberty to people who are hungry. What is the good of political liberty, if political action cannot produce bread? What is the good of economic liberty if it cannot stave off want? These were the two questions which confounded the nation in the early twentieth century, and which were to break in pieces the whole structure of British Liberalism at the moment of its greatest triumphs.

The Labor Party took over where the Liberals left off. Into the radical background of the left wing they wove the pattern of the new ideology, Marxism. Once again the ideology provided the steam to overcome the inertia of the Establishment and bring a new dynamism to the British political scene. The Marxist ideology provided exactly the same short-term advantages to the radicals of the twentieth century as the laissez-faire ideology had done for the radicals of the nineteenth century. The over-all pattern of the last 50 years is almost an exact repetition of the previous century. While conservatism remained steady, giving ground only when compelled to do so, the forces of change gained ever-increasing momentum, until in 1945 the Socialist triumph was complete and a Labor government was returned to power with an overwhelming majority over all its opponents. Once again, as in 1906, the radical forces had gained a momentous victory. And once again, victory brought the inevitable nemesis.

This brings the story up to date. In theory there is nothing to prevent the Labor Party continuing as the radical party in Britain and alternating with the Conservatives as the government of the country, depending on whether progress or consolidation is the dominant mood of the people. But in practice there are overwhelming obstacles.

First there is the ideological obstacle, Marxism. The Labor

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Party had cheerfully used the dogma as a weapon in their struggle, just as the Liberals had formerly used their dogma. And let us remember that both dogmas contain a large vein of truth. But though they contained the truth, they did not contain the whole truth or "nothing but the truth." Thus today, as in the 1920s, the dogmatists find themselves in a minority. Once a political party finds itself in a permanent minority, with little or no hope of attaining power in the foreseeable future, all the stuffing is knocked out of it, and the members start looking over their shoulders for another home.

But not only that. The Labor Party is financed and controlled by the trade unions, who exercise an absolute veto over policy decisions in the party. Now there is nothing wrong with this. The trade unions are entitled to control a political party to further their own ends, but it means that any potential radical supporter who is not a trade unionist has little or no chance of playing his part in a wider radical movement. Nothing can illustrate this better than the fact that within the last 12 months both the chairman and the secretary-general of the Labor Party have been unable to secure nominations to safe Socialist seats; these seats were held to be trade-union preserves. And the unions, having made great gains for their members over the latter years, feel it their duty to conserve these gains. They are becoming more and more conservative. Moreover, the trade unions finance and maintain more than a hundred M.P.s directly out of their own funds in the same manner as the nineteenth-century landlords maintained their M.P.s; and this militates against any real radical revival, and encourages conservatism.

The fundamental fact in British politics today, as it has been to a great extent over the last 150 years, is this: Under ordinary circumstances there is a tendency in Britain to conservatism and the status quo. This general tendency can be overcome only if the forces of radicalism not only are united under a common flag but in addition are energized by a common ideology. If the forces of the Left are divided, or if they lack a purposeful ideology, then the inertia of conservatism tends to prevail. The continued domination of the Conservative Party over the last eight years, in spite of events in Suez and elsewhere, is largely due to the fact that there is no longer a united radical opposition to be found in Britain.

The problem, then, is whether, if the Labor Party is unable to

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hold the allegiance of sufficient radicals to continue to provide a radical alternative to the Conservatives, a revived Liberal Party can take its place. But before answering this question we must ask another. Why cannot the Liberal Party exist as a center party regardless of the Conservatives and the Socialists? Is there not room for a third party of moderates who can hold the balance of power between the extremes? And the answer to this must, I think, be no. For short periods it is possible for third parties to maintain themselves, but in the end they are bound to be swallowed up by the major parties and cease to exert any influence on events. The middle of the road is a dangerous place; you get run over by the traffic coming in both directions. In addition, you have no initiative. You have to conform to the initiative of others if you are to remain balanced between them. If the British Liberal Party were to attempt to become a center party, holding a balance of power, it would disappear in a very short space of time.

Despite its many drawbacks, the two-party system offers great advantages to a democracy. Here is the government, and there is the opposition. The choice is clear-cut. But what the two-party system does *not* imply is that the same two parties should always be the only two parties involved. The Conservative Party will always be one of the two, whatever its name; for it can take its stand on things as they are, and wait for the other side to attack. The variations will come from the Left flank. Who is to do the attacking?

The two-party system works effectively only if the two parties are sufficiently broad-based in their doctrines to accommodate all shades of opinion. Such a system is to be seen in the United States, where neither party is tied to an ideology in such a manner as to exclude large sections of potential supporters. The principles of both parties are flexible enough for all. In Britain today this is not so. The radical alternative is tied to a dogma, socialism. The would-be radical voter must swallow the dogma whole, or go elsewhere; and until recently there was nowhere else to go. The present revival of the Liberal Party under Jo Grimond's leadership is mainly due to the fact that it is now prepared to provide a radical alternative.

To the question of what chance, then, a revived Liberal Party stands of taking the place of the Labor Party, the answer on the face of things must be, little enough. But outward appearances may be misleading. The Liberal Party today has six M.P.s in the

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House of Commons, two more than the Socialists had in 1906. Another fact which gives Liberals encouragement is that during the last two years Liberal candidates have averaged 25 percent of the votes in every by-election they have contested. This figure shows that there are already millions of potential Liberal voters in the country today, even though they know that the Liberal Party cannot yet form a government. With three parties in the field, 34 percent of the votes is the theoretical breakthrough point when victory becomes a possibility. The Liberal Party is already within 10 percent of the threshold.

A further glance at the figures reveals another interesting fact. At present it takes more than 150,000 votes to return one Liberal M.P., whereas 33,000 is all that is necessary to return a Conservative or a Socialist. This is a measure of the disadvantage which a third party suffers under our electoral system. It shows the strength of the impetus towards a two-party system, and the vital importance to a party in moving from third to second place if it is to survive. In the coming years, the struggle between the Liberal and Labor Parties for second place will, I believe, become the focal point of interest in the British political scene.

But a Liberal revival will not come by juggling with figures. It will come about only if there is a powerful body of opinion backed by a powerful political organization dedicated specifically to putting liberal principles into practice. Most political parties today profess liberal principles; some even practice them. But these parties are held together by other interests and pressures which in moments of stress take priority over purely liberal sentiments. The spirit is willing enough, but the flesh is too weak to withstand the painful realities of political life.

The British Liberal Party exists primarily to fill this gap, and to convert vague principles into hard political reality. We are concerned to make freedom work. We want to make it work first of all in our industrial and social life. The first plank in our platform is to tackle the bitterness and wastefulness of the class war by bringing justice and true partnership into industry. We recognize the injustice and the folly of a capitalist system which relies entirely on a floating proletariat to keep it going, but we reject state ownership as an alternative. There must be partnership in industry for all who work in it: a partnership which recognizes social and psychological needs as well as economic forces. This process can be fostered by suitable fiscal means, as well as by a

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resolute attack on monopolies and restrictive practices which strangle the workings of a free economic system. We want, too, to make a clean sweep through the dusty corridors of snobbery, privilege, patronage and class distinction which choke the nation today, and which are the real enemies of true freedom.

Abroad, our policy is aimed at breaking down the barriers which separate man from man, and at creating a world in which men may move freely with their families and goods to wherever their services are most required and their abilities most rewarded. We are committed to the lowering of tariffs, the freeing of trade and the convertibility of currency. We are convinced of the folly of emphasizing the division of the world into black and white—Communist and non-Communist—and basing military strategy on this distinction. While resolute in our opposition to Communism, we believe that the best way to convert the world to freedom is to prove that freedom works. We reject the primacy of military measures in the battle for men's minds. We are opposed to the continuance of colonial rule in Asia and Africa. We believe that where freedom is at stake, arguments of economics and strategy must take second place. The history of the United States confirms this fact.

These objectives are of course proclaimed by liberal-minded men in many parties. But the Liberal Party is the only party specifically created and organized to put them into practice as a first priority. They are the sole justification for our existence and our coherence as a party.

The British party system is no longer adjusted to the problems which affect us today. The fundamental loyalties of both the Conservative and Labor Parties are to social classes, the Conservatives implicitly, the Socialists explicitly; the dialectic is between the "haves" and the "have nots," the workers and the bosses, the proletariat and the capitalist. The language is the language of Marx. But this dialectic does not fit into the social scene in the same way that it did earlier in the century. Gross poverty, gross inequality and gross injustice no longer exist, and if they did, all parties would combine to tackle them. Today the great problems cut across the old party lines, which is another way of saying that the parties are not adjusted to deal with these problems. The problems of nuclear weapons, of national sovereignty, of the unity of Europe and the free world and of colonialism—these find expression in "non-party" organizations. The trivia of politics—"How

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many cars can an election candidate use?"—are what generate heat and smoke in Parliament, and then the whole panoply of the class war is trotted out and paraded round the ring.

If the party system is to survive, the parties must be divided over vital issues. Whether or not Britain remains a nuclear power is a vital matter; whether Europe is united or Central Africa is free are vital matters. It is nonsense to say that these are "non-party matters." But because they cannot be fitted into the context of the class war, because a working man and a banker happen to be on the same side of the argument, these issues are seldom if ever debated realistically in the House of Commons.

It is on the home front, most of all, that the present party divisions fail so completely. The greatest domestic issue in the forthcoming election is likely to be nationalization. The Conservative Party organization is spending hundreds of thousands of pounds in advertising the iniquities of nationalization. The Labor Party man carries engraved on his membership card, and on his heart, that he fights for the nationalization of all the means of production, distribution and exchange. Yet for the vast majority of the people the question, "Who owns an industry?" is but one minor facet of the problem of industry as such. What matters to most of us is not who owns it, but whether it is efficient, whether it is profitable. Does it provide a decent livelihood for all who work in it? Does it provide the customer with what he wants at the price he can afford? Does it provide the worker with a stake and a status which satisfy his social as well as his economic needs? The problem of industrial relations is something quite apart from the problems of ownership.

There must be a revolution in our political thinking. Whether the Liberal Party can be the vehicle for this revolution time alone can tell. But until there is a thorough reconstruction of our party system, politics in Britain will continue to be conducted on wholly misleading lines.

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ENTERPRISE IN IRAN

An Experiment in Economic Development

By David E. Lilienthal

THE political affairs of men and nations have always been profoundly affected by water. This has been conspicuously true of the waters of those great rivers that flow from their mountain sources through the vast plains and highlands lying to the north of the Persian Gulf, into which these rivers empty.

More than five thousand years ago it was the skillful use of the great rivers in what is today known as the Khuzestan region of western Iran that provided much of the sinews of military strength and political skills making possible, first, the Elamite kingdom so familiar to readers of the Old Testament, and, later, the Persian Empire, the first world government. Because they nourished the governmental centers and the granary of an empire that at one time ruled the civilized world, from Greece to India, the rivers of the Khuzestan region have left their influence upon political events and thought, from that day to this; their heritage lives on, too, in the art and the humanistic values, the language and the poetry of the whole Western world.

The Persian Empire of ancient days declined; the extensive system of water conservation in the Khuzestan region was impaired or destroyed, by invasion or neglect; the green plains and wooded uplands, once the seat of plenty and power, became what Lord Curzon described as "a desert over which the eye may roam unrested for miles." The great irrigation works gone, the abundant waters of the rivers of Khuzestan flowed uncontrolled and largely unused to the sea; periodic floods inundated vast areas, infecting more and more land with the poison of salinity. Khuzestan became a region of poverty, disease and despair.

Then, after centuries of obscurity, Khuzestan emerged early in this century as one of the world's richest oil fields and a principal supplier of petroleum to Europe. These mineral riches, however, did not restore the basic strength of this strategic region. For the rivers continued to flow unused to the sea and the land remained barren; despite the riches of oil, the condition of life of all but a small fraction of the people remained as it had for centuries—at a very low ebb.

The restoration of a green and flourishing Khuzestan region, employing present-day advances in the technology of water control and land improvement, has been a cherished goal of modern Persia. Three and a half years ago, upon the initiative of Iranian leadership, a program of action to achieve this transformation of Khuzestan was begun in an atmosphere of urgency and singleness of purpose. Today a start in this long-range effort is well under way; the physical changes have begun.

The basic development policy and process, including the decision to assign unusually broad responsibilities for its execution to an American private company, had its origin in the imagination, the sense of history and the judgment

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of Iranian leadership. A clear exposition of the concept is contained in an address by the Shah of Iran, delivered before the National Press Club in Washington on July 2, 1958:

> . . . The manipulation of water, providing it where there is none and controlling it where it is being wasted, is one of our primary concerns. The re-discovery of water may prove a more meaningful factor in the future growth of Iran's mainland than the voyaging of outer space. . . .
>
> Development of the fertile province of Khuzestan, the largest fertile valley in Iran, . . . irrigated by the Karun river and its tributaries which flow into the Persian Gulf, has been given priority. The project covers a series of dams and flood control works, and the program is based on the coördinated exploitation of all the resources of the region by principles of coöperation between public and private groups and agencies, on the lines of the Tennessee Valley. This symbolizes the threshold of a new era and a unique expansion of industrial development in the Middle East.

In February 1956, Mr. Gordon R. Clapp and I, as the principal officers of the Development and Resources Corporation,[1] were asked by the Imperial Government to appraise the potentialities of the Khuzestan region. After a study of the available data, we made an intensive first-hand inspection of the region, accompanied by a group of Iranian and U.N. technicians.

We presented our conclusions to Mr. A. H. Ebtehaj, then the Managing Director of Iran's Plan Organization, a public agency responsible for a nation-wide economic development program known as "The Seven Year Plan," and financed chiefly from oil revenues.[2] In general our observations confirmed the views held by Persian leaders regarding the feasibility of a restoration of Khuzestan and its development as a major economic asset of the whole country. It was—and is—our conviction that the region's natural resources of large rivers, extensive plains and valleys, climate favorable to plant growth, good rail and highway transport and ports, and enormous quantities of natural gas and petroleum provided an unusually favorable setting for a major economic development, with water control and utilization as the keystone of the arch.

Upon Plan Organization's request, Development and Resources Corporation contracted to assume responsibility to Iran for the preparation of a long-range program for the restoration of Khuzestan and the full development of the region's resources; we also assumed over-all responsibility for the execution of that program.

II

There are several characteristics of method, management and philosophy of this development program that seem to have principal relevance at a time when economic development has become a central issue of international relations.

[1] A private company founded in July 1955, in association with the New York investment banking house of Lazard Frères & Co., to provide managerial, technical and business services in the development of natural resources.

[2] Since that time the Prime Minister, Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, has become Managing Director, with Khosrow Hedayat as Deputy Prime Minister for Plan Organization.

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First is the breadth of the responsibility delegated by a sovereign nation to a private American company, a company having no official links nor financial dependence upon the United States Government, nor upon the United Nations. But neither the owners of the American company nor its contractors acquire any "concession" or proprietary or financial interest in the resources developed; compensation in all cases is limited to payment for the managerial or technical services rendered.

The scope of this responsibility is carefully defined, by agreement. On the side of Iran, Plan Organization must review and approve specific projects before Development and Resources may begin any project such as a water control dam or a sugar cane development. After that approval, however, it is up to us to get the job done, through our own employees or through contracting organizations selected by us. The American company acts only as agent of Iran, of course; but it draws contracts directly with construction concerns, manufacturers of equipment, service organizations, and is responsible for supervising their work. Similarly, the disbursements of funds in payment for services or equipment under such contracts are made by us out of funds supplied the Company each six months, in advance, by Plan Organization. Twice a year the proposed program-budget is reviewed by Plan Organization, and approved or modified. The accounts are audited by a firm of independent accountants whose report each six months is submitted to Plan Organization. Finally, each party may terminate the entire arrangement upon short notice.

The chief reason advanced for proposing and continuing this unusual arrangement was Iran's strong sense of urgency to get things done as promptly as possible. The speed of physical and managerial progress thus far attained can be attributed largely to the focusing of responsibility and the flexibility the arrangement provides.

A second major point about the undertaking is that as a matter of basic policy we have brought together an *international* group to help carry out the task for which we have over-all responsibility; the number of such major international companies or independent consulting groups under contract to us is now about 40. Thus, an Italian firm built a big transmission line, and another Italian company rebuilt the electric distribution facilities in the city of Ahwaz; an American firm built a tunnel-road down the face of a canyon to the site of the first dam; a Dutch firm with extensive experience in reclamation and land development has made the detailed field study of the first irrigation scheme and will design the physical facilities; a group of international technicians of the U.N.'s Food and Agricultural Organization are at work on soil-fertility studies and related field investigations; an American foundation is training village workers in the use of fertilizers; planning of housing was a task contracted to an American firm with world-wide experience. In the design of the first water-control dam, known as the Dez Project, we called upon a distinguished Italian expert in high-arch dams; a Milan concern produced the design itself under the supervision of an international panel of consulting engineers, and some of the model testing was carried on in a southern university of the United States; the initial electrical equipment for the Dez Dam is now being manufactured in West Germany, in Japan and in Canada; aerial mapping for Khuzestan was carried out by a British firm; under our general

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supervision, a sugar cane plantation project was put in the joint charge of a Los Angeles engineering firm and a Hawaiian cane sugar company; the sugar mill and refinery are being manufactured by a Dutch concern; petrochemical design and market development for plastics has been assigned to a leading Italian chemical company.

While this list is not exhaustive, it indicates to what extent the undertaking has been made truly international. Of course, Iranians themselves are engaged in every aspect of the enterprise, from technical and managerial posts to the operation of trucks, while the staff of Plan Organization and some of the Iranian ministries are hard at work on many essential aspects of this comprehensive activity.

A third characteristic is that the program is conceived and carried out on the basis of the inter-action of each part upon all the other parts, rather than as a miscellaneous collection of separate projects only vaguely related to each other. The reason for inviting Americans with a background in T.V.A. to undertake the development of the Khuzestan region was so that the concept of "unified development of a natural region," central to the T.V.A. idea, might be applied to Iran; in the preparation of a program and the management of our responsibilities in carrying it out, this concept of unity has been the guiding principle.

In this Khuzestan program, Iran has set out to achieve something she regards as fundamental for her future. Her primary concern has not been to seek to persuade Americans or any other foreigners, West or East, that this program serves their political, military or commercial interests. Yet the simple fact that this major development is going on in Iran makes it important to anyone interested in, or concerned with, international affairs. Iran today occupies a unique position: a country with close ties of religion and geography with the Arab states and yet herself not Arab; with cultural and economic and military links with the West, and yet an integral part of the Middle East; a nation with vast oil resources upon which Europe so largely depends; with ports on the warm waters of the Persian Gulf toward which Russia has been driving since the days of Peter the Great; a long common frontier with the Soviet Union and with Iraq and Afghanistan. These and other circumstances make Iran among the most important areas in the world today. Hence success or failure of her development program is necessarily a matter of the highest interest.

III

What are the elements composing this integrated development program? The key to the full utilization of the resources of the Khuzestan is, of course, the same as it was in centuries past: the utilization of the waters.

Modern technology makes possible a fundamental physical rearrangement of the water régime of Khuzestan. The first step in this fundamental change has begun—the beginning of the building of a dam on the Dez river, major tributary of the Karun. The Dez Dam is designed as the first of a series of 14 multi-purpose water-control structures, all inter-related, on the five major streams of the region. To complete the full series a generation or more may be required. But on the Dez the start has been made, and is well under way. Sev-

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

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eral thousand men—Iranian, American, Dutch and Italian—are presently at work at the Dez Dam site and in the areas to be irrigated with its impounded waters and energized with the electricity that falling water will be producing by late 1962.

The site of the Dez Dam is a very narrow canyon that rises almost vertically for more than 1,300 feet from the bed of the stream. A concrete dam, 620 feet in height, will eventually store about the same amount of water at maximum volume as the T.V.A. system's largest tributary reservoir, Norris Lake. In the Dez area, which embraces 159 villages and 130,000 people—experienced farmers for the most part—this amount of stored water will permit year-round farming on 375,000 acres of good land, with at least a fourfold increase in food and fibre production. The dam will also provide a substantial degree of control over floods on the lower Dez and Karun rivers, and improve navigation conditions on both the lower Karun and the Shatt-al-Arab river from the oil refinery center of Abadan to the sea.

By relatively short canals, part of the stored water of the Dez will be poured into another river, the nearby Karkheh, and thus bring relief to the Dasht-E-Mishan area which lies on the border between Iran and Iraq. There, water is now so desperately short that the land is a desert; in summer there is not even drinking water. Putting water into the Karkheh river so it can be used to meet the needs of the land and the people of Dasht-E-Mishan is considered by Iranian leaders as a matter of the highest human and policy importance.

The Dez Dam's water control will also make it possible to produce large amounts of electrical energy, which is in very short supply in this region. The cost of producing electricity will be low because of the exceptional character of this narrow canyon. The power, in stages, will be fed by transmission lines to the major towns of Khuzestan, and later to rural communities.

To meet a part of the immediate demand, a high-tension transmission line has been built, the first such in Iran. It runs from Abadan to Ahwaz, a distance of 72 miles, and is now supplying electricity from a previously unfinished steam-electric generator at the Abadan refinery. Concurrently, the electric distribution system of Ahwaz is being rebuilt to meet the rapidly expanding use of electricity, now that at long last it is available. These activities are being conducted by a Khuzestan Energy Authority, whose directors are all Iranian citizens, although for the time being operation and management are in the hands of the American Company until Iranians, now in training, are able to assume full responsibility.

The whole series of dams projected in the long-range program will together be capable of producing 6,000,000 kilowatts, four times as much as the St. Lawrence development, and irrigate 2,500,000 acres of the better land in the region. Khuzestan will be able to export power to other regions—indeed become the "power house" of a modernized Iran; its increases in agricultural production will have a major effect on the food supply of the whole country.

The construction road to the lip of the canyon, the construction village and the tunnel-road from the top of the canyon down the almost perpendicular canyon wall to the bed of the stream have been completed. The dam is scheduled to be finished in 1962 and, with initial transmission and power facilities for 130,000 kilowatts, is estimated to cost $58,600,000.

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The capital requirements of the Khuzestan undertaking are substantial, and this is only one part of the nation-wide Plan Organization program. Where will the money come from for an extensive development of so large a country, with so many urgent needs?

Compared with many of the less developed countries, Iran has considerable capital, especially from oil revenues. But there is a need for far, far greater funds than there are funds available. And so Iran, like the United States in its earlier development of basic facilities and capital equipment, has turned to external borrowing to meet part of the gap between current income and these large capital demands. One instance is a loan agreement made in May 1959 with the World Bank for a $72,000,000 road program; other loan applications by Iran, including one for port development and the Dez Project, are now under study by the Bank; some funds have been loaned Iran by the United States Development Loan Fund during 1959. There will continue to be a financial gap for a decade or more, until increased productivity resulting from public and private investment has closed the gap between urgent need and capital resources.

IV

For many centuries Khuzestan was known as "the land of the sugar cane;" now the cane is no more. There is a high symbolic as well as economic and agricultural importance in the restoration of what was once one of the glories of Persia, and in recent years Iranian experts have been testing many new strains of sugar cane. The restoration of this crop, which requires large amounts of water, is one of the objectives of the integrated plan. A large pilot operation (about 25,000 acres) has been initiated; cane plots and plantings have been made; a contract has been awarded for the erection of a sugar mill and a sugar refinery; the first harvest of the new cane and production of sugar are scheduled for 1961.

To get the maximum value from the great new supply of water from the rivers, fertilizers—now used hardly at all in Iran—will be needed in large quantities. To ascertain the right kinds of fertilizers, chemical and mineral, and the manner of use adapted to particular soil conditions is a responsibility of our company. Already, testing and demonstration has been conducted by farmers on 20,000 different plots under existing farming practices. The increased yields and quality thus far produced have exceeded even rather sanguine expectations of the experts. This is an aspect of Khuzestan's revival which any farmer or landlord can see for himself, and understand.

The responsible leadership of Iran recognizes clearly that these changes in the supply of water for a whole region will require the creation of new Iranian organizations—such as irrigation districts—with ample authority to see to it that the increased water supply will be paid for by those who benefit from it, that there are facilities for education of farmers in the new methods, that relations between landlords and their tenants are adjusted to take into account the new levels of productivity, etc. These are not easy goals, but they are feasible, particularly where the imagination of an entire country is quickened by a historic change, and attention can be focused on the importance of these organizational, economic and educational objectives. It is worth bearing

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in mind that it was on these very slopes and valleys of the Zagros mountains of Khuzestan—so anthropologists have good reason to believe—that man's earliest successful organizations for the purpose of producing food had their beginnings, many thousands of years ago.

Next to wasted water, the Khuzestan's chief unused natural resource is the natural gas that is burned in the course of bringing oil to the surface. This "flaring" of gas has been going on for 50 years. Natural gas is not only a fuel; it is far more valuable as the raw material for chemical products—such as fertilizers or plastics. The building of a substantial petrochemical industry based on wasted gas is a major Iranian objective. As a first step, we have recommended production of the plastic, Polyvynl chloride (P.V.C.), to supply the already existing private Iranian plastic fabricating plants, and a growing consumer market. The next step is now under way: to interest private Iranian and foreign capital and management in making use of the plant design and the work already done in market development. If this succeeds, it will open the door to what is expected to be a substantial petrochemical industry, in which the production of fertilizers from gas will be an important part.

In each project of the over-all plan for the Khuzestan region, training plays an important part. The American Company believes that the success or failure of its efforts will be measured to a large degree by how soon we can relinquish our responsibilities and turn them over completely to Iranians. Therefore, we regard the process of training and seasoning of Iranians in all aspects of the work as absolutely essential, even though it is often a difficult responsibility given the pressure of time.[3]

V

The issue of economic development of less developed countries, which today is so central to the foreign policy of most nations, is not entirely a matter of capital, as one might suppose from many public utterances on the subject. At least of equal importance are the managerial *methods* of getting results—whether governmental or private—whereby development can move along the path from rhetoric to reality.

There is, of course, no one method of economic development applicable everywhere. What method is the most effective for a particular area depends upon the physical resources, the traditions, the political convictions and the financial and managerial assets of each country. The particular methods being followed in the Khuzestan region of Iran are experimental in that, so far as I know, they have never before been used.

Whether or not these methods are adaptable to other situations, they do provide a specific example relevant to what I suggest is the central question of economic development in the less developed countries: How to *get things done* that the people of developing countries want and expect—and get them done in time.

[3] The contract between Development and Resources Corporation and the construction concern that will build the main portions of the Dez Dam contains the following provisions, which are typical of the Company's contracts: "Contractor will make intensive efforts to select and recruit Iranians for every kind of work in Iran under the Contract, at every stage of the performance of the work . . . . He shall further encourage his managerial and senior administrative staff to give on-the-job training to such Iranians, with a view to their promotion to higher grades of work and their assumption of superior responsibilities."

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REVISING THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

By Harold S. Quigley

THE circulation in 1950 of a report[1] prepared for the Supreme Commander in Japan, General MacArthur, made known that the original draft of the postwar Constitution of Japan had been written by members of Government Section of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in February 1946. The first volume of this authoritative report included a frank statement of facts already known to many. However, it left room for questions, some of which have now been answered by General MacArthur and by General Courtney Whitney, who was Chief of Government Section. The fresh data were elicited by a "Study Group" appointed by the Japanese Research Council set up in 1956 under authority of the Diet to examine into the origin, operation and possible revision of the Constitution.[2] Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, Chairman of the Research Council, headed the Study Group, which visited the United States in November and December of 1958. He summarized its findings in an address before the Harvard Club in Tokyo on March 9, 1959.[3]

Although the SCAP draft Constitution was approved by the Japanese Diet with largely minor changes acceptable to SCAP, it has been regarded widely in Japan as a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions. It has been criticized also as having been written hastily by men without adequate knowledge of Japanese civilization and with little regard either for the sensibilities of a mature citizenry or for the national right of self-determination. American scholars, the present writer among them, have made similar criticisms. Civilians employed in Government Section took part in writing the draft; although the extent of their influence has not yet been established, it undoubtedly was considerable.

The decision to prepare a constitution was made by General MacArthur, who interpreted directives from Washington very liberally. These directives required that the Japanese system of government be reformed along democratic lines, in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945. They did not require SCAP to write a new constitution. On the contrary, they specifically laid down, as did the Potsdam Proclamation, that the new government should be established "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Moreover, the victor powers had agreed at Moscow in December 1945 to set up a Far Eastern Commission to oversee the Occupational administration. Under this agreement "any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure . . ." were to be "issued only following consultation and the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission." Actually the Commission did not function until three months later. Before then, the draft Constitution, prepared in early

[1] Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section, "Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948," 2 v. Washington: G.P.O., 1949.

[2] The Research Council is composed of 30 members of the Diet and 20 non-member scholars.

[3] Published in *The Japan Times*, March 16, 1959.

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February, had been presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister by General Whitney. It was not issued as a directive, but General Whitney urgently advised acceptance.

During its visit to the United States the Study Group headed by Professor Takayanagi interviewed some 20 Americans who had served with SCAP or were known to be students of Japanese politics. In my talk with members of the Group, I was impressed by their calm approach to the subject, by the apparent absence of vindictiveness, and by their desire to make clear that the purpose of their mission was non-political fact-finding. They obviously hoped to remove obstacles to reasonable consideration of constitutional revision, not to intensify prejudices in Japan or embarrass Americans. They regretted that Generals MacArthur and Whitney refused to see them but felt that the letters received from them in response to questions were quite adequate. They expressed appreciation of their cordial reception by a number of other Americans who had served in the Government Section of SCAP or had specialized in the study of Japan's political development. They also benefited from hitherto unavailable documents furnished by the Department of State.

In his address of last March, Chairman Takayanagi dealt mainly with his group's findings on the following aspects of SCAP's reformism: (1) its attitude toward the so-called Emperor system, which embodies the doctrine of the oneness of the reigning dynasty with the state, termed *kokutai* by the Japanese; (2) the proper interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, the "no war" provision; (3) SCAP's intentions in writing a draft Constitution; (4) General Whitney's attitude toward Cabinet acceptance of the draft; and (5) SCAP's authority to prepare a draft.

On the first aspect Takayanagi quotes MacArthur's letter:

> The preservation of the Emperor system was my fixed purpose. It was inherent and integral to Japanese political and cultural survival. The vicious efforts to destroy the person of the Emperor and thereby abolish the system became one of the most dangerous menaces that threatened the successful rehabilitation of the nation.

General MacArthur credits Prime Minister Shidehara with suggesting that an article outlawing war be included in the new Constitution. But he did not say that otherwise he would not have insisted upon Article 9.[4] Dr. Takayanagi did not appear to be perturbed by inclusion of the article, in view of MacArthur's explanation that "it was aimed entirely at foreign aggression and was to give spiritual leadership to the world. . . . Nothing in Article 9 prevents any and all necessary steps for the safety of the nation." He surmises, however, that SCAP's failure to inform the Japanese Government that the article did not preclude armed forces for defensive purposes led Dr. Kanamori, deputed by the Cabinet to explain the draft Constitution to both Houses of the Diet, to misinterpret the article and thus to arouse opposition from conservative members and provide plausible ground for later Socialist intransigence toward evasion, amendment or repeal of the article.

[4] Article 9 reads: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

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On the point of SCAP's intent in preparing the original draft, the investigators learned that this "extraordinary step had been taken, without the knowledge of the American home government," because of the failure of a Japanese committee, headed by Dr. Joji Matsumoto, to produce an acceptable draft. However, says Dr. Takayanagi, "SCAP merely desired that the Japanese Government prepare a draft similar in fundamental principles and basic forms to the draft presented. It [the American draft] was to be a suggestion and advice within the powers of the Supreme Commander." In explanation of the haste with which it was written, Dr. Takayanagi quotes General MacArthur: "The choice was alien military government or autonomous civil government. The pressure for the former by many of the Allied nations was intense, accompanied by many drastic concepts designed to fracture the Japanese nation. My fixed determination and purpose was to avoid such violent discrimination and to reconstruct Japan's sovereignty along liberal lines as soon as possible." This statement satisfied the investigators that the American draft was advisory, not mandatory, that it did not contravene the Moscow agreement, and that General MacArthur "was still following the policy of his home government," which was faithful to the requirement of the Potsdam Proclamation that the new government of Japan be established "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Dr. Takayanagi avers: "The surmise that it was the intention of SCAP to impose an American type of constitution is wrong. It loses sight of the Allied pressure on SCAP."

Speaking for his colleagues as well as himself, Dr. Takayanagi accepts General Whitney's repudiation of the interpretation placed upon a statement which he made in presenting the SCAP draft to Mr. Yoshida, the Foreign Minister.[5] With Mr. Yoshida at this midnight meeting was Dr. Matsumoto, whose draft had been rejected as being unresponsive to the Potsdam principles. Dr. Matsumoto reported to a committee of the Liberal Party that General Whitney had expressed doubt that the person of the Emperor could be guaranteed if the SCAP draft were not accepted immediately; and he interpreted this statement as a threat to bring the Emperor before the War Crimes Tribunal. Dr. Takayanagi refutes this interpretation very definitely: "We found, however, after due scrutiny of evidence, that this was a total misunderstanding on the part of Dr. Matsumoto. General Whitney was merely explaining the severe international atmosphere then prevailing."

There would be small profit at this time in comparing earlier comments on the writing of the Constitution with the findings of the Japanese mission. American writers have not questioned SCAP's motives. They have been concerned, as were many eminent scholars in the Diet, with the propriety and possible consequences of exerting great influence upon the process of constitutional reform in another state. They have found evidence that this concern was felt also by the Far Eastern Commission. They have feared the effect of the procedure upon Japanese comprehension of democracy and upon the prospects for its development in Japan. They have noted, however, that the Japanese people seemed to comprehend the spirit of good will evinced by the

[5] General Whitney's account of the presentation is given in his book, "MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History." New York: Knopf, 1956.

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Occupation and were not unwilling to experiment with a system which few of them understood.

Post-Occupation cabinets have moved cautiously toward constitutional revision, partly in deference to the policy of coöperation with the United States, partly because of opposition from the strong Socialist Party, which has tended to view revisionism as a disguise for return of the old régime. The principal obstacle in the path of the revisionists has been the widespread sympathy with the determination of the Socialists to keep Article 9 in the Constitution. To strike it out, they maintain, would open the way to a new militarist oligarchy. Although Article 9 was in effect nullified before the Occupation ended, with the approval of SCAP, it has become the symbol of Socialist neutralism. The Liberal-Democratic—and conservative—Cabinet of Prime Minister Kishi favors repeal of the article; and this might well have been done but for the fact that the Socialists hold enough seats in the Diet to prevent his party from obtaining the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution.

The Kishi Cabinet, which is none too secure, is not attempting to hurry the process of revision. The law authorizing the Research Council affords it wide latitude in deciding its policies and procedure. The Council plans to take six years in all in preparing its report, which means that actual revision, if decided upon, will begin in 1962. The report will be in three parts. The first will give the history of the making of the Constitution; the second will be a sociological study of its operation; and the third will embody the Council's conclusions as to whether or not there is any need of revision. The program appears to meet with the approval of the Japanese people.

An editorial in *The Japan Times* of Tokyo, on November 29, 1958, set forth the general Japanese attitude toward the reformist phase of the Occupation:

> The military occupation of Japan was a political experiment unparalleled in history. As such there were many aspects of it which reflected the lack of foresight as well as understanding of the problems involved on the part of the generally well-meaning experimenters. Yet we fall behind no one in pointing out the enormous amount it achieved by way of democratic reforms, for which credit is due almost entirely to the United States.
>
> Therefore, the United States Government need feel no qualms about the Occupation. What is needed now is a dispassionate reassessment of the great experiment by both the former occupier and the formerly occupied. Coöperation on the part of the United States in this respect would have a salutary effect upon the psychological attitude of the Japanese people toward the United States, which has become palpable since the end of the Occupation. Toward this goal, reëxamination of the Constitution would be a step of foremost importance.

The Department of State and the Americans interviewed by the Japanese group demonstrated the hoped-for attitude of coöperation. Whether or not the Japanese will desire further evidence of this attitude, other than cordiality toward their independent decision regarding their system of government, remains to be seen. Undoubtedly American and other Western political scientists would welcome an opportunity to serve in an advisory capacity if invited to do so by the Japanese Government. But Japanese scholarship is well equipped for the task, defined by Dr. Takayanagi as being "to assure the

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growth of democracy by making it workable under a constitution understandable to the people," one that will "ward off any interpretation of it that could lead to dictatorship arising either on the right or on the left." Although accustomed to bureaucracy, the Japanese have proved their desire for democracy. Democracy, however, takes different forms, evolving as the genius of a people interprets it.

We cannot now forecast the outcome of the Research Council's labors but may note some indications of the probable direction constitutional revision will take. Premier Kishi's cabinet and the Socialists are in heated controversy over the treaty of mutual security signed with the United States in 1951. The Socialists demand that the treaty be abrogated and are believed to be willing to delete Article 9 of the Constitution if their demand is accepted. The Government desires to retain the treaty, though in a form revised to satisfy Japanese claims for equal status and other changes. Apparently the underlying motivation of the Socialists is threefold: their long-standing fear of conservative recidivism; their desire for diplomatic relations with Communist China, which, they contend, are held up in deference to the United States; and their neutralism in the cold war.

Other indications are that there will be changes in the Constitution not related to the controversy over military organization. The division of opinion between the Liberal-Democrats and the Socialists which was revealed in the Diet discussion of the draft in 1946 continues. The Liberal-Democrats control not only the Diet but the prefectural governorships and the prefectural and local assemblies. The Socialists hold approximately a third of the seats in the Diet and the assemblies but their strength is increasing and, while the voters distrust the left-wing Socialists, the party's representation in office seems smaller than its present popular following. Both parties are rent by factionalism and the leftward trend among the Socialists threatens to split the party in two. Should the split occur it seems probable that conservatively-minded revision would be hastened, and that it would reflect the views of those who characterize the present instrument as alien in authorship and idiom, destructive of the traditional status of the dynasty, disruptive of the family system and restrictive of military power.[6] The Socialists support the Constitution but would add more specific protections of human rights and clarify provisions designed to assure democratic operation of the parliamentary system.[7] The Liberal-Democrats made no mention of revision in their 1959 platform, warned by losses in 1955 when they made revision a major issue; the Socialists included a plank against revision in 1959.

Recommendations for revision by groups of Japanese political scientists have not diverged from the spirit of the Constitution, as Professor Ukai points out, but have aimed at clarifying and strengthening it. Quite naturally they agree that the status of the Emperor should be raised but without departure from the parliamentary system.[8]

[6] Conservative arguments are presented by Y. Nakasone, "Reasons for Constitutional Revision," *Contemporary Japan*, nos. 7–9, 1956, p. 401–413.

[7] This position is argued by K. Inomata, "In Defence of the Constitution," *Ibid.*, nos. 4–6, 1956, p. 200–215.

[8] Nobushige Ukai, "Constitutional Trends and Developments," *The Annals*, November 1956, p. 1–9.

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Japan's phenomenal economic progress within the past decade would seem to assure a comparatively smooth political future. Yet there are those who match the prophets of a shift to the left with one to the right. One may not, therefore, ignore the proposals of a committee of the old Liberal Party, the *Jiyuto,* made in 1954. They would come close to restoring the Meiji Constitution. They would remove the constitutional safeguard of human rights, put back the power to issue ordinances on a par with the legislative power, authorize the Cabinet not only to dissolve the House of Representatives but to suspend the Diet, and revive the myth of imperial rule. War would be renounced in the preamble, but a military organization would be part of the governmental structure. While these proposals recall the thinking of dominant prewar oligarchs, they ignore both the growth of liberalism that had taken place before the war—exhibited in official circles by such courageous leaders as Ozaki, Takahashi, Shidehara and others—and the present intellectual and moderate-labor spokesmen who compose a capable, vigorous and fearless alliance against the return of "behind-the-curtain" government. I believe the present Emperor and Crown Prince find this alliance worthy of moral support. Nor do they mirror progressive business attitudes, which oppose the trend toward reversion to centralized bureaucracy that has been embodied in post-Occupation legislation in such fields as education, local government, labor regulation and police administration. When I add to these protagonists of liberalism the mass sentiment for a system that has brought peace and a freer way of life, whether imported or not, I am encouraged to expect that while there will be changes in form and phraseology the Constitution to come will embody the substance of a democratic system.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND EMPIRES. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Scribner, 1959, 306 p. $5.00.

In this relatively brief but ambitious and wide-ranging study Dr. Niebuhr seeks, through an inquiry into certain perennial patterns and problems of political communities, to enlarge our understanding of the challenges we are encountering in Communism and the nuclear stalemate. As always the author is acutely aware of the "limits of human striving" and the fact that "historically creative positions are taken not from some absolute perspective but under the promptings of very tangential historical causes."

PROTRACTED CONFLICT. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ AND OTHERS. New York: Harper (for the Foreign Policy Research Institute), 1959, 203 p. $3.95.

This first volume in a continuing study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania is chiefly an analysis of the principles and application of Communist global strategy over a protracted span of time: the use of indirect methods, the employment of deception and distraction, the maintenance of the initiative, and the tactics of attrition and neutralization.

THE PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE. By NORMAN THOMAS. New York: Norton, 1959, 189 p. $2.95.

Mr. Thomas, still patiently and reasonably trying to help the world survive, develops three broad lines of policy: general disarmament, military disengagement in the danger zones and strengthening the powers of the United Nations.

THE THIRD WORLD WAR. By HARRY WELTON. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959, 330 p. $6.00.

A somewhat disorderly discussion of the Soviet economic threat as the leading weapon in the continuing conflict.

THE FAILURE OF ATOMIC STRATEGY. By F. O. MIKSCHE. New York: Praeger, 1959, 224 p. $4.50.

A vigorous critique of Western military strategy, especially its emphasis on atomic deterrence, its excessive reliance on technology to solve all problems, and its failure to be prepared for flanking movements in the Middle East and Asia.

COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WARFARE. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, 92 p. $2.50.

In this lively tract for the times Lord Russell continues his assault on "brinkmanship" and the nuclear arms race, which he proposes to avoid through some basic changes in outlook, conciliation and appropriate negotiations.

FALL OUT. EDITED BY A. PIRIE. London: MacGibbon, 1958, 176 p. 12/6. (New York: De Graff, distributor, 1959, $3.00.)

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A popular exposition by nine British scientists of the radiation hazards from nuclear explosions. Foreword by Bertrand Russell.

THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE AND THE COLD WAR. By Edgar McInnis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 163 p. $4.50.

An examination, by the president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, of the state of Anglo-American-Canadian relations under the pressures and difficulties of the current international situation.

ALLIANCE POLICY IN THE COLD WAR. Edited by Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, 314 p. $6.00.

Ten authors contribute to a symposium on various features and problems of an alliance policy in recent years.

DIPLOMACY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Lester B. Pearson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 114 p. $2.75.

In these William L. Clayton Lectures, delivered at Tufts in 1958, the former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs discusses the problems of the diplomat and diplomacy under the changed and trying circumstances of our time.

THE TRENDS IN MODERN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE. By Roberto Regala. Milan: Giuffrè, 1959, 209 p.

Lectures on diplomacy and diplomatic practice, delivered in Madrid by the Philippine Ambassador to Italy.

METHODOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Trygve Mathisen. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 265 p. $3.75.

A study, by a Norwegian scholar, of the tools, techniques and methodological problems involved in the study of international relations.

THE GREAT WAR. By Cyril Falls. New York: Putnam, 1959, 447 p. $5.95.

In this very substantial military history of the First World War the author, a well-known British military historian, undertakes, among other things, to refute the myth that the generals were a bunch of incompetents and that military strategy failed to progress under the conditions of this particular conflict.

PEACE MOVES AND U-BOAT WARFARE. By Karl E. Birnbaum. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1958, 388 p. Kr. 35.

A careful and scholarly study of German policy toward the United States during the critical months between April 1916 and the decision for unrestricted U-boat warfare on January 9, 1917.

THE MOVEMENT OF WORLD REVOLUTION. By Christopher Dawson. New York: Sheed, 1959, 179 p. $3.00.

A collection of essays by a leading Catholic historian on the origins and revolutionary expansion of modern Western culture and its impact on Asia.

MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS. By Kenneth N. Waltz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 263 p. $5.50.

In this thoughtful inquiry into the views of classical political theory on the nature and causes of war, Professor Waltz follows three principal themes or images: war as a consequence of the nature and behavior of man, as an outcome of the internal organization of states and as a product of international anarchy.

POLITICAL POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM. By Sidney Hook. New York: Criterion Books, 1959, 462 p. $7.50.

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In these numerous pieces, written for the most part in the last ten years, Professor Hook, a vigorous and incisive essayist, deals with a series of related themes: the nature of democracy, the nature of Communism, the problem of security and the prospects for socialism and freedom.

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. By C. Northcote Parkinson. Boston: Houghton, 1958, 327 p. $5.00.

The expositor of "Parkinson's Law" here explores the forms of political evolution—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and dictatorship—taking on the way a number of slaps at the "drivel" of much political theory.

THE STUDY OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR. By D. E. Butler. London: Hutchinson, 1958, 128 p. 18/.

The author of some valuable studies of the British electoral system here surveys and comments on the various approaches to political analysis by students of the subject: the deductive, the descriptive, the quantitative, the sociological-psychological and the practical.

THE IMAGE OF MAN. Edited by M. A. Fitzsimons and Others. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, 451 p. $6.00.

An excellent selection of essays from *The Review of Politics,* a quarterly published by the University of Notre Dame.

PROBLÈMES ACTUELS DU MARXISME. By Henri Lefebvre. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1958, 126 p. Fr. 300.

An interesting essay on some contemporary problems and crises of Marxism, by a French Communist philosopher.

THE PRESS IN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES. Zurich: International Press Institute, 1959, 201 p. (New York: Praeger, distributor, $3.50.)

A survey of the position of the press in the Communist countries and also Spain, Portugal, Latin America, Egypt and the Far East.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PEACE. By Kurt von Schuschnigg. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1959, 512 p. $9.50.

The former Austrian Chancellor, now professor of government at St. Louis University, has prepared a general text on international law and international organization.

THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA. By F. V. Garcia Amador. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959, 212 p. Florins 26.75.

A discussion of an increasingly important question in contemporary international law. The author, a well-known Cuban jurist, is a member of the United Nations International Law Commission.

THE UNITED NATIONS AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION. By H. G. Nicholas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 222 p. $3.40.

In this study the author—Nuffield Reader in the Comparative Study of Institutions at Oxford—describes the United Nations "as an established political institution which has a right to be examined in terms of its processes as well as its products and which must be understood through its politics as well as its constitution."

THE NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Robert M. MacIver.

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New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1959, 186 p. $3.00.

In this volume Professor MacIver summarizes and appraises the findings of the series of volumes, prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the experiences and opinions of individual countries regarding the United Nations.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER. By Moses Moskowitz. New York: Oceana Publications, 1958, 239 p. $3.95.

The author, since 1947 the representative of the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations at the United Nations, discusses the successes and failures in the effort to protect human rights through the U.N.

RED CROSS INTERNATIONAL AND THE STRATEGY OF PEACE. By James Avery Joyce. New York: Oceana Publications, 1959, 270 p. $6.50.

This book, in celebration of the centenary of the founding of the Red Cross, reviews its history and discusses its possible future role in the prevention of war.

BEFORE I FORGET. By Isaac F. Marcosson. New York: Dodd, 1959, 587 p. $6.00.

The author, for many years chief foreign correspondent of *The Saturday Evening Post*, was also a very active interviewer. The present volume of reminiscences includes material on Lloyd George, Churchill, Smuts, Kerensky, Trotsky, Hindenburg and Sun Yat-sen.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE ECONOMY, LIBERTY AND THE STATE. By Calvin B. Hoover. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959, 445 p. $5.00.

In these observations and reflections on the various economic systems of the world and their capacity to survive and to promote freedom, Professor Hoover considers both the Soviet and Nazi totalitarian systems, the American system and the mixed economic systems of Western Europe.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE. Washington: National Planning Association, 1959, 3 v.

The National Planning Association is preparing a series of studies on the Economics of Competitive Coexistence. The first three volumes in the series are: "Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East-Central Europe," by Jan Wszelaki (132 p. $3.00); "Japan, China, and the West," by H. Michael Sapir (79 p. $2.00); and "East and West in India's Development," by Wilfred Malenbaum (67 p. $1.75).

FORTY YEARS OF FOREIGN TRADE. By P. Lamartine Yates. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 255 p. $9.00.

An extensive statistical handbook on world trade in the years 1913–1953. The approach is "to present for selected years the commodity composition of world trade in value terms and to measure various kinds of changes that have occurred."

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE. By V. A. Seyid Muhammad. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1958, 348 p. $9.50.

This legal study centers chiefly on the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

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NATIONAL WAGES POLICY IN WAR AND PEACE. By B. C. Roberts. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, 180 p. 15/. (New York: Macmillan, $3.50.)

The author, Reader in Industrial Relations at the London School of Economics, reviews the experience of national wage policies gained under the varying conditions of war and peace and concludes that a centrally administered national wages policy is not effective as a means of preventing inflation. Examples are drawn from experience in Britain, the United States, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands and Germany.

LABOR AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Walter Galenson. New York: Wiley, 1959, 304 p. $6.75.

This volume of essays by six social scientists deals with the evolution of the labor movement in countries at various stages of industrialization: India, Japan, Egypt, French West Africa and the British West Indies.

INTERNATIONALE ZAHLUNGSABKOMMEN. By Eugen Langen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1958, 176 p. DM. 18.60.

A legal study of international payments agreements and the questions arising in international, administrative and civil law.

ZUR KRITIK DER KLASSISCHEN TRADITION IN DER AUSSENHANDELSTHEORIE. By Horst Bockelmann. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1958, 110 p. DM. 12.50.

A critique of classical theories of foreign trade, especially with respect to comparative costs, and international prices.

SAGGIO SULLO SVILUPPO ECONOMICO DEI PAESI ARRETRATI. By Vittorio Marrama. Turin: Einaudi, 1958, 396 p. L. 3500.

A systematic analysis of theoretical and practical problems in promoting economic development.

The Second World War

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. By Blanche D. Coll and Others. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1959, 622 p. $4.00.

This is the first of four volumes on the Corps of Engineers in the official history of the U. S. Army in World War II.

THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. VOLUME II. By W. N. Medlicott. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1959, 727 p. 50/. (New York: British Information Services, $9.29.)

This second volume on the Economic Blockade (Volume I appeared in 1952) in the United Kingdom Civil Series of the official British History of the Second World War covers the period from the summer of 1941 to that of 1945. The story is largely that of Anglo-American planning and coöperation in throttling the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan.

SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA—FIRST YEAR: KOKODA TO WAU. By Dudley McCarthy. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959, 656 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 30/.)

This volume in the official Australian war history describes the operations in 1942–1943 in the Owen Stanley Mountains and around Buna, Gona and Sanananda.

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KŌGUN: THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC WAR. By Saburo Hayashi in Collaboration with Alvin D. Coox. Quantico (Va.): Marine Corps Association, 1959, 249 p. $4.50.

An account, by a General Staff officer, of the plans and activities of the Japanese Army High Command in the Pacific War (the Japanese edition, "Taiheiyo Senso Rikusen Gaishi," was published in 1951). Includes a biographical digest of military leaders.

D DAY. By David Howarth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 251 p. $4.95.

The Normandy landing reconstructed through the experiences of a number of individual soldiers on both sides.

THE BATTLE OF FRANCE, 1940. By Colonel A. Goutard. New York: Ives Washburn, 1959, 280 p. $4.00.

A translation of the author's military account of the French defeat, "1940: La Guerre des occasions perdues" (noted here April 1957).

SEEKRIEG UND VÖLKERRECHT. By Reinhold Schenk. Cologne: Heymann, 1958, 140 p. DM. 6.50.

A study of German naval warfare and blockade measures in the Second World War and their status in international law.

The United States

DREAM AND REALITY: ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Louis J. Halle. New York: Harper, 1959, 327 p. $5.00.

In these reflections on the history and quality of American foreign policy Mr. Halle is chiefly concerned with certain themes where aspiration and reality have notably failed to correspond: the hope for isolation from the world's troubles, the dislike of "balance of power," the advocacy of the "open door."

THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION. By Joseph Dorfman. New York: Viking, 1959, 2 v. $12.50.

In these two volumes Professor Dorfman concludes his massive five-volume history of economic thought and doctrine in America. They begin with the reconversion and adjustment at the end of the First World War and proceed to the inauguration of the New Deal.

ISSUES AND CONFLICTS. Edited by George L. Anderson. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1959, 374 p. $5.00.

A symposium of 15 essays on various issues and controversies concerning the conduct of American diplomacy in the twentieth century.

SUMMIT DIPLOMACY: PERSONAL DIPLOMACY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. By Elmer Plischke. College Park (Md.): University of Maryland, Bureau of Governmental Research, 1958, 125 p. $2.50.

A brief exploratory study of personal presidential diplomacy since Washington.

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET. By Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 327 p. $5.50.

An able and comprehensive study of the organization and functioning of the Cabinet as it has developed under the administrations since Woodrow Wilson.

CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION. By James Burnham. Chicago: Regnery, 1959, 363 p. $6.50.

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In this extended essay the author of "The Managerial Revolution" and "The Machiavellians" offers his thoughts on the general principles of American government and warns against what he takes to be the declining role of Congress, especially in the matter of treaty-making and investigations.

THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN. Edited by Henry M. Christman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, 237 p. $4.50.

A selection of public addresses and Supreme Court decisions.

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By David R. Deener. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957, 416 p. (New York: Heinman, $10.00.)

A study of the legal opinions by the Attorney General of the United States on questions relative to international law. In general these opinions support the view of the "realist" school.

RICHARD NIXON. By Earl Mazo. New York: Harper, 1959, 309 p. $3.95.

Mr. Mazo, a correspondent for the Washington bureau of the New York *Herald Tribune*, has been remarkably successful in a quite difficult enterprise: painting a portrait of a contemporary, and very controversial, political figure without use of whitewash or tar. The personality of the Vice President as it emerges is complex but vigorous: "No one, whether in dismay or in admiration, can expect that Richard Nixon would be a weak executive."

SENATOR JOE McCARTHY. By Richard H. Rovere. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 280 p. $3.95.

An appraisal of the late Senator from Wisconsin. No admirer, Mr. Rovere does have a lively and abiding curiosity about the man. While the book adds little new information to what was generally written and known during McCarthy's stormy passage across the political scene, it does contribute to placing this extraordinary phenomenon in some historical perspective.

ANGRY VOICES: LEFT-OF-CENTER POLITICS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA. By Donald R. McCoy. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958, 224 p. $4.00.

A brief study of figures and movements to the left of Roosevelt in the 1930s: The League for Independent Political Action, the Farmer-Labor or American Commonwealth Political Federation, the Union party and the National Progressives of America.

Western Europe

COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE COMMON MARKET. By E. Strauss. New York: Rinehart, 1959, 168 p. $3.50.

A British economist, formerly Austrian, who works for a British trade board, Mr. Strauss criticizes the European common market as too *laissez faire* in its principles, too apt to open the way for German domination of the Continent, and too likely to split the European economy.

EXPANSION ÉCONOMIQUE RÉGIONALE ET COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE. By Paul Romus. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1958, 363 p. Florins 18.75.

The bulk of this book is given over to a most useful exposition and comparative analysis of national policies regarding depressed or underdeveloped areas followed in Great Britain and the six Common Market countries of Western Europe. On the

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basis of this survey and an account of the brief experience of the European Coal and Steel Community in these matters, the author, a Belgian economist on the staff of the new European Economic Community, sketches some possibilities for a European policy toward regional development.

PREISPOLITIK IM TEILINTEGRIERTEN MARKT. By Gottfried Erb and Peter Rogge. Basel: Kyklos; Tübingen: Mohr, 1958, 228 p. DM. 17.

Taking the experiences of the first few years of the European Coal and Steel Community as their basis, the authors of this careful and pioneering work examine systematically the central problems of pricing in a partially-integrated market, where some barriers are down, some supranational powers exist, but where national influences, private and public, continue to have a powerful role.

GUIDE TO THE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES OF WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M. Case. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959, 389 p. $7.50.

A welcome guide, by country, to the diplomatic archives of Western Europe. Information includes the history of the depositories, the arrangement and classification of the records, regulations and bibliography.

THE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE: UNITY 1942-1944. By Charles de Gaulle. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, 378 p. $6.00.

A translation of the second volume of General de Gaulle's memoirs (French edition noted here July 1957). The first volume appeared here under the title "The Call to Honour."

PARTIES AND POLITICS IN MODERN FRANCE. By Richard Barron. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959, 213 p. $4.50.

A study of the political parties and their activities in the Fourth Republic, with particular emphasis on the formative years immediately after the war.

FRANCE: A MODERN HISTORY. By Albert Guérard. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959, 563 p. $8.75.

A rich general history by the Professor Emeritus of General and Comparative Literature at Stanford. It is a volume in the University of Michigan History of the Modern World.

THE DECLINE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC. Edited by James Joll. New York: Praeger, 1959, 127 p. $3.50.

Essays by Max Beloff on the Sixth of February 1934, James Joll on the Popular Front, W. F. Knapp on the Rhineland Crisis of March 1936 and John Sherwood on Georges Mandel.

FRANCE DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1940–1944. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, 3 v. $20.00.

This translation of some 292 statements, assembled by René de Chambrun and Madame de Chambrun, Pierre Laval's daughter, and deposited in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, deals with the conduct of affairs under the government of Marshal Pétain and Laval. The publication of the French edition ("La Vie de la France sous l'Occupation, 1940–1944," Paris: Plon, 1957, 3 v. Fr. 6400) has led to a lively controversy over the politics of Vichy and the accuracy of the picture presented by these documents.

LA FRANCE SOUS L'OCCUPATION. By P. Arnoult and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959, 194 p. Fr. 800.

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An extensive critical analysis of the content and implications of "France During the German Occupation."

BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES SOCIALISTES. By Guy Mollet. Paris: Plon, 1958, 113 p. Fr. 390.

Observations on international, colonial and domestic issues by the leader of the French Socialists.

AN ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES AND FINLAND. By W. R. Mead. London: University of London Press, 1958, 302 p. 42/.

An excellent regional geography, with sections on resources, the "human variable," economic activities and Lapland.

SCHWEDISCHE NEUTRALITÄT HEUTE. By Heinz Krüger. Lűbeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1958, 86 p. DM. 3.40.

A brief presentation of the current Swedish views and position on neutrality and the avoidance of alliances.

THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GERMANY. By Eugene Davidson. New York: Knopf, 1959, 422 p. $5.75.

An extensive and serious account, by the former editor of the Yale University Press, of the revival of a defeated and prostrate Germany in the decade 1945 to 1955; centering chiefly in Western Germany and the American zone of occupation.

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. By Burton H. Klein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 272 p. $5.00.

An excellent and most revealing study. The author finds that the Nazi régime did not, in fact, prepare particularly effectively for war, and never really mobilized its resources for total warfare, even in the 1940s.

GERMANY AND THE EAST-WEST CRISIS. By William S. Schlamm. New York: McKay, 1959, 237 p. $3.95.

In the course of this brief book Mr. Schlamm manages to cover a wide range of contemporary topics. After an interesting report on Germany, which he visited in 1957–1958, he goes after scientists who are unduly fearful of radiation and fall-out, discusses the inexorable yet cautious nature of Communism, and concludes with some proposals for Western policy which bring Germany into the center of the picture again.

WARTIME ORIGINS OF THE EAST-WEST DILEMMA OVER GERMANY. By John L. Snell. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959, 268 p. $7.00.

A thoughtful and well-documented study of the German question as it emerged in the course of the Second World War and became a central, and continuing, issue in postwar diplomacy.

THE NUREMBERG TRIALS. By August von Knieriem. Chicago: Regnery, 1959, 561 p. $12.50.

A translation of an extensive critique (the German edition, "Nűrnberg," was noted here in April 1954).

DER NÜRNBERGER PROZESS. By Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1958, 609 p. DM. 12.80.

A review of the enormities of the Hitler régime as reflected in the Nuremberg trials.

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A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY, 1815–1945. By E. J. Passant. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959, 255 p. $3.75.

A concise review of German history since 1815, prepared originally for official use by the British Admiralty in the Second World War.

THE DEATH OF THE PRUSSIAN REPUBLIC. By Earl R. Beck. Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1959, 283 p. $6.00.

A monograph dealing with Prussia in the Weimar Republic, especially with the destruction of its democratic government in the years 1932–1934.

MATTHIAS ERZBERGER AND THE DILEMMA OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY. By Klaus Epstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 473 p. $10.00.

A very substantial political biography of a leading German figure of the first two decades of this century, a man who played a major role in the last years of the First World War and who was assassinated in 1921.

WER IST WER IN DER SBZ? Berlin-Zehlendorf: Verlag für Internationalen Kulturaustausch, 1958, 307 p. DM. 12.

A Who's Who for the Soviet zone of Germany.

THE ITALIAN FASCIST PARTY IN POWER. By Dante L. Germino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959, 181 p. $4.50.

A scholarly study of the Italian Fascist Party in operation in the years from 1925 to the outbreak of the Second World War. Contrary to some views, the author concludes that Italy was developing relentlessly toward a complete totalitarian system.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

NASCITA DEL COMINFORM. By Eugenio Reale. Milan: Mondadori, 1958, 174 p. L. 800.

Notes taken by Reale, then representative of the Italian Communist Party, of a number of the speeches at the secret opening meeting of the Cominform in September 1947. A very significant if fragmentary document.

THE MARCH WIND. By Desmond Donnelly. London: Collins, 1959, 256 p. 18/.

A personal account, by a British journalist and Member of Parliament, of his travels between 1952 and 1957 to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

THE SOVIET CITIZEN. By Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 533 p. $10.00.

This volume, one of Harvard's Russian Research Center Studies, presents and interprets the main body of statistical data from the extensive Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. The first three chapters deal at length, and interestingly, with the methodology of the project: how the data was collected from the refugees, the question of bias in the sample, the processing of the answers, etc. The rest of the book deals with the substantive findings: the round of daily living, the individual and the state, sources of cleavage within the society, and the possible future trends. An important work.

WAR AND THE SOVIET UNION. By H. S. Dinerstein. New York: Praeger, 1959, 268 p. $5.50.

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A lengthy discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet military and political strategy in the post-Stalin era. The author, a staff member of the RAND Corporation, maintains the thesis—which has been debated by other specialists—that their current strategy is that of "pre-emptive war"—a strategy arrived at in the course of sharp political debate.

DIE UMFORMUNG DER SOWJETGESELLSCHAFT. By Ruth Fischer. Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1958, 99 p. DM. 5.80.

The author, long a vigorous anti-Stalinist Marxist, here reviews and interprets the changes in Soviet society and policy in the years 1953 to 1958. In general she attributes considerable significance to these changes and to the prospects for further liberalization.

WIE STARK IST DIE SOWJETUNION? By Wilhelm Joost and Hellmut H. Führing. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1958, 255 p. DM. 12.80.

An appraisal of the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union.

DAS SYSTEM DER SOWJETWIRTSCHAFT. By R. Roland Oertel. Berlin: Duncker, 1957, 209 p. DM. 18.60.

A theoretical and formal study of the Soviet economy.

SOVIET EDUCATION TODAY. By Deana Levin. New York: De Graff, 1959, 170 p. $3.00.

A brief, descriptive and quite uncritical account.

THE SOVIET AIR AND ROCKET FORCES. Edited by Asher Lee. New York: Praeger, 1959, 311 p. $7.50.

A symposium of essays on the history and development of Soviet aviation, military and civilian, including chapters on training, production and air force politics.

THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA: MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE. By Stuart Ramsay Tompkins. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957, 282 p. $5.00.

A discussion of radical intellectual currents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: nihilism, populism, Narodnaya Volya, the Marxists and Social Revolutionaries.

LENIN AND WORLD REVOLUTION. By Stanley W. Page. New York: New York University Press, 1959, 252 p. $5.00.

A study of Lenin's writings and behavior in connection with the promotion of revolution, at home and abroad. It is the author's thesis that Lenin had a compulsive need to dominate, a need that underlay his cold revolutionary fanaticism.

DAS RUSSISCHE PERPETUUM MOBILE. By Dieter Friede. Würzburg: Marienburg Verlag, 1959, 244 p. DM. 12.80.

A German journalist's exposition of the theme of the essential continuity of Russia's expansionist, military and repressive impulses from Tsarist times to the present.

STALIN UND SEINE ERBEN. By Wilhelm Starlinger. Würzburg: Marienburg Verlag, 1957, 342 p. DM. 14.80.

RUSSLAND UND DIE ATLANTISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT. By Wilhelm Starlinger. Würzburg: Marienburg Verlag, 1957, 163 p. DM. 8.80.

The first volume of the late author's study, "Grenzen der Sowjetmacht," which appeared in 1954, apparently aroused considerable discussion in Germany. A planned

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second volume is appearing in several titles, including the two above. In these the author develops his view of Russian strengths and weaknesses and of the policies that should be followed by the Western powers.

KATORGA. By Bernhard Roeder. London: Heinemann, 1958, 271 p. 21/.

Experiences in a Soviet concentration camp, by a German who was interned between 1950 and 1956. (German edition, "Der Katorgan," Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1956, 249 p. DM. 12.80.)

WAS DIE HUNDE HEULEN. By Aurel von Jüchen. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 285 p. DM. 13.80.

Observations and reflections on the Soviet system and the Soviet people, by a German pastor who spent five years in a forced labor camp.

BITTER HARVEST. Edited by Edmund Stillman. New York: Praeger, 1959, 313 p. $5.00.

An extensive selection of dissident and "revisionist" writings—stories, essays, poems—from the Communist world since Stalin's death. Includes pieces from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Jugoslavia, China and Viet Nam.

LEGAL SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Alois Bohmer and Others. New York: Praeger (for Free Europe Committee), 1959, 180 p. $6.00.

LEGAL SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BULGARIA. By Ivan Sipkov. New York: Praeger (for Free Europe Committee), 1957, 199 p. $5.00.

Two further volumes in the series on legal sources and bibliography of Eastern Europe.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN LITHUANIA. By Alfred Erich Senn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 272 p. $6.00.

This scholarly monograph, one of the Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, deals with the creation of Lithuania as a national state in the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire.

DIE BEVÖLKERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN OSTGEBIETE UNTER POLNISCHER VERWALTUNG. By Hans Joachim von Koerber. Berlin: Duncker, 1958, 233 p. DM. 19.60.

A study of postwar settlement and demographic policy, and its consequences, in the areas of eastern Germany taken over by Poland.

RICORDA COSA TI HA FATTO AMALEK. By Alberto Nirenstajn. Turin: Einaudi, 1958, 439 p. L. 2500.

A reconstruction, through diaries and other documents, of the tribulations and horrors of the Warsaw ghetto and other Jewish centers in Poland during the Nazi occupation.

ANATOMY OF A MORAL: THE POLITICAL ESSAYS OF MILOVAN DJILAS. New York: Praeger, 1959, 181 p. $2.95.

Translations of a series of 18 articles which first appeared in the Belgrade paper *Borba* toward the end of 1953—articles that led eventually to Djilas' break with the Tito régime.

SARAJEVO. By Joachim Remak. New York: Criterion Books, 1959, 301 p. $5.00.

A lively and readable reconstruction of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in

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June 1914. The controversial and long-disputed details of this catastrophic event still remain murky and unresolved.

THE SECOND SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE. Edited by Vaclav L. Benes and Others. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1959, 272 p. $3.50.

A useful collection of documents—Russian, Jugoslav and from the Communist orbit countries—relating to the controversy that boiled up in the spring and early summer of 1958.

DAS SYSTEM DER EINKOMMENSVERTEILUNG IN DER SOZIALISTISCHEN MARKTWIRTSCHAFT JUGOSLAWIENS. By Igor Weitzmann. Berlin: Duncker, 1958, 147 p. DM. 14.

A monograph on income distribution in Communist Jugoslavia.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR L'AFFAIRE NAGY. Paris: Plon, 1958, 256 p. Fr. 1500.

An extensive collection of documents and testimony in refutation of the charges made against Imre Nagy at his trial in Budapest, June 1958.

CHILD OF COMMUNISM. By Ede Pfeiffer. New York: Crowell, 1959, 213 p. $3.50.

The experiences of a Hungarian schoolboy—who was nine years old in 1945—during the decade that led to the explosion of 1956.

THE DIVIDED LAND. By Geoffrey Chandler. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 214 p. $4.75.

An able chronicle, by a former British army officer, of the civil strife in Greece in the years following the Nazi withdrawal in 1944.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

POLICY AGAINST INFLATION. By Roy Harrod. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 257 p. $4.75.

In this book, addressed primarily to laymen, Sir Roy Harrod presents his views on the fundamental principles that should guide British economic policy now and in the future.

THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND CIVIL AVIATION. By Sir Gilmour Jenkins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 231 p. $3.40.

This is a volume in the New Whitehall Series, the purpose of which is to provide "authoritative descriptions of the present work of the major Departments of Central Government." The author has served as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport (now the combined Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation) since 1947.

FULL CYCLE. By Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers. London: Hodder, 1959, 288 p. 30/.

A biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, whose career included the evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940 and the planning for the major amphibious operations in the latter years of the war.

SCOTLAND PAST AND PRESENT. By J. M. Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 200 p. $1.20.

A convenient and concise survey.

PROSPER THE COMMONWEALTH. By Sir Robert Randolph Garran. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958, 444 p. 50/.

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An informal personal and political autobiography by a leading Australian public figure, who died in 1957.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: 1953–1955. By Donald C. Masters. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 223 p. $3.95.

This is the eighth volume in a series reviewing Canada's role and policy in international affairs.

The Middle East

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Praeger, 1959, 366 p. $6.00.

This important book by an exceptionally perceptive student of both Soviet and Middle Eastern Affairs is divided into two parts: "The Soviet Image of the Middle East," which analyzes the background of Soviet attitudes and policies toward the area; and "The Great Breakthrough"—the impressive expansion of Soviet and Communist influence in the years since 1954.

LE PROCHE ORIENT À L'HEURE OCCIDENTALE. By Guy Morissée. Paris: Plon, 1957, 308 p. Fr. 795.

Largely personal observations—the author was born in Alexandria—on the mingling of Western and Islamic influences in the Near East during the present century.

NASSER OF EGYPT: THE SEARCH FOR DIGNITY. By Wilton Wynn. Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959, 213 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $3.95.)

A generally sympathetic study of Nasser and his career by an American correspondent with considerable experience in Egypt.

ARAB UNITY: HOPE AND FULFILLMENT. By Fayez A. Sayegh. New York: Devin-Adair, 1958, 272 p. $4.00.

The author, Counsellor of the Arab States Delegations Office in New York, discusses, as a partisan but with considerable restraint, the Arabs' movement for independence and unity. Somewhat inclined toward generalizations and abstractions which do not quite get to the root of some political issues in the Arab world.

TURKEY AND THE WORLD. By Altemur Kilic. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959, 224 p. $4.50.

An exposition, and a defense, of Turkey's foreign relations since the First World War. The author is Press Attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Washington.

THE CARAVAN MOVES ON. By Irfan Orga. London: Secker and Warburg, 1958, 227 p. 21/.

An account, by the author of "Portrait of a Turkish Family," of travels in southwestern Anatolia in 1955 and 1956, including a visit to the Yűrűk nomads in the Taurus mountains.

TURMOIL IN BEIRUT. By Desmond Stewart. London: Wingate, 1958, 119 p. 13/6.

A brief, well-informed but very partisan account of the 1958 crisis in Lebanon.

IT HAS COME TO PASS. By James T. Farrell. New York: Theodor Herzl Press, 1958, 288 p. $4.50.

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A leading American novelist here gives his impressions of the State of Israel as seen on a recent visit.

ADEN. By Sir Tom Hickinbotham. London: Constable, 1958, 242 p. 21/.

These memoirs of Aden and the Protectorate by the former Governor of the Crown Colony also serve as a pleasant if old-fashioned introduction to the area.

WHO'S WHO IN U.A.R. AND THE NEAR EAST. Edited by J. E. Blattner. New York: Heinman, 1959, 644 p. $17.50.

This 24th edition of the Who's Who covers the U.A.R., Sudan, Iran, Libya, Cyprus, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Ethiopia and Aden.

South and Southeast Asia

MAHATMA GANDHI: A BIOGRAPHY. By B. R. Nanda. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959, 542 p. $6.50.

A comprehensive and rewarding biography, particularly in its development of Gandhi's philosophical, political and moral views.

NEHRU: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Michael Brecher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 682 p. $8.50.

This very substantial and scholarly biography by a political scientist at McGill University, is probably the best single work presently available on the political career of Nehru.

A BUNCH OF OLD LETTERS. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958, 511 p. Rs. 12.50.

An engaging "mixed collection" of letters to and from Jawaharlal Nehru, chiefly in the three decades preceding Indian independence.

WELTPROBLEME AM HIMALAYA. By Walter Leifer. Würzburg: Marienburg Verlag, 1959, 197 p. DM. 14.80.

A discussion of the growing importance of the lands lying along the vast Himalayan range: Tibet, Assam, Burma, India, Pakistan, Turkestan, Kashmir and Nepal.

THE DRAGON'S SEED. By Robert S. Elegant. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 319 p. $4.95.

An informative account, by the chief of *Newsweek's* Hong Kong bureau, of the 13,000,000 overseas Chinese in southeast Asia, especially in Singapore, Malaya, Indonesia and Thailand. The author is particularly concerned with the susceptibility of these relatively wealthy and influential groups to propaganda and manipulation from Peking.

VIET-NAM: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. Edited by Richard W. Lindholm. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959, 365 p. $6.50.

A very substantial international symposium by specialists discussing events in free Viet Nam since 1954: the creation of the new state, the refugee and minorities problems, education, industrial, agricultural and financial development.

THE INDONESIAN TOWN: STUDIES IN URBAN SOCIOLOGY. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958, 379 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959, $6.00.)

Translations of four studies originally appearing in Dutch between 1925 and 1940: town development in the Indies, the living conditions of coolies in Batavia, differential mortality in Bandung, and the district of Kuta Gede near Jogjakarta.

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THE DYNAMICS OF THE WESTERN NEW GUINEA (IRIAN BARAT) PROBLEM. By Robert C. Bone, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 1958, 170 p. $1.50.

A useful "interim report" on the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over Western New Guinea (Irian Barat).

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

RED CARPET TO CHINA. By Michael Croft. London: Longmans, 1958, 278 p. 21/.

An English writer's account of a six-week visit to Communist China in 1956, of particular interest because of his presence there during the Hungarian and Suez crises.

DRAGON AND SICKLE. By Guy Wint. New York: Praeger, 1959, 107 p. $2.50.

A concise review (perhaps Hammer and Tong would have been a preferable title) of the growth and victory of Communism in China and of relations with Russia.

POPULATION AND PROGRESS IN THE FAR EAST. By Warren S. Thompson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, 443 p. $7.50.

A substantial rewriting and expansion of the author's earlier work, "Population and Peace in the Pacific" (1946). The author was formerly director of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems.

IN EVERY WAR BUT ONE. By Eugene Kinkead. New York: Norton, 1959, 219 p. $3.95.

This study, an expansion of the author's much discussed and hotly debated article in *The New Yorker*, deals with the behavior of American prisoners of war in Korea: the problem of collaboration with the enemy, high mortality rates and uncertain morale.

PARADISE IN TRUST: A REPORT ON AMERICANS IN MICRONESIA, 1946–1958. By Robert Trumbull. New York: Sloane, 1959, 222 p. $3.50.

A *New York Times* correspondent's informal report on American administration in the Marshalls, Carolines and northern Mariana Islands.

Africa

BRITISH POLICY IN CHANGING AFRICA. By Sir Andrew Cohen. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1959, 116 p. $4.50.

The author, who was head of the Africa Division of the Colonial Office and is now British representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council, discusses the development, interplay and creations of the "two main dynamic forces" in British Africa: African nationalist movements and British officials.

SERVIZIO PROIBITO. By Raffaello Uboldi. Turin: Einaudi, 1958, 123 p. L. 600.

An Italian correspondent for the journal *Avanti!* reports on the conflict in Algeria.

THE YEAR BOOK AND GUIDE TO EAST AFRICA. Edited by A. Gordon-Brown. London: Hale, 1959, 342 p. 8/6. (New York: H. W. Wilson, $3.00.)
THE YEAR BOOK AND GUIDE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by A. Gordon-Brown. London: Hale, 1959, 712 p. 10/6. (New York: H. W. Wilson, $3.00.)

Compact and useful reference works.

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HIS OWN OPPRESSOR. By B. G. Paver. London: Davies, 1958, 235 p. 25/.
A discussion of the ways to achieve a democratic order in a multi-racial society, by a Rhodesian newspaperman.

AFRICA IN TRANSITION. Edited by Prudence Smith. London: Reinhardt, 1958, 179 p. 15/.
A collection of some 19 B.B.C. talks on conditions in the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias.

HOPE FOR SOUTH AFRICA. By Alan Paton. New York: Praeger, 1959, 94 p. $2.50.
A brief exposition and manifesto resting its hopes for the future in the Liberal Party.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN TREASON TRIAL. By Lionel Forman and E. S. (Solly) Sachs. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1958, 216 p. $5.00.
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